UPDATED to add Santa Barbara and Cortes to list of departments where votes held for "monitoreo" favored the Alianza; and to note that the TSE has said it will count all votes, something we are seeing happen as we go through our list of tallies in monitoreo.
Today. reports from Honduras indicated that the Tribunal Supremo Electoral was holding about 300,000 uncounted votes in a state of "monitoreo". They offered no explanation why. What was expressed was that these votes would not be counted before a winner was named in the now extremely tight contest between Juan Orlando Hernández and Salvador Nasralla.
This alarmed international observers, who observed-- quite rightly-- that this many uncounted votes could well swing such a tight election. Both the OAS and the European Union publicly called on the TSE to count all the votes before designating a victor.
Remarkably, this call was echoed by COHEP, the Honduran council of private enterprise.
The EU in particular urged the TSE to take the time to count the votes, so that every vote was recognized, rather than hurry to end the election prematurely. UPDATE: as of 10 PM Tegucigalpa time, the TSE has said it will count all votes; and we are seeing the status change as we go through our list.
We decided to review the vote tallies that are being held for greater scrutiny-- or monitoreo-- ourselves, to see if the suspicion many have, that this includes a preponderance of pro-Alianza voting, was upheld.
It may take us a few hours. So far, though, in the Departments of Atlantida, Colon, Cortes, Santa Barbara, Valle and Yoro, the total of votes on these uncounted tallies for the Alianza is higher than the total for the National Party. (We are suspending this project at 1 AM Tegucigalpa time, as the TSE continues to update some of these. We will spot check other departments tomorrow...)
There may be reasons these tallies require extra scrutiny. There are check sum features built into the tallies, so errors in transcription or uncertainties about numerals can be resolved in many cases. In others, the question would be if, for example, over-writing on one line should result in ignoring the votes for other candidates.
So far, though, it is clear that this vote pool reserved from counting would contribute to shifting the margin back in the other direction.
Showing posts with label COHEP. Show all posts
Showing posts with label COHEP. Show all posts
Thursday, November 30, 2017
Monday, August 31, 2015
"Central American Spring"?
The Economist published an article that provocatively asks in the headline if the 12 weeks of torchlight marches in Honduras is "A Central American Spring".
The paper quickly repudiates that idea in the body of the article. The Arab Spring was rapid and violent. Rather than a violent uprising, the Economist quotes Central American Business Intelligence as expecting slow, gradual change in Central America.
Slow, gradual change is not what the people protesting want: they are asking for the current president to resign.
For 14 weeks in Honduras the indignados, those upset with corruption and impunity in Honduras, have taken to the streets in all the major cities, carrying bamboo torches (not unlike the patio torches one can buy here in the US), seeking a Honduran International Commission against Impunity (CICIH in Spanish) and the removal of Juan Orlando Hernandez.
While there are no official crowd estimates, the marches clearly mobilize tens of thousands of people in both Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula alone. Also remarkable is the range of cities and towns where marches are taking place. They are substantial and peaceful.
In an attempt to defuse the crowds, Hernandez has called for facilitators and mediators from the Organization of American States and the UN to oversee what he calls "dialogue". This is in lieu of asking for a CICIH, which would be appointed by the UN to independently investigate corruption and impunity in Honduras.
Hernandez alleges his government's efforts to reform the government are sufficient if people just give the institutions a chance to operate.
But the institutions he wants the Honduran people to trust aren't operating.
A snail's pace would be fast compared to the Public Prosecutor's office, for example.
A trail of checks document the movement of money from the Instituto Hondureño de Seguridad Social (IHSS) through at least three front companies in Honduras into the National Party bank accounts including those of the Hernandez Presidential Campaign. When journalists made this public in May, they used copies of the checks from the actual prosecutorial case file shared with them. Despite this financial trail, no one has been charged, and no one even questioned, about these checks, checks that implicate the leadership of the National Party in corruption.
There are actually indications that the Assistant Public Prosecutor, Rigoberto Cuellar, may himself be linked to an influence-pedaling scandal, but he is not as yet the target of any investigation.
This is the face of impunity in Honduras. It is why the indignados are marching. And they are marching for a specific remedy that exists in action in their neighbor to the north, Guatemala.
In Guatemala, people are also marching weekly. Here, there is already an International Commission against Corruption and Impunity (CICIG in Spanish), sponsored by the UN at Guatemala's request, and funded by voluntary contributions from a number of different countries.
This unit, as noted in the Economist article, has been instrumental in uncovering and prosecuting corruption in the Guatemalan governments past and present. The transparency of these investigations served to mobilize the populace of Guatemala tired of corruption.
The CICIG has in fact, sought to bring charges against the President and Vice President of Guatemala for corruption. Over 100,000 people gathered last week in central Guatemala City to call for the President to resign. Their demands have now been endorsed by the country's Roman Catholic bishops.
In Honduras, at least for now, President Hernandez is not only rejecting the idea of an independent CICIH, he's actively working to discredit the idea through the public pronouncements of his advisor Ebal Diaz, who has made up "facts" to discredit the CICIG. Officially the National Party Congressional delegation is against the proposal as well. Mauricio Oliva, President of Congress, called it "foreign intervention".
Almost every other political party in Honduras supports the call for the CICIH. LIBRE supports it; the AntitCorruption Party (PAC) does too.
The Liberal Party recently held a "unification" meeting to align its congressional delegation with the thinking of its directorate. The idea of a CICIH was a key source of difference. The Liberals in Congress recently voted against legislation that would have put the call for a CICIH to a public referendum, legislation sponsored by LIBRE. At the time they said they voted against it because they thought it would delay prosecution, particularly of former Zelaya government officials. The directorate of the Liberal Party was in favor of a referendum, making the defection of its Congressional delegation a major issue. In the unification meeting, the party members agreed to vote for a CICIH if it comes up again. But it is unclear that the Congressional leadership will allow another vote.
Last Wednesday, the indignados held a national strike, calling for businesses to shut down and main traffic arteries in the country to be blocked. Roads were blocked for a time until the police broke up the protests, and some businesses shut down, but not most.
Last Friday's march ended at the Consejo Hondureño de Empresa Privada (COHEP) building where marchers met with business leaders. Whether this will result in businessmen supporting the marchers' goals is an open question, but the fact that talks were entertained is significant. COHEP supports the government; any change in support here would likely destabilize it.
Slow change indeed.
The paper quickly repudiates that idea in the body of the article. The Arab Spring was rapid and violent. Rather than a violent uprising, the Economist quotes Central American Business Intelligence as expecting slow, gradual change in Central America.
Slow, gradual change is not what the people protesting want: they are asking for the current president to resign.
For 14 weeks in Honduras the indignados, those upset with corruption and impunity in Honduras, have taken to the streets in all the major cities, carrying bamboo torches (not unlike the patio torches one can buy here in the US), seeking a Honduran International Commission against Impunity (CICIH in Spanish) and the removal of Juan Orlando Hernandez.
While there are no official crowd estimates, the marches clearly mobilize tens of thousands of people in both Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula alone. Also remarkable is the range of cities and towns where marches are taking place. They are substantial and peaceful.
In an attempt to defuse the crowds, Hernandez has called for facilitators and mediators from the Organization of American States and the UN to oversee what he calls "dialogue". This is in lieu of asking for a CICIH, which would be appointed by the UN to independently investigate corruption and impunity in Honduras.
Hernandez alleges his government's efforts to reform the government are sufficient if people just give the institutions a chance to operate.
But the institutions he wants the Honduran people to trust aren't operating.
A snail's pace would be fast compared to the Public Prosecutor's office, for example.
A trail of checks document the movement of money from the Instituto Hondureño de Seguridad Social (IHSS) through at least three front companies in Honduras into the National Party bank accounts including those of the Hernandez Presidential Campaign. When journalists made this public in May, they used copies of the checks from the actual prosecutorial case file shared with them. Despite this financial trail, no one has been charged, and no one even questioned, about these checks, checks that implicate the leadership of the National Party in corruption.
There are actually indications that the Assistant Public Prosecutor, Rigoberto Cuellar, may himself be linked to an influence-pedaling scandal, but he is not as yet the target of any investigation.
This is the face of impunity in Honduras. It is why the indignados are marching. And they are marching for a specific remedy that exists in action in their neighbor to the north, Guatemala.
In Guatemala, people are also marching weekly. Here, there is already an International Commission against Corruption and Impunity (CICIG in Spanish), sponsored by the UN at Guatemala's request, and funded by voluntary contributions from a number of different countries.
