Lobo's Secret Pact Redux

Remember Roger Noriega's alarmist article on Fox about Porfirio Lobo Sosa's supposed "Secret Pact" with Hugo Chavez?

We first addressed it here.

Now, El Heraldo has published the text of what purports to be a diplomatic cable from the Venezuelan Embassy in Honduras back to Venezuela, detailing a meeting between Ariel Vargas, the Embassy's chargé d'affaires, and Porfirio Lobo Sosa in mid May of this year.

This should be the same cable Noriega refers to in his article, as we cannot imagine there are two diplomatic summaries of that meeting. Its content, as we suspected, bears no resemblance to what Roger Noriega says it said.

I would translate the cable for you, but it's long.

So, here are the interesting things Vargas reports Lobo Sosa telling him. They aren't Noriega's fantasies, but then, we all knew that, right?

The cable does not, as Noriega alleges, have Lobo Sosa "pledging his loyalty to Chavez". There's no description of Lobo Sosa as a "fervent revolutionary."

Lobo Sosa initiated the meeting, according to Vargas, after failing to reach Chavez by phone. He wanted to accelerate the negotiations with Chavez and Colombian President Santos and had some points he wanted to raise with respect to Zelaya's four demands.

Lobo Sosa noted the precarious political position of his government. This should come as no surprise to anyone reading this blog on a regular basis. Lobo Sosa has little traction, even in his own party.

Vargas says Lobo Sosa's strategy is not to come between opposing forces in Honduras, but to mediate between them, bringing elements of both sides forward in negotiated solutions.

As any realist knows, a Constituent Assembly is impossible given current politics in Honduras. It cannot happen without a major change in political opinion.

Vargas reports that Lobo Sosa says as much. Vargas reports that Lobo Sosa also says, to the extent that he can, he will work tactfully to change that opinion. However, he insisted that commitment to hold a Constituent Assembly could not be part of the Cartagena Agreement.

Lobo Sosa did not, as Noreiga claims, "say that he needed help neutralizing opposition within his own Nationalist Party and the Catholic Church."

What he did say is that both he and Chavez needed to work to build support for a Constituent Assembly with both the Catholic and Protestant churches in Honduras.

In response to Ecuador's demand that the authors of the coup be punished, Lobo Sosa noted that he had been called on the carpet by Congress (many members among the authors of the coup) when, traveling in Europe, he simply referred to the June 2009 coup as a coup.

Vargas reports that Lobo Sosa then joked that if he signed such an agreement, Chavez would quickly be receiving him in Venezuela as they would throw him out of Honduras as they had Zelaya.

The cable, in short, is a frank discussion of the four points Zelaya had proposed: what was, and was not, politically possible for Lobo Sosa.

Lobo Sosa, it appears, had not "posed as a fellow revolutionary", though Noriega was right that he did ask for Chavez's patience.

It was not the military's backing Lobo Sosa said he would lose if he called it a coup, but rather Congress's.

So where does Noriega's fantasy of Lobo Sosa the revolutionary come from? we suggest three sources: first, anyone negotiating with Zelaya was betraying the right wing. The suspicion that Lobo Sosa shares a desire to change the constitution to allow the possibility of staying in power is there to be mobilized against him, as it now is against any Honduran president.

Second, anyone talking to Hugo Chavez.... well, we all KNOW what that means, comrade.

Finally, and this is the peculiarly Honduran piece: Lobo Sosa, after all, went to school in the Soviet Union. It seems for some people, no amount of right wing conversion can entirely clear up a mis-spent youth.

The Cartagena Accord

The Cartagena Accord has been published. Here is a translation of the actual points of the agreement with some initial comments:

1. The framing of all actions and decisions of the government of Honduras in strict compliance with the constitution and the law.

This is a recognition by both sides that Honduras is governed by the rule of law, and that the conflict must be settled using that law. As we've seen, the interpretation of that law can be pretty malleable in the Honduran courts....

2. Ensure that former president José Manuel Zelaya Rosales can return to Honduras, with full recognition of his rights under the constitution and laws of Honduras, including the exercise of political action, in terms of security and freedom.

3. Deepening the guarantees for the return, safety, and freedom, of the former officials of the government of former president José Manuel Zelaya Rosales, and others affected by the crisis who are not abroad, with full recognition of their rights under the constitution and laws of Honduras.

This is actually a broadening beyond the initial demand, which was just for guarantees for Zelaya himself. Many former government officials, and members of the FNRP, are still living in exile.

4. To welcome the decision of the competent authorities to anull the legal proceedings against former president José Manuel Zelaya Rosales, highlighting the presentation of documents by the Public Prosecutor's office and the Attorney General's office before the ad-hoc Court of Appeals according to which both institutions waive the right to appeal, and its admission by the Court, which makes the Court's decision final.

Put another way, we celebrate the "happy coincidence" that the law allowed the charges against Zelaya to be annulled. But as has been noted many times before, while the Court's decision to annul was final, both the Public Prosecutor and the Attorney General's office retained the right to refile charges at any time once they correct the procedural errors. In the absence of an admission that the charges themselves were without merit, the international position that the charges amounted to political persecution is not upheld by the Cartagena Accord.