This unit, as noted in the Economist article, has been instrumental in uncovering and prosecuting corruption in the Guatemalan governments past and present. The transparency of these investigations served to mobilize the populace of Guatemala tired of corruption.
The CICIG has in fact, sought to bring charges against the President and Vice President of Guatemala for corruption. Over 100,000 people gathered last week in central Guatemala City to call for the President to resign. Their demands have now been endorsed by the country's Roman Catholic bishops.
In Honduras, at least for now, President Hernandez is not only rejecting the idea of an independent CICIH, he's actively working to discredit the idea through the public pronouncements of his advisor Ebal Diaz, who has made up "facts" to discredit the CICIG. Officially the National Party Congressional delegation is against the proposal as well. Mauricio Oliva, President of Congress, called it "foreign intervention".
Almost every other political party in Honduras supports the call for the CICIH. LIBRE supports it; the AntitCorruption Party (PAC) does too.
The Liberal Party recently held a "unification" meeting to align its congressional delegation with the thinking of its directorate. The idea of a CICIH was a key source of difference. The Liberals in Congress recently voted against legislation that would have put the call for a CICIH to a public referendum, legislation sponsored by LIBRE. At the time they said they voted against it because they thought it would delay prosecution, particularly of former Zelaya government officials. The directorate of the Liberal Party was in favor of a referendum, making the defection of its Congressional delegation a major issue. In the unification meeting, the party members agreed to vote for a CICIH if it comes up again. But it is unclear that the Congressional leadership will allow another vote.
Last Wednesday, the indignados held a national strike, calling for businesses to shut down and main traffic arteries in the country to be blocked. Roads were blocked for a time until the police broke up the protests, and some businesses shut down, but not most.
Last Friday's march ended at the Consejo Hondureño de Empresa Privada (COHEP) building where marchers met with business leaders. Whether this will result in businessmen supporting the marchers' goals is an open question, but the fact that talks were entertained is significant. COHEP supports the government; any change in support here would likely destabilize it.
Slow change indeed.
Sunday, January 26, 2014
Political Promises in Honduras
They say you can tell when a lawyer is lying because his lips are moving.
Well, in Honduras, the same should be said of politicians.
Back on July 20, Congress passed a controversial law called the Ley de promoción del desarrollo y reconversion de deuda publica (Decreto 145-2013) by which Honduras seeks to monetize its income stream from its national resources. We wrote about it, and the controversy surrounding the sudden introduction and passage of the law back on July 29, and you should reread it for details about the law.
The law was then sent to Porfirio Lobo Sosa for action on July 23.
Now in theory, Honduran law says Lobo Sosa had 10 days to either sign or veto the law. He signs the law by writing an order that says "Por Tanto Ejecutese" or vetos it by writing "Vuelva al Congreso" with a letter explaining what he thinks is wrong with it. If he takes no action, it enters limbo. It becomes law, but it is not in effect or enforceable until its printed in La Gaceta.
Porfirio Lobo Sosa initially defended the law, saying :
But the law provoked a lot of opposition, both from business( the Associacion Nacional de Industriales de Honduras (ANDI) and the Asociacion Nacional de Minería Metálica, and even COHEP), unions (like Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria de Bebidas y Similares), and campesino groups.
On August 15, 2013, after Lobo Sosa had to have acted one way or another, he announced he would not sign the law, not because he didn't believe in it, but rather because it might hurt Juan Orlando Hernandez's chances of getting elected:
Now he was very clear to say he's not going to veto the law, but just put it in his desk. That meant the law was already law, just not in effect because it hadn't been published.
And the law wasn't a campaign issue.
Then the Presidential campaign concluded, with Juan Orlando Hernandez declared President. When it could no longer influence the results of the election, Porfirio Lobo Sosa signed the law on December 18, and ordered its publication in La Gaceta where it appeared in the December 20, 2013 issue, which came out this week (they're slow to publish).
It is now in effect, and the government of Juan Orlando Hernandez, who championed the law, will have 90 days to implement the administrative structure and regulations that will govern the issuance securities backed by natural resources income streams.
Honduras wants to sell the net present value of its wind, its rivers, and its mineral rights. Who will buy them?
Well, in Honduras, the same should be said of politicians.
Back on July 20, Congress passed a controversial law called the Ley de promoción del desarrollo y reconversion de deuda publica (Decreto 145-2013) by which Honduras seeks to monetize its income stream from its national resources. We wrote about it, and the controversy surrounding the sudden introduction and passage of the law back on July 29, and you should reread it for details about the law.
The law was then sent to Porfirio Lobo Sosa for action on July 23.
Now in theory, Honduran law says Lobo Sosa had 10 days to either sign or veto the law. He signs the law by writing an order that says "Por Tanto Ejecutese" or vetos it by writing "Vuelva al Congreso" with a letter explaining what he thinks is wrong with it. If he takes no action, it enters limbo. It becomes law, but it is not in effect or enforceable until its printed in La Gaceta.
Porfirio Lobo Sosa initially defended the law, saying :
To veto this law would be to go against the interests of the nation.
But the law provoked a lot of opposition, both from business( the Associacion Nacional de Industriales de Honduras (ANDI) and the Asociacion Nacional de Minería Metálica, and even COHEP), unions (like Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria de Bebidas y Similares), and campesino groups.
On August 15, 2013, after Lobo Sosa had to have acted one way or another, he announced he would not sign the law, not because he didn't believe in it, but rather because it might hurt Juan Orlando Hernandez's chances of getting elected:
I'm not going to convert this into a campaign issue. When the new president arrives he can decide to approve it or not; it will stay in the desk for him.
Now he was very clear to say he's not going to veto the law, but just put it in his desk. That meant the law was already law, just not in effect because it hadn't been published.
And the law wasn't a campaign issue.
Then the Presidential campaign concluded, with Juan Orlando Hernandez declared President. When it could no longer influence the results of the election, Porfirio Lobo Sosa signed the law on December 18, and ordered its publication in La Gaceta where it appeared in the December 20, 2013 issue, which came out this week (they're slow to publish).
It is now in effect, and the government of Juan Orlando Hernandez, who championed the law, will have 90 days to implement the administrative structure and regulations that will govern the issuance securities backed by natural resources income streams.
Honduras wants to sell the net present value of its wind, its rivers, and its mineral rights. Who will buy them?
Monday, December 23, 2013
New Taxes, Old Economic Problems
The lame duck Honduran Congress is now piling on taxes to try and make up for the last four years of spending as the Lobo Sosa administration prepares to give way to the presidency of Juan Orlando Hernández.
On Saturday, December 21, the Congress passed a new, extensive series of taxes and rule changes designed to bring up to 4000 million lempiras ($200 million) in new revenue to the government over the next year. The same measure imposes restrictions on the transfer of income between government branches that is expected to bring about a further 12000 million lempiras ($600 million) in savings.
Everyone will pay a new "special contribution" of 3% on all sales. This is on top of the already existing sales tax of 12%.
All customs tax exemptions (commonly used by religious institutions, businesses aimed at tourism, newspapers, and power generation companies) are cancelled. Telephone and cable television service will be subject to the 15% tax, but internet service will continue to be taxed at 12%.
Everyone except those given an exemption under legislation called the Regímenes Especiales de Importación y Turismo will pay a further 5% tax on taxable income greater than 1 million lempiras ($50,000).
Consumption taxes are in general regressive-- they disproportionately affect the poorest members of a population. In addition to the general impact that the Honduran poor will experience from the added special contribution tax, other aspects of the new law will sharply affect their use of energy.
Some consumers receive a subsidy on their electric service. Until now, that subsidy has been for those who consume less than 150 kw/month. From today forward, the subsidy will only be for those who consume 75 kw/month or less.
Gasoline will be taxed a further 5.3 lempiras/gallon ($0.25/gallon). The income is supposed to be earmarked for infrastructure and social welfare projects.
But the poor are not targeted by the new sweeping tax increases: property owners will see sharp increases in taxation as well.
The central government will retain 10% of the gains from the purchase or sale of property, bonds, rights, and titles as a capital gains tax. Dividends will be taxed at 10% as well.
Consumption and property transfer taxes make sense as policy because Honduras has a poor record of tax collection on basic income tax. But that doesn't mean income tax rates were left alone, either.
Foreign companies will pay a tax of 10% on gross income in Honduras. Honduran companies will pay 1.5% on their gross income over 3 million lempiras ($150,000) except if their business is selling cement, services given to the government, pharmaceuticals for human consumption, petroleum products, or supplies for baking, which will pay a tax of 0.75%.