5. To watch in a special way to ensure compliance with the constitution of the Republic with regard to guarantees of respect and the protection of human rights.

We're not quite sure what they mean here. Is the Compliance Commission going to have oversight of this ("the special way") or is it the Honduran Minister of Justice and Human Rights, Ana Pineda, who so far has assured there is lip service to Human Rights, but no actual compliance?

6. To ensure compliance with all guarantees that the law gives the National Front for Popular Resistance applying for registration [as a political party] before the Supreme Electoral Tribunal to participate democratically in the electoral political process in Honduras and to enable government agencies to integrate it as an electoral political equal. In this context and with the full respect of procedures and legal powers, to instruct the Compliance Commission to verify compliance with the procedures for registration of the People's National Front in an atmosphere of cooperation and transparency.

In some ways this is the most interesting of the agreements. It highlights the tension within the FNRP over whether to become a political party or not. Negotiations were carried out by Juan Barahona, a former campesino leader, on behalf of the FNRP, and he has clearly been in favor of the Frente becoming a political party, but other significant factions in the Frente, such as COPINH, have not. It will be interesting to see their public statements in reaction to the agreement. Can the Frente survive being fractioned into both a political party, and a wider social movement as this split would imply?

7. Reiterate that the amendment to Article 5 of the Honduran constitution regulates the call for a referendum with clearly established procedures, allowing the possibility for the people to be consulted. This reform enables all sectors to launch legal procedures to conduct a plebiscite and thus subject directly to the will of the people the political, economic and social through the new constitutional plebiscite and referendum. Therefore, the request that the former president Zelaya made to convene a National Constituent Assembly will be part of these consultation mechanisms. In this regard, the government of Honduras is committed to the taking measures that are within their legal powers to ensure the electoral rights of citizens, and to instruct the Compliance Commission to verify compliance with the procedures established for the conduct of referendums in the Republic of Honduras, when this process is initiated by any sector, with total respect for the legal powers of the branches of government, which complement the paperwork associated with these processes.

While Zelaya initially called for, as part of the accord, a National Constituent Assembly, this clause represents Lobo Sosa's response. Lobo Sosa and the Honduran National Congress have been busy making sure that everything Zelaya tried to do, and allegedly was overthrown for doing, is sanctioned under current Honduran law. To that end, Congress rewrote large sections of the Constitution over the last 2 years, making it possible for citizens to collect signatures to convene an election to modify the constitution of Honduras.

The fact that the Frente collected over a million signatures (1.3 million) calling for a National Constituent Assembly certainly contributed to making this a legislative priority of the current government.

8. Recognize the creation of the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights as the entity that will strengthen national capacities for the promotion and protection of Human Rights in Honduras, following up on recommendations made to Honduras as a result of having submitted the Universal Periodic Review of Human Rights to the Human Rights Council of the United Nations in Geneva, and coordinate and harmonize the cooperation and support of the United Nations and other international organizations to strengthen public policies and national capacities to ensure full respect for human rights in Honduras. In the same vein, the Honduran presidency has asked the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights of the UN to install an office in Honduras.

The new Ministry of Justice and Human Rights seems to be well intentioned, but ineffectual. It makes pronouncements, but not policy. As an example, the Minister, Ana Pineda, denounced the new wiretapping bill being considered by Congress as going too far and violating Hondurans rights to privacy. This did not trigger a reconsideration of the bill, which is expected to pass unchanged this week. Congress basically ignored her.

9. The Compliance Commission will consist initially of the foreign ministers of Colombia and Venezuela, who will assume office after the signing of this agreement by the President of the Republic of Honduras, Porfirio Lobo Sosa and former President, José Manuel Zelaya Rosales, and as witnessed by the Presidents of Colombia and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Juan Manuel Santos and Hugo Rafael Chavez Frias.

The Compliance Commission is a purely ornamental body, having no actual power to enforce the Accord. They can only shame non-compliant parties through public exposure. The body of the agreement in another section states that the parties may add other countries to the Compliance Commission by mutual agreement.

All of this was accomplished without the United States, whose State Department has remained silent about the mediation efforts being carried out by Presidents Santos and Chavez.

Indeed, the US State Department has been decidedly unhelpful in pursuing mediation, having called several times in the last month, as the mediation was being carried out, for the OAS to immediately return Honduras to full membership. In the end, Arturo Valenzuela, who is stepping down as Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs said this was a very positive step because it showed they were overcoming their deep divisions and it recognizes the legitimacy of the Lobo Sosa government.

This accord brings certainty to Honduras' return full OAS membership.

What it will mean for reconciliation within Honduras remains to be seen. Does Porfirio Lobo Sosa have the political influence in his own party, let alone in the Liberal Party, to encourage support and follow through? Will the Frente, or a significant enough portion of it, take up the offer to become a political party, and what will happen to those elements of the Frente that do not wish to do so? Will anti-Zelaya forces be able to resist the urge to bring the same (or variant) charges again, once Zelaya is back in the country?

Canahuati Shamed?

Adolfo Facussé, head of the National Industrial Business Association (Asociación Nacional de Industriales, ANDI), started a rumor Monday that Mario Canahuati was going to resign as Foreign Minister.