The tax law also contemplates retaining more money for the central government at the expense of entities it owes fixed levels of funding.
The new law freezes the 2014 budget for the central government at 2013 levels. But it also changes how amounts specified in the constitution for other government entities, such as municipal governments and the National Autonomous University, are calculated. Some kinds of income that previously counted in calculating the amounts to transfer will be exempt from being counted now. This means that all dependencies specified as receiving a fixed percent of the government income will receive a budget cut, while the central government will retain more.
On top of all this, there is yet another revision to the security tax.
This revision extends the security tax to cover previously exempt bank accounts with deposits under 120,000 lempiras. Now, all savings and checking accounts will be taxed. COHEP, one of the principal business organizations in the country, warns that this might lead to capital flight.
So why is Congress doing this now?
Part of the answer is that Honduras simply has to find more revenue or the government cannot continue. And some of the answer is partisan politics, with a hand-off of government from one National Party president to another, something that has never happened since the new Honduran constitution was set in place in the 1980s. Even with the new taxes and savings envisioned under this law, it will not close the fiscal deficit under which the government operates.
Right now the lame duck Congress has enough National Party members to pass anything they want, short of a constitutional amendment. The new Congress might not be so amenable. The National Party will not have sufficient representation to do what it wants. It will need to make alliances with other parties in order to enact legislation, making laws like this one difficult to pass.
Most of the Liberal Party members in the present Congress opposed the new taxes, and suggested that the press headline their coverage "National Party passes new taxes". The Liberal membership in the incoming Congress will be joined by LIBRE and PAC contingents that can also be expected to be less inclined to automatically agree with the ruling party's legislative direction
The Lobo Sosa government used 1.4 billion dollars in borrowing to make ends meet this year. Under the new tax law's projections, the increases will, at best, cover half of that.
It will be up to the next government to figure out how to cover the other half, while improving actual tax collection enough to cover those projections. And that is presumably why, along with changes in the leadership of the police and military, the first choices for government offices made by Juan Orlando Hernández included a new head of the Dirección Ejecutivo de Ingresos (Executive Office of Income), Miriam Guzman, reportedly already at work.
On Saturday, December 21, the Congress passed a new, extensive series of taxes and rule changes designed to bring up to 4000 million lempiras ($200 million) in new revenue to the government over the next year. The same measure imposes restrictions on the transfer of income between government branches that is expected to bring about a further 12000 million lempiras ($600 million) in savings.
Everyone will pay a new "special contribution" of 3% on all sales. This is on top of the already existing sales tax of 12%.
All customs tax exemptions (commonly used by religious institutions, businesses aimed at tourism, newspapers, and power generation companies) are cancelled. Telephone and cable television service will be subject to the 15% tax, but internet service will continue to be taxed at 12%.
Everyone except those given an exemption under legislation called the Regímenes Especiales de Importación y Turismo will pay a further 5% tax on taxable income greater than 1 million lempiras ($50,000).
Consumption taxes are in general regressive-- they disproportionately affect the poorest members of a population. In addition to the general impact that the Honduran poor will experience from the added special contribution tax, other aspects of the new law will sharply affect their use of energy.
Some consumers receive a subsidy on their electric service. Until now, that subsidy has been for those who consume less than 150 kw/month. From today forward, the subsidy will only be for those who consume 75 kw/month or less.
Gasoline will be taxed a further 5.3 lempiras/gallon ($0.25/gallon). The income is supposed to be earmarked for infrastructure and social welfare projects.
But the poor are not targeted by the new sweeping tax increases: property owners will see sharp increases in taxation as well.
The central government will retain 10% of the gains from the purchase or sale of property, bonds, rights, and titles as a capital gains tax. Dividends will be taxed at 10% as well.
Consumption and property transfer taxes make sense as policy because Honduras has a poor record of tax collection on basic income tax. But that doesn't mean income tax rates were left alone, either.
Foreign companies will pay a tax of 10% on gross income in Honduras. Honduran companies will pay 1.5% on their gross income over 3 million lempiras ($150,000) except if their business is selling cement, services given to the government, pharmaceuticals for human consumption, petroleum products, or supplies for baking, which will pay a tax of 0.75%.
The tax law also contemplates retaining more money for the central government at the expense of entities it owes fixed levels of funding.
The new law freezes the 2014 budget for the central government at 2013 levels. But it also changes how amounts specified in the constitution for other government entities, such as municipal governments and the National Autonomous University, are calculated. Some kinds of income that previously counted in calculating the amounts to transfer will be exempt from being counted now. This means that all dependencies specified as receiving a fixed percent of the government income will receive a budget cut, while the central government will retain more.
On top of all this, there is yet another revision to the security tax.
This revision extends the security tax to cover previously exempt bank accounts with deposits under 120,000 lempiras. Now, all savings and checking accounts will be taxed. COHEP, one of the principal business organizations in the country, warns that this might lead to capital flight.
So why is Congress doing this now?
Part of the answer is that Honduras simply has to find more revenue or the government cannot continue. And some of the answer is partisan politics, with a hand-off of government from one National Party president to another, something that has never happened since the new Honduran constitution was set in place in the 1980s. Even with the new taxes and savings envisioned under this law, it will not close the fiscal deficit under which the government operates.
Right now the lame duck Congress has enough National Party members to pass anything they want, short of a constitutional amendment. The new Congress might not be so amenable. The National Party will not have sufficient representation to do what it wants. It will need to make alliances with other parties in order to enact legislation, making laws like this one difficult to pass.
Most of the Liberal Party members in the present Congress opposed the new taxes, and suggested that the press headline their coverage "National Party passes new taxes". The Liberal membership in the incoming Congress will be joined by LIBRE and PAC contingents that can also be expected to be less inclined to automatically agree with the ruling party's legislative direction
The Lobo Sosa government used 1.4 billion dollars in borrowing to make ends meet this year. Under the new tax law's projections, the increases will, at best, cover half of that.
It will be up to the next government to figure out how to cover the other half, while improving actual tax collection enough to cover those projections. And that is presumably why, along with changes in the leadership of the police and military, the first choices for government offices made by Juan Orlando Hernández included a new head of the Dirección Ejecutivo de Ingresos (Executive Office of Income), Miriam Guzman, reportedly already at work.
Monday, September 16, 2013
How do you cover a new progressive party in Honduras?
With misleading critique masquerading as news, it would appear.
We previously commented on the relative lack of reporting in Honduran media of LIBRE's actual positions, and Xiomara's campaign events. We have hesitated to give more space to the odd way she is being covered, but it is time, now.
Proceso Digital, an online Honduran news outlet, published a piece on Friday about the fragmented voter landscape in Honduras. In the third paragraph, after noting that LIBRE is in the lead in all the presidential polls, they describe the presidential candidate as "keeping herself practically unknown, sheltered behind the figure of her husband, ex-president Manuel Zelaya". (We will return to some of the more outrageous parts of this "news article" in another post.)
What caught our attention was the phrase "casi anonimo" (practically unknown)-- an active link in the story. We followed it, and landed on a previous Proceso Digital story, published July 16, headlined "Xiomara Castro Newly Absent from Public Events".
The "public event" in July was the selection, by lottery, of places on the ballot for each party. Proceso Digital noted in passing that Salvador Nasralla also absented himself from this political show; but it was the LIBRE party candidate who came in for criticism for not being there. Both of the new parties sent delegates, so it wasn't a boycott of this step in the process. The story tried to make it seem like evidence of a pattern of hiding Xiomara to avoid public scrutiny, so that she remains "practically unknown".
Which is kind of amazing, when you think about it, since Xiomara became visible as a political actor through the most public political events of Honduras' recent history: the overthrow of the legally elected government of Honduras in 2009, and the sustained public protest that followed and was brutally suppressed by the de facto regime. Video footage shows her, in early July 2009, declaring that she couldn't stay safely in refuge while the people were giving their lives to the cause. By October 2009, public polling was showing Xiomara Castro de Zelaya with the highest approval rating of any public figure in Honduras.
So, she is hardly anonymous, unknown, or simply standing in the shadow of her husband. She is representing the positions of LIBRE, which are continuations (or extensions) of policy directions of the Zelaya administration. And despite the claim that she is not appearing in public, even with the Honduran press being less than fair and balanced, we can reconstruct a clear record of regular public events where she has announced or discussed LIBRE policy directions.
In fact, the same article complaining about her (scheduled) absence from a formal event (at which her party was suitably represented) reported that Xiomara Castro issued a position statement the same week: that she would send the military back to their quarters if elected. Cholusat Sur covered her statement on July 16:
On August 4, Tiempo, in coverage of a campaign event in Tocoa in the Department of Colon, noted that she reiterated to supporters there her plan to demilitarize policing and send the armed forces to guard the border. At a campaign event in early September held in Siguatepeque, Department of Comayagua, she announced a plan to form a new national advisory body on culture, and received a formal statement in support of her campaign from a coalition of Honduran writers and artists.
In recent campaign appearances, Xiomara Castro has emphasized the need for support of the rural agrarian population. On September 9, she called for extension of credit at low interest to rural farmers and small businesses, while also restating her intent to remove the military from civilian policing. This was during a tour of small towns in the state dominated by San Pedro Sula, the Department of Cortes, Santa Cruz de Yojoa, San Francisco de Yojoa, San Antonio and Potrerillos.
What is notable in these campaign events is not just the kinds of audiences she is addressing: the venues are places outside the two major cities, including locations (Tocoa, Siguatepeque) that are centers of rural organizing.
So where is Xiomara anonymous and invisible, as Proceso Digital claims? In addition to the lottery for ballot position, the Honduran press reported her declining to attend events of the Chamber of Commerce in Tegucigalpa, and other events planned by the Consejo Hondureña de la Empresa Privada (COHEP).
The actual story here, then, is that a candidate running for president on a ticket emphasizing social justice and seeking popular support, who has no reason to think the business community will back her, is choosing events where her message may motivate voters. And she is using those appearances to publicize a consistent set of policy positions. Pretty outrageous, isn't it?
We previously commented on the relative lack of reporting in Honduran media of LIBRE's actual positions, and Xiomara's campaign events. We have hesitated to give more space to the odd way she is being covered, but it is time, now.
Proceso Digital, an online Honduran news outlet, published a piece on Friday about the fragmented voter landscape in Honduras. In the third paragraph, after noting that LIBRE is in the lead in all the presidential polls, they describe the presidential candidate as "keeping herself practically unknown, sheltered behind the figure of her husband, ex-president Manuel Zelaya". (We will return to some of the more outrageous parts of this "news article" in another post.)
What caught our attention was the phrase "casi anonimo" (practically unknown)-- an active link in the story. We followed it, and landed on a previous Proceso Digital story, published July 16, headlined "Xiomara Castro Newly Absent from Public Events".
The "public event" in July was the selection, by lottery, of places on the ballot for each party. Proceso Digital noted in passing that Salvador Nasralla also absented himself from this political show; but it was the LIBRE party candidate who came in for criticism for not being there. Both of the new parties sent delegates, so it wasn't a boycott of this step in the process. The story tried to make it seem like evidence of a pattern of hiding Xiomara to avoid public scrutiny, so that she remains "practically unknown".
Which is kind of amazing, when you think about it, since Xiomara became visible as a political actor through the most public political events of Honduras' recent history: the overthrow of the legally elected government of Honduras in 2009, and the sustained public protest that followed and was brutally suppressed by the de facto regime. Video footage shows her, in early July 2009, declaring that she couldn't stay safely in refuge while the people were giving their lives to the cause. By October 2009, public polling was showing Xiomara Castro de Zelaya with the highest approval rating of any public figure in Honduras.
So, she is hardly anonymous, unknown, or simply standing in the shadow of her husband. She is representing the positions of LIBRE, which are continuations (or extensions) of policy directions of the Zelaya administration. And despite the claim that she is not appearing in public, even with the Honduran press being less than fair and balanced, we can reconstruct a clear record of regular public events where she has announced or discussed LIBRE policy directions.
In fact, the same article complaining about her (scheduled) absence from a formal event (at which her party was suitably represented) reported that Xiomara Castro issued a position statement the same week: that she would send the military back to their quarters if elected. Cholusat Sur covered her statement on July 16:
in her government, the military would return to their quarters because their function is not to go out in the streets to patrol, their function is to protect national sovereignty, combat drug trafficking, and prevent contraband arms traffic, what should be done, asserted Xiomara, is to make it possible for the National Police to really dedicate themselves to the security of the people.
On August 4, Tiempo, in coverage of a campaign event in Tocoa in the Department of Colon, noted that she reiterated to supporters there her plan to demilitarize policing and send the armed forces to guard the border. At a campaign event in early September held in Siguatepeque, Department of Comayagua, she announced a plan to form a new national advisory body on culture, and received a formal statement in support of her campaign from a coalition of Honduran writers and artists.
In recent campaign appearances, Xiomara Castro has emphasized the need for support of the rural agrarian population. On September 9, she called for extension of credit at low interest to rural farmers and small businesses, while also restating her intent to remove the military from civilian policing. This was during a tour of small towns in the state dominated by San Pedro Sula, the Department of Cortes, Santa Cruz de Yojoa, San Francisco de Yojoa, San Antonio and Potrerillos.
What is notable in these campaign events is not just the kinds of audiences she is addressing: the venues are places outside the two major cities, including locations (Tocoa, Siguatepeque) that are centers of rural organizing.
So where is Xiomara anonymous and invisible, as Proceso Digital claims? In addition to the lottery for ballot position, the Honduran press reported her declining to attend events of the Chamber of Commerce in Tegucigalpa, and other events planned by the Consejo Hondureña de la Empresa Privada (COHEP).
The actual story here, then, is that a candidate running for president on a ticket emphasizing social justice and seeking popular support, who has no reason to think the business community will back her, is choosing events where her message may motivate voters. And she is using those appearances to publicize a consistent set of policy positions. Pretty outrageous, isn't it?
Thursday, March 1, 2012
Cat and Mouse With the Supreme Court
There's a cat and mouse game going on in Honduras between the Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch on one side, and the Supreme Court on the other.
The Executive and Legislative branches have teamed up to exert political pressure on the Court to reverse several of its findings of recent Honduran law.
That the Supreme Court is political should surprise no one. As we wrote in an earlier post, Heather Berkman's scholarly article on the subject makes it abundantly clear how politicized the judiciary is.
This is also manifest in the analysis of the Initiative For Peacebuilding of the European Union. Their Reform Without Ownership study in 2010 detailed the problems with the existing justice system in Honduras and how the International community could constructively engage with the current Honduran government to reform it.
Author Julia Schüneman wrote (p. 10):
The recent history of governmental proposals to somehow stop the Supreme Court from making decisions the Executive and Legislative branches don't like exposes this politicization at its worst.
The Supreme Court decision on the Ley de Seguridad Poblacional is what concerns Honduran politicians the most. That law, passed in April of 2011, introduced a security tax retroactive to January 1 of that year. At stake is a lot of money already collected and sitting in the treasury.
The Honduran constitution (Article 96) is very clear that backdating of laws is illegal except in carefully defined cases. The Consejo Hondureño de Empresa Privada (COHEP) appealed the constitutionality of the law with the Supreme Court.
On January 31, 2012 the five justices of the Sala Constitutional initially found the law unconstitutional. The government appealed the decision and is awaiting the ruling of the full court's fifteen justices.
In the meantime, Lobo Sosa and Juan Orlando Hernandez are using public declarations to try and pressure the court to reverse the previous finding.
Marvin Ponce (Vice President of Congress) commented:
Because of this, Ponce tells us, Juan Orlando Hernandez has had Congress draft a law for a Constitutional Court which would be above the Supreme Court. Ponce continued:
Juan Orlando Hernandez, head of Congress, went further, essentially putting the Supreme Court on notice not to make decisions against his desired legislation:
Rigoberto Chang Castillo, Secretary of Congress, assured La Tribuna that Congress has the authority to create an institution to watch over the Supreme Court:
At the same time, Lobo Sosa has been talking about how he'll appoint a commission of jurists to review the legal determinations of the Supreme Court to see if they're based in law.
"If we don't like your rulings, we'll supersede you" is what Lobo Sosa and Juan Orlando Hernandez are saying.
Now to see if the Supreme Court yields to the political pressure...
The Executive and Legislative branches have teamed up to exert political pressure on the Court to reverse several of its findings of recent Honduran law.
That the Supreme Court is political should surprise no one. As we wrote in an earlier post, Heather Berkman's scholarly article on the subject makes it abundantly clear how politicized the judiciary is.
This is also manifest in the analysis of the Initiative For Peacebuilding of the European Union. Their Reform Without Ownership study in 2010 detailed the problems with the existing justice system in Honduras and how the International community could constructively engage with the current Honduran government to reform it.
Author Julia Schüneman wrote (p. 10):
An efficient justice system requires adequate resources, personnel selected based on merit, adequate structures and procedures to deliver services, sufficient intra-institutional coordination and a minimum of political interference. Honduras’ justice system does not fulfill these criteria.
Honduras’ judicial system is extremely politicized and not transparent. Its independence is severely undermined by pressure from the executive and the two main political parties.... The highest judicial instances are divided along partisan lines. There is strong political interference in the selection of judges for the Supreme Court (and other judges), with each administration changing a significant number of judges according to political preferences and bargaining over judge positions as “compensation” for electoral favours.
The recent history of governmental proposals to somehow stop the Supreme Court from making decisions the Executive and Legislative branches don't like exposes this politicization at its worst.
The Supreme Court decision on the Ley de Seguridad Poblacional is what concerns Honduran politicians the most. That law, passed in April of 2011, introduced a security tax retroactive to January 1 of that year. At stake is a lot of money already collected and sitting in the treasury.
The Honduran constitution (Article 96) is very clear that backdating of laws is illegal except in carefully defined cases. The Consejo Hondureño de Empresa Privada (COHEP) appealed the constitutionality of the law with the Supreme Court.
On January 31, 2012 the five justices of the Sala Constitutional initially found the law unconstitutional. The government appealed the decision and is awaiting the ruling of the full court's fifteen justices.
In the meantime, Lobo Sosa and Juan Orlando Hernandez are using public declarations to try and pressure the court to reverse the previous finding.
Marvin Ponce (Vice President of Congress) commented:
The security tax is the prized child of Pepe Lobo and Juan Orlando Hernandez to be able to take money and look for a solution to the problems of the country.
Because of this, Ponce tells us, Juan Orlando Hernandez has had Congress draft a law for a Constitutional Court which would be above the Supreme Court. Ponce continued:
The technicians of Congress are on this subject. There's a text written to present to the full [Congress] by a legislator as a law and we are working with it now.Congressman Oswaldo Ramos Soto crafted the law, which would create the new Constitutional Court.
Juan Orlando Hernandez, head of Congress, went further, essentially putting the Supreme Court on notice not to make decisions against his desired legislation:
We are preoccupied because there has circulated a story that the Supreme Court wants to declare the security tax unconstitutional; this would be a terrible blow to the country in terms of the fight against delinquency. They also say that they wish to declare unconstitutional the last decree which is about the cleanup of the police, and that seems serious to us, also the model cities. I hope that these are nothing more than rumors because the country needs to move forward.
Rigoberto Chang Castillo, Secretary of Congress, assured La Tribuna that Congress has the authority to create an institution to watch over the Supreme Court:
Yes, we can, remember that when we approved the reform to the Ley de Seguridad Publica, we placed in it the creation of an institution that would supervise judges and magistrates.
At the same time, Lobo Sosa has been talking about how he'll appoint a commission of jurists to review the legal determinations of the Supreme Court to see if they're based in law.
"If we don't like your rulings, we'll supersede you" is what Lobo Sosa and Juan Orlando Hernandez are saying.
Now to see if the Supreme Court yields to the political pressure...
Saturday, December 17, 2011
Business Organizations At Odds Over Security, Minimum Wage
The Asociación Nacional de Industriales (ANDI) decided last week to stop participating for a while in the main business association of Honduras, the Consejo Hondureño de la Empresa Privada (COHEP).
Why?
Because ANDI's president, Adolfo Facussé, was kicked out of the Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Interior (CONASIN) for proposing a candidate for president of that body, intended to deal with cleaning up corruption in the police. CONASIN has existed for a while, but scholars have noted that even in the first half of the 2000s, it "rarely convened". In 2010, Julia Schünemann reported in a study for the EU-funded think tank FRIDE that
CONASIN was essentially moribund. Now, with police corruption the story of the hour, it is being reactivated.
COHEP chose to remove Facussé as its representative to CONASIN because they did not approve of his suggesting a candidate of his own. Facussé was replaced by the president of COHEP, Santiago Ruiz.
Adolfo Facussé reacted to this as a personal affront:
ANDI also has decided not to participate in minimum wage negotiations, while COHEP will be participating. According to Facussé, that is a change from a position the business associations had agreed on, to not participate with Lobo Sosa in this exercise (which, readers will remember, was one of the presidential functions that polarized the business community against Manuel Zelaya Rosales during his term as president). Facussé said
Regardless of whether they participate or not, ANDI member businesses will be bound by any agreements that come out of wage negotiations.
The ANDI-COHEP conflict, which Facussé makes seem very personal, represents a fragmentation in what until now was a united front in the business community.
Why?
Because ANDI's president, Adolfo Facussé, was kicked out of the Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Interior (CONASIN) for proposing a candidate for president of that body, intended to deal with cleaning up corruption in the police. CONASIN has existed for a while, but scholars have noted that even in the first half of the 2000s, it "rarely convened". In 2010, Julia Schünemann reported in a study for the EU-funded think tank FRIDE that
in recent years the functions of CONASIN have been severely cut, turning it into a toothless, “ornamental” body, and ultimately reducing civilian oversight and participation.
CONASIN was essentially moribund. Now, with police corruption the story of the hour, it is being reactivated.
COHEP chose to remove Facussé as its representative to CONASIN because they did not approve of his suggesting a candidate of his own. Facussé was replaced by the president of COHEP, Santiago Ruiz.
Adolfo Facussé reacted to this as a personal affront:
How can I go to a place where they expelled me and ignored my representations.... I don't want a bigger mess. If I bothered them, I won't attend, I don't need them....I won't attend, but ANDI will continue to be a member.
It's the first time I've been expelled from an organization, and that's why I resent it. If it was the second or third time, I'd be used to it.
ANDI also has decided not to participate in minimum wage negotiations, while COHEP will be participating. According to Facussé, that is a change from a position the business associations had agreed on, to not participate with Lobo Sosa in this exercise (which, readers will remember, was one of the presidential functions that polarized the business community against Manuel Zelaya Rosales during his term as president). Facussé said
In the last meeting of presidents of business organizations carried out by COHEP it was decided that we were not going to participate, I don't know if that organization changed its opinion, I am not attending the meetings now since they expelled me as a member of the Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Interior.
Regardless of whether they participate or not, ANDI member businesses will be bound by any agreements that come out of wage negotiations.
The ANDI-COHEP conflict, which Facussé makes seem very personal, represents a fragmentation in what until now was a united front in the business community.
Wednesday, September 14, 2011
Rolling back the Security Tax
Media inside and outside Honduras are reporting on actions Wednesday by the Honduran Congress removing the security tax originally promoted by former security minister Oscar Alvarez, supported by Juan Orlando Hernandez, head of Congress, and Porfirio Lobo Sosa.
This tax was what Alvarez was counting on to buy Super Tucanos and other new equipment for the military.
The English-language coverage by Reuters foregrounded complaints that the new tax was "crimping" mining. A Mexican version of Reuters' article led with the fact that the reform would cut taxes charged mining companies by more than half, from 5% to 2% taxes on raw minerals.
A 3% tax on bank withdrawals was removed entirely. Allowed to continue without alteration were a 1% tax on mobile phone companies, and a 0.5% tax on fast food companies.
The reform also introduced new taxation on credit card issuers.
In arguing against the security tax, the business community claimed that, rather than producing the projected $79 million the government originally estimated, the tax would produce more that $230 million.
In Honduran coverage, the actions taken were described as "reforms".
Included in this coverage was a proposal (defeated) to rename the act the "Law for Strengthening State Finances". This, reports said, would help address such criticisms by the business community, which Honduran media said suggested that funds raised might be used to finance political campaigns.
If the Honduran coverage is to be believed, the passage of the reforms illustrates the depth of suspicion of the honesty of politicians -- and an echo of this is seen in the Reuters coverage citing suspicion by businesses that the law would bring in more than estimated, although the international media don't report the charge that these funds could end up being used in political campaigns.
After the reforms, the head of the financial commission of Congress estimated the tax will produce more than $116 million. This seems to be an acceptable level of funding for the business community; the English-language Reuters article quoted an approving voice from COHEP, Gabino Carbajal, saying
This tax was what Alvarez was counting on to buy Super Tucanos and other new equipment for the military.
The English-language coverage by Reuters foregrounded complaints that the new tax was "crimping" mining. A Mexican version of Reuters' article led with the fact that the reform would cut taxes charged mining companies by more than half, from 5% to 2% taxes on raw minerals.
A 3% tax on bank withdrawals was removed entirely. Allowed to continue without alteration were a 1% tax on mobile phone companies, and a 0.5% tax on fast food companies.
The reform also introduced new taxation on credit card issuers.
In arguing against the security tax, the business community claimed that, rather than producing the projected $79 million the government originally estimated, the tax would produce more that $230 million.
In Honduran coverage, the actions taken were described as "reforms".
Included in this coverage was a proposal (defeated) to rename the act the "Law for Strengthening State Finances". This, reports said, would help address such criticisms by the business community, which Honduran media said suggested that funds raised might be used to finance political campaigns.
If the Honduran coverage is to be believed, the passage of the reforms illustrates the depth of suspicion of the honesty of politicians -- and an echo of this is seen in the Reuters coverage citing suspicion by businesses that the law would bring in more than estimated, although the international media don't report the charge that these funds could end up being used in political campaigns.
After the reforms, the head of the financial commission of Congress estimated the tax will produce more than $116 million. This seems to be an acceptable level of funding for the business community; the English-language Reuters article quoted an approving voice from COHEP, Gabino Carbajal, saying
"The current changes made to the reform now put the taxes at levels where private enterprise can survive."It is hard to imagine that the timing of these changes is unrelated to the removal of Oscar Alvarez, the patron of the original legislation, from the Lobo Sosa cabinet. And it makes absolutely clear the power wielded by the mining sector in Honduras.
Monday, August 1, 2011
Model Cities Law
The National Congress completed and passed Model City legislation last Wednesday and while the details continue to trickle out, the law is very different than the prototype they started with.
This was one of the first laws that Congress passed with its new electronic voting system. Instead of debating and passing the law as a whole, Congress debated and voted on each of the 72 individual articles of the law. They also added four new ones. Paul Romer, the Stanford economist whose brainchild this is, was available in Congress all week during the debate and consulted on the legislation without charge.
The new law firmly establishes that any Región Especial de Desarollo (RED) or Model City is part of Honduras and cannot be alienated. The territories encompassed will be subject to the constitutional clauses about national sovereignty, territory, national defense, identity papers, and foreign relations. This explicit bow to Honduran sovereignty was necessary to gain the support of the Liberal Party members of Congress.
Congress will be able to create a RED from either an unpopulated region, or from urban regions that request conversion through a binding local referendum.
Congress will vote on and approve charter legislation for any proposed RED. Congress made it particularly difficult to change approved charters, reportedly to keep from having to respond to jockeying for gains.
Any RED approved will have an Executive Governor, responsible to a "Transparency Commission", appointed for a seven year term.
Here's where things get strange. The Transparency Commission will consist of elected foreigners who reside in the RED. The Transparency Commission-- a group of non-Hondurans-- will function as the governing council of the RED.
An Auditing Commission will be responsible for the day-to-day administration of the RED and will report to the Transparency Commission.
Finally, the law calls for a "Norms Commission" which will function to set the laws and regulations of the RED. It will function somewhat like Congress. Its members will be elected by residents within the RED.
The RED will have its own judges, though in part, they will enforce the Honduran Penal Code. It will have its own police force. It will be able to administer airports and ports freely. It will be free to set its own currency and taxes, though some taxes will also be imposed by the Honduran government.
A RED will have its own labor law. By law, 90 percent of the jobs in a RED must be filled by Honduran citizens. Each RED can set up its own education system and health care system. The import of automobiles into and out of the RED will be regulated by the RED.
Hondurans will, by law, be able to travel freely into a RED, but foreigners will require special immigration procedures. These were not spelled out in press coverage.
So what should we think of this version of the idea? we have previously covered the reasons we think model cities is a bad fit for Honduras-- even if we set aside all the qualms we have about corporatizing governance, it does not seem to us that model cities will deliver on their hype. The places held up as illustrations of the potential benefit from conditions not present in Honduras.
Reaction to the new law in Honduras also is negative-- including from sectors that might have been expected to be more positive.
COHEP, the business council, hates the law, calling it unconstitutional and filled with inconsistencies. According to COHEP it does not provide sufficient guarantees for investors, be they Honduran or foreign.
The law is unclear about whether absolute title to the land involved transfers to the RED, and thus whether they may transfer title when they sell or lease it to others within the RED. COHEP believes title does transfer. This could, depending on the location of any proposed RED, contradict Honduran laws about foreign ownership of lands near the coast or international borders.
From our perspective, the law simply concretizes a lot of the concerns we and others have expressed.
It provides no protections (either through labor law, or social protections like payments to IHSS) for the Honduran workers who work in any future RED.
It is up to the RED to set labor law, including protections for workers, and to establish its own health care system. The law is vague about who will have access to that healthcare system, if created. Nor do employers have to provide health care for workers.
The law is equally vague about an educational system, and whether it would be only for residents, or potentially also for employees who work in the RED.
But regardless of concerns like these, or even those of the Honduran business community, the enabling legislation has been sent to Porfirio Lobo Sosa for signing and publication in La Gaceta.
There is one enthusiastic supporter of the law: Paul Romer told El Heraldo that in six months all kinds of investors will be coming to Honduras to take advantage of this legislation.
Honduras is indeed open for business-- what is utterly unclear is whether predictions like these will actually prove to be accurate; and if they do, whether Honduran workers will benefit or see their social supports erode even more.
This was one of the first laws that Congress passed with its new electronic voting system. Instead of debating and passing the law as a whole, Congress debated and voted on each of the 72 individual articles of the law. They also added four new ones. Paul Romer, the Stanford economist whose brainchild this is, was available in Congress all week during the debate and consulted on the legislation without charge.
The new law firmly establishes that any Región Especial de Desarollo (RED) or Model City is part of Honduras and cannot be alienated. The territories encompassed will be subject to the constitutional clauses about national sovereignty, territory, national defense, identity papers, and foreign relations. This explicit bow to Honduran sovereignty was necessary to gain the support of the Liberal Party members of Congress.
Congress will be able to create a RED from either an unpopulated region, or from urban regions that request conversion through a binding local referendum.
Congress will vote on and approve charter legislation for any proposed RED. Congress made it particularly difficult to change approved charters, reportedly to keep from having to respond to jockeying for gains.
Any RED approved will have an Executive Governor, responsible to a "Transparency Commission", appointed for a seven year term.
Here's where things get strange. The Transparency Commission will consist of elected foreigners who reside in the RED. The Transparency Commission-- a group of non-Hondurans-- will function as the governing council of the RED.
An Auditing Commission will be responsible for the day-to-day administration of the RED and will report to the Transparency Commission.
Finally, the law calls for a "Norms Commission" which will function to set the laws and regulations of the RED. It will function somewhat like Congress. Its members will be elected by residents within the RED.
The RED will have its own judges, though in part, they will enforce the Honduran Penal Code. It will have its own police force. It will be able to administer airports and ports freely. It will be free to set its own currency and taxes, though some taxes will also be imposed by the Honduran government.
A RED will have its own labor law. By law, 90 percent of the jobs in a RED must be filled by Honduran citizens. Each RED can set up its own education system and health care system. The import of automobiles into and out of the RED will be regulated by the RED.
Hondurans will, by law, be able to travel freely into a RED, but foreigners will require special immigration procedures. These were not spelled out in press coverage.
So what should we think of this version of the idea? we have previously covered the reasons we think model cities is a bad fit for Honduras-- even if we set aside all the qualms we have about corporatizing governance, it does not seem to us that model cities will deliver on their hype. The places held up as illustrations of the potential benefit from conditions not present in Honduras.
Reaction to the new law in Honduras also is negative-- including from sectors that might have been expected to be more positive.
COHEP, the business council, hates the law, calling it unconstitutional and filled with inconsistencies. According to COHEP it does not provide sufficient guarantees for investors, be they Honduran or foreign.
The law is unclear about whether absolute title to the land involved transfers to the RED, and thus whether they may transfer title when they sell or lease it to others within the RED. COHEP believes title does transfer. This could, depending on the location of any proposed RED, contradict Honduran laws about foreign ownership of lands near the coast or international borders.
From our perspective, the law simply concretizes a lot of the concerns we and others have expressed.
It provides no protections (either through labor law, or social protections like payments to IHSS) for the Honduran workers who work in any future RED.
It is up to the RED to set labor law, including protections for workers, and to establish its own health care system. The law is vague about who will have access to that healthcare system, if created. Nor do employers have to provide health care for workers.
The law is equally vague about an educational system, and whether it would be only for residents, or potentially also for employees who work in the RED.
But regardless of concerns like these, or even those of the Honduran business community, the enabling legislation has been sent to Porfirio Lobo Sosa for signing and publication in La Gaceta.
There is one enthusiastic supporter of the law: Paul Romer told El Heraldo that in six months all kinds of investors will be coming to Honduras to take advantage of this legislation.
Honduras is indeed open for business-- what is utterly unclear is whether predictions like these will actually prove to be accurate; and if they do, whether Honduran workers will benefit or see their social supports erode even more.
Wednesday, May 25, 2011
"There's A Hidden Agenda"
"There's a hidden agenda," or so says Fernando Anduray, a UCD Member. Jimmy Dacaret, former had of the UCD, who stepped down a few weeks ago, said the Cartagena Accord quarrels with the Honduran constitution.
Are either of these statements the official policy statement of the UCD?
No.
The UCD itself has formally remained silent, like so many other golpista parts of Honduran civil society,
ANDI and COHEP each said last Sunday that they would make formal statements last Monday, yet, if they've made them, no one has seen fit to cover them. The Catholic Church, through a spokesperson, said last Sunday that it would need a day to analyze the document. It spoke out late Monday in favor of the accord.
Nonetheless, when the UCD does formally speak, if ever, it probably will sound a lot like what Dacaret and Anduray had to say.
Dacaret, speaking to Tiempo on Sunday, said
Dacaret, however,failed to cite any examples of this disrespect. He predicted that Lobo Sosa and Juan Orlando Hernandez would find themselves in a fight with Manuel Zelaya Rosales.
Fernando Anduray is another often heard voice of the UCD. In Wednesday's La Tribuna, he said the Cartagena Accord has a hidden agenda.
Anduray goes on to launch an attack on Lobo Sosa:
Anduray sees all of this as a plot in which Manuel Zelaya Rosales and the FNRP are political instruments for those who seek macroeconomic control for the next twelve years.
The UCD does not like anything that Manuel Zelaya Rosales or Hugo Chavez are part of. Lobo Sosa is being tarred with that brush for having agreed to the Chavez - Santos mediation that resulted in the Cartagena Accord, and for saying that a plebiscite is the way to begin the road to convene a National Constituent Convention.
So from a fair proxy for the extreme right of Honduran society, we would have to say the Cartagena Accord has gotten a pretty thorough rejection, and Porfirio Lobo Sosa along with it.
Are either of these statements the official policy statement of the UCD?
No.
The UCD itself has formally remained silent, like so many other golpista parts of Honduran civil society,
ANDI and COHEP each said last Sunday that they would make formal statements last Monday, yet, if they've made them, no one has seen fit to cover them. The Catholic Church, through a spokesperson, said last Sunday that it would need a day to analyze the document. It spoke out late Monday in favor of the accord.
Nonetheless, when the UCD does formally speak, if ever, it probably will sound a lot like what Dacaret and Anduray had to say.
Dacaret, speaking to Tiempo on Sunday, said
"The politicians continue to play with the law, with this Accord - although they say its based on the constitution - it disrespects it completely."
Dacaret, however,failed to cite any examples of this disrespect. He predicted that Lobo Sosa and Juan Orlando Hernandez would find themselves in a fight with Manuel Zelaya Rosales.
Fernando Anduray is another often heard voice of the UCD. In Wednesday's La Tribuna, he said the Cartagena Accord has a hidden agenda.
"We are preoccupied by the things that we don't see of the Accord that was signed; on the one hand, we have a call to a National Constituent Assembly, but disguised in the form of constitutionalism and it does not say the time in which these situations will happen."
Anduray goes on to launch an attack on Lobo Sosa:
"There's a hidden agenda; this has been the permanent conduct of President Porfirio Lobo Sosa, who has never told the Honduran people the truth and the things which are behind [this]; here, nonetheless, is behind the participation of Honduras in this famous society of nations the Hugo Chavez wants to form."
Anduray sees all of this as a plot in which Manuel Zelaya Rosales and the FNRP are political instruments for those who seek macroeconomic control for the next twelve years.
The UCD does not like anything that Manuel Zelaya Rosales or Hugo Chavez are part of. Lobo Sosa is being tarred with that brush for having agreed to the Chavez - Santos mediation that resulted in the Cartagena Accord, and for saying that a plebiscite is the way to begin the road to convene a National Constituent Convention.
So from a fair proxy for the extreme right of Honduran society, we would have to say the Cartagena Accord has gotten a pretty thorough rejection, and Porfirio Lobo Sosa along with it.
Monday, September 6, 2010
Minimum Wage or Living Wage?
In all the discussion about setting a new minimum wage, with its focus on the proposals and counter-proposals of business and labor organizations, it can be easy to lose sight of what it costs urban workers to subsist in Honduras. The Honduran government has defined this as the cost of the canasta basica alimenticia, a monthly supply of 32 basic products that feeds a family of six.
In 2008, Honduras' labor minister said the cost of the canasta basica was 6,800 lempiras ($360 US). The minimum wage then was just half that amount.
Rampant speculation in 2008 was driving up the cost of beans. When the minimum wage was last set, Honduras had the most expensive canasta basica in all of Central America.
When he set a new minimum wage in December 2008, Manuel Zelaya explicitly placed it at 500 lempiras less than what it would cost a worker to buy the components of the canasta basica at that time.
Yet the claim being made today is that the canasta basica costs a fraction of its 2008 price, a claim that if true, would justify (in some measure) a lower minimum wage. How is this estimate being produced?
COHEP says the canasta basica cost is about 4,400 lempiras per month, basing their estimate on pricing the goods at the Tegucigalpa government-subsidized supermarket called Banasupro and the wholesale market in Tegucigalpa. This is well under the current minimum wage of 5,500 lempiras.
The workers unions, in contrast, suggest the canasta basica costs about 6,300 lempiras a month in the stores where their employees actually typically shop. The difference between the two sides comes to about $100 (US) a month.
The Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (INE) calculates the prices of the constituents of the canasta basica in a quite different manner from that used by COHEP. INE collects prices from six retail markets in a specific city, for a given week, as well as in seven supermarkets, 46 pulperias and two farmer's markets in the same city, and for each category calculates an average price. These four averages are then averaged to get a price for a given item in the canasta basica. You can find the weekly price reports for 2006 to 2008 for several cities on the INE's website here.
The Banco Central de Honduras then use these prices and applies them to a standard amount of each item sufficient to feed a family of six for a month, and calculates the cost of the canasta basica.
What COHEP did, in contrast, is go to a wholesale food market and to a government subsidized supermarket, a disingenuous selection of prices that systematically profoundly underestimates the real cost of the canasta basica.
Current INE estimates, and in fact, any of those for 2009-2010, are not available online. But one thing is clear: proposing a minimum wage based on low prices very few Hondurans will actually be able to obtain would make the minimum wage something far different from a living wage.
La Prensa noted in August that, in general, prices have continued to increase throughout all of 2009 and 2010. Bean prices increased $0.80 a pound just in the month of August, largely due to speculation. Vegetable prices have increased rapidly as the persistent heavy rains damage field crops. To the extent that these prices are not reflected in neighboring Central American countries for the same commodities, and they are not, this indicates significant market price manipulation in Honduras.
When Porfirio Lobo Sosa was sworn in in January, 72 percent of Hondurans lived in households that didn't have access to even the canasta basica according to a European Union study, creating a serious food security problem for Honduras. That's 5.7 million people. A further 1.5 million Hondurans lived in households that earned enough to pay for the canasta basica every month, but not enough to afford housing, health care, transportation, education, etc. That leaves just 800,000 people in Honduras, according to the study, in households with incomes that adequately support them.
And that is what is at stake in the current negotiation, if we step back and think about how wages affect people's ability to survive.
In 2008, Honduras' labor minister said the cost of the canasta basica was 6,800 lempiras ($360 US). The minimum wage then was just half that amount.
Rampant speculation in 2008 was driving up the cost of beans. When the minimum wage was last set, Honduras had the most expensive canasta basica in all of Central America.
When he set a new minimum wage in December 2008, Manuel Zelaya explicitly placed it at 500 lempiras less than what it would cost a worker to buy the components of the canasta basica at that time.
Yet the claim being made today is that the canasta basica costs a fraction of its 2008 price, a claim that if true, would justify (in some measure) a lower minimum wage. How is this estimate being produced?
COHEP says the canasta basica cost is about 4,400 lempiras per month, basing their estimate on pricing the goods at the Tegucigalpa government-subsidized supermarket called Banasupro and the wholesale market in Tegucigalpa. This is well under the current minimum wage of 5,500 lempiras.
The workers unions, in contrast, suggest the canasta basica costs about 6,300 lempiras a month in the stores where their employees actually typically shop. The difference between the two sides comes to about $100 (US) a month.
The Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (INE) calculates the prices of the constituents of the canasta basica in a quite different manner from that used by COHEP. INE collects prices from six retail markets in a specific city, for a given week, as well as in seven supermarkets, 46 pulperias and two farmer's markets in the same city, and for each category calculates an average price. These four averages are then averaged to get a price for a given item in the canasta basica. You can find the weekly price reports for 2006 to 2008 for several cities on the INE's website here.
The Banco Central de Honduras then use these prices and applies them to a standard amount of each item sufficient to feed a family of six for a month, and calculates the cost of the canasta basica.
What COHEP did, in contrast, is go to a wholesale food market and to a government subsidized supermarket, a disingenuous selection of prices that systematically profoundly underestimates the real cost of the canasta basica.
Current INE estimates, and in fact, any of those for 2009-2010, are not available online. But one thing is clear: proposing a minimum wage based on low prices very few Hondurans will actually be able to obtain would make the minimum wage something far different from a living wage.
La Prensa noted in August that, in general, prices have continued to increase throughout all of 2009 and 2010. Bean prices increased $0.80 a pound just in the month of August, largely due to speculation. Vegetable prices have increased rapidly as the persistent heavy rains damage field crops. To the extent that these prices are not reflected in neighboring Central American countries for the same commodities, and they are not, this indicates significant market price manipulation in Honduras.
When Porfirio Lobo Sosa was sworn in in January, 72 percent of Hondurans lived in households that didn't have access to even the canasta basica according to a European Union study, creating a serious food security problem for Honduras. That's 5.7 million people. A further 1.5 million Hondurans lived in households that earned enough to pay for the canasta basica every month, but not enough to afford housing, health care, transportation, education, etc. That leaves just 800,000 people in Honduras, according to the study, in households with incomes that adequately support them.
And that is what is at stake in the current negotiation, if we step back and think about how wages affect people's ability to survive.
Monday, February 15, 2010
Mario Canahuati Goes to Washington
A story on the AP newswire last Saturday quotes Mario Canahuati, new Foreign Minister of Honduras, saying he is on his way to Washington, DC to promote a direct meeting between Barack Obama and Porfirio Lobo Sosa as part of the campaign to normalize relations with the US.
According to El Tiempo, Lobo Sosa's main goal in meeting with President Obama would be to seek extension of the Temporary Protected Status, extended to almost 80,000 Honduran immigrants in the US. This status allowed undocumented migrants who came to the US in the wake of Hurricane Mitch to remain there.
Foreign Relations Minister Canahuati is quoted in the Spanish El Economista as saying
So does Mario Canahuati have a chance of promoting such an encounter between Obama and Lobo Sosa? In part, that depends on defining a politically acceptable agenda. So it is worth pointing out that while the AP claims the purpose of such a meeting would be "restoring ties damaged by last June's coup", the actual proposal by Canahuati steers clear of that touchy terrain. Instead, by raising the impending end of the protected status in summer of this year, Canahuati has identified an issue that is of sufficient weight that it can credibly be proposed as the focus of joint discussions by presidents of the two countries. Which of course does not mean Obama has to agree to this, and given the radioactive nature of debate in the US about undocumented immigrants, and hysteria promoted by news coverage of gang violence by youths of Central American background, it would not be surprising if this issue were taken up at a lower level of the government.
And that brings us to a second factor at play in this bid to get Lobo Sosa some reflected glow, which is Canahuati's own skills and connections. As minister of Relaciones Exteriores, Canahuati brings to the table a history as Ambassador to Washington, from 2002 to 2005. As Ambassador, he was responsible for negotiating a previous renewal of the protected status given to undocumented Hondurans in the US after Hurricane Mitch. In 2005, he was the National Party candidate for vice president, on the losing ticket with Porfirio Lobo Sosa. He went on to be President of the Consejo Hondureño de la Empresa Privada (COHEP, Honduran Council of Private Enterprise) in 2006, speaking in opposition to President Zelaya's policies.
Canahuati is the son of a businessman, Juan Canahuati, whose wealth came from textile companies in the north coast, near San Pedro Sula, founded in 1964, and today called Grupo Lovable. His brother is Jesús Canahuati, head of the maquiladora's association. Jorge Canahuati, owner of La Prensa and El Heraldo, is another relative. According to a profile published while he was Ambassador to Washington previously, Mario Canahuati studied industrial engineering at Georgia Institute of Technology.
In a previous post, we noted Canahuati's role as a defender of the coup d'etat of 2009 who promoted the idea that the economic sector could withstand international pressure. He was a major rival of Lobo Sosa's in the primary campaign for the National Party nomination, leading the "Todos Somos Honduras" movement. Juan Canahuati was identified by sociologist Leticia Salomon as one of the group of wealthy elites who backed the June 28 coup d'etat. Jesus Canahuati was vice president of the Honduran section of CEAL, the Business Council of Latin America, notorious as the on-the-record employer of Lanny Davis as apologist for the 2008 coup.
According to El Tiempo, Lobo Sosa's main goal in meeting with President Obama would be to seek extension of the Temporary Protected Status, extended to almost 80,000 Honduran immigrants in the US. This status allowed undocumented migrants who came to the US in the wake of Hurricane Mitch to remain there.
Foreign Relations Minister Canahuati is quoted in the Spanish El Economista as saying
What has been requested is to strengthen relations with the US and logically for that a reunion of president Porfirio Lobo with president Barack Obama is necessary.Of course, a direct face-to-face conversation between the two is not required for strengthening of relations with the US; but it would be a publicity boon for Lobo Sosa. It is worth remembering that President Obama never met directly with former President Zelaya after the coup d'etat, despite Zelaya making at least five separate trips to Washington, and despite reiterating that Zelaya remained the only recognized president of Honduras in the eyes of the US government, even as late as January 22 of this year. Instead, Zelaya was offered meetings with representatives of the State Department, including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. There is a reason that governments use high-ranking cabinet members for such purposes: the aura that comes from meeting directly with the US president is political capital on its own.
So does Mario Canahuati have a chance of promoting such an encounter between Obama and Lobo Sosa? In part, that depends on defining a politically acceptable agenda. So it is worth pointing out that while the AP claims the purpose of such a meeting would be "restoring ties damaged by last June's coup", the actual proposal by Canahuati steers clear of that touchy terrain. Instead, by raising the impending end of the protected status in summer of this year, Canahuati has identified an issue that is of sufficient weight that it can credibly be proposed as the focus of joint discussions by presidents of the two countries. Which of course does not mean Obama has to agree to this, and given the radioactive nature of debate in the US about undocumented immigrants, and hysteria promoted by news coverage of gang violence by youths of Central American background, it would not be surprising if this issue were taken up at a lower level of the government.
And that brings us to a second factor at play in this bid to get Lobo Sosa some reflected glow, which is Canahuati's own skills and connections. As minister of Relaciones Exteriores, Canahuati brings to the table a history as Ambassador to Washington, from 2002 to 2005. As Ambassador, he was responsible for negotiating a previous renewal of the protected status given to undocumented Hondurans in the US after Hurricane Mitch. In 2005, he was the National Party candidate for vice president, on the losing ticket with Porfirio Lobo Sosa. He went on to be President of the Consejo Hondureño de la Empresa Privada (COHEP, Honduran Council of Private Enterprise) in 2006, speaking in opposition to President Zelaya's policies.
Canahuati is the son of a businessman, Juan Canahuati, whose wealth came from textile companies in the north coast, near San Pedro Sula, founded in 1964, and today called Grupo Lovable. His brother is Jesús Canahuati, head of the maquiladora's association. Jorge Canahuati, owner of La Prensa and El Heraldo, is another relative. According to a profile published while he was Ambassador to Washington previously, Mario Canahuati studied industrial engineering at Georgia Institute of Technology.
In a previous post, we noted Canahuati's role as a defender of the coup d'etat of 2009 who promoted the idea that the economic sector could withstand international pressure. He was a major rival of Lobo Sosa's in the primary campaign for the National Party nomination, leading the "Todos Somos Honduras" movement. Juan Canahuati was identified by sociologist Leticia Salomon as one of the group of wealthy elites who backed the June 28 coup d'etat. Jesus Canahuati was vice president of the Honduran section of CEAL, the Business Council of Latin America, notorious as the on-the-record employer of Lanny Davis as apologist for the 2008 coup.
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