Facussé told the press this was because Canahuati was distressed over not being included in the secret meetings between Lobo Sosa, Hugo Chavez, and Juan Manuel Santos. He said it was embarrassing for Canahuati to not be included in the meeting, when the Foreign Ministers of Venezuela and Colombia were. Instead, Arturo Corrales, Lobo Sosa's planning minister, participated.

"Don Mario Canahuati for respect and his own dignity, should resign from his position,"

Facussé told the press.

He further suggested that the Lobo Sosa government should respect Canahuati and if he didn't have the President's confidence as Foreign Minister, perhaps Lobo Sosa would appoint him to manage soliciting foreign investment. Facussé pointed out that Mario Canahuati was the former head of the Honduran Council of Private Business (Consejo Hondureño de la Empresa Privada, COHEP).

Why is Facussé trying to create a breach between Lobo Sosa and Mario Canahuati when there is none?

Perhaps it is because both he and Canahuati were backers of Micheletti, who just warned about the dangers of meeting that supposedly shamed Canahuati. Maybe he's warning Canahuati of business's unhappiness with Lobo Sosa's policies. Maybe its just that they were business buddies. We don't know.

Facussé specifically suggested Canahuati be put in charge of the "Honduras is open for business" conference to be held next week in San Pedro Sula. He took the opportunity to criticize the list of invited companies and individuals saying it was heavy on the industries with things to sell to Honduras and light on investors.

Facussé seemed not to know that Canahuati's Foreign Relations Ministry is in charge of the event and was responsible for the invitations.

In any case, Canahuati said he's not resigning and supports Lobo Sosa.

Chavez, Lobo, and readmitting Honduras to the OAS

News reports have appeared claiming that Honduras will be reintegrated to the OAS following a meeting between Hugo Chavez and Porfirio Lobo Sosa in Cartagena, Colombia.

AFP's story probably hews closest to the truth: talks were held, that is true. But nothing really has changed, so press coverage claiming a breakthrough would appear to be premature. As AFP correctly described the situation

Zelaya is currently in exile in the Dominican Republic, and will not return to Honduras until he is guaranteed immunity from legal action. His return is a condition for the OAS to re-admit Honduras.

What that means is that someone with the ability to do so would have to guarantee that the remaining charges against Zelaya were dismissed. Lobo Sosa, the head of the executive branch of government, cannot make such a guarantee, because the charges are being defended by the judicial branch.

While the most obvious political charges against Zelaya were recently dismissed, there remain charges on which the court still demands Zelaya be tried. Lobo Sosa has made overtures before, and has been briskly pushed back by Honduran factions who want the OAS to back down.

The head of the Honduran Supreme Court Jorge Rivera Aviles, recently reiterated that the judicial branch-- which is, we re-emphasize, not controlled by Lobo Sosa-- thinks it has done enough to satisfy the international community:

“From my point of view all the requirements for Honduras to be in the OAS have already been completed...Honduras should be reintegrated without greater conditions (since it has complied) with the aspects of national reconciliation and government respect for human rights, to give accounts to international organizations and many other activities since Lobo took office”.

Speaking specifically to the question of Zelaya still being under threat of trials that, given the extreme nature of his removal from office and the open hostility of the courts to him, we might assume will be somewhat less than fair, the head of the Supreme Court continued:

"He can come anytime, he doesn't have any warrant for arrest pending".

For pro-coup Honduras, this is reality, even if the rest of the world sees things otherwise.

A call for charges to be dropped against ex-President Zelaya is reinterpreted: see, we won't arrest him (at least right away) so why should he be afraid to come back?

So it seems wildly unlikely that Lobo Sosa will shift their position, especially not on the promise that Hugo Chavez-- reviled by the Honduran right-- would then change his position.

And notice that in fact, Chavez has not changed his position. Santos may have managed a surprise meeting with Lobo Sosa, but the "agreement" is that Lobo Sosa needs to deliver the immunity from prosecution which has always been the requirement for readmission to the OAS.

The positive spin on the most recent meeting comes from two sources: Porfirio Lobo Sosa and the president of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos. Both are, quite obviously, interested parties who would like to get credit for changing the situation.

The Chinese publication People's Daily (in English) quotes Lobo Sosa as its main source, saying

"I am very glad the meeting has initiated the incorporation of Honduras into regional bodies like the OAS".

Santos, on the other hand, sounded more cautious even in this highly spun story:

"I hope this meeting will become a further step toward the final settlement of Honduras' problem with the OAS and that the OAS will accept Honduras' return as a full member of that organization."

A "further step" is a long way from "initiating incorporation" in OAS. Indeed, coverage in the English-language Colombia Reports is more measured:

The Honduran president said he agreed to allow ousted former leftist President Zelaya to return to the country with immunity from prosecution. This is a condition of the readmission of Honduras to the OAS.

The problem remains that the will to acknowledge that the coup of 2009 was a coup is absent in Honduras. So various parties cling to their claims of corruption-- not that these would, in fact, have justified a coup.

Lobo Sosa has pretty successfully distanced himself from the coup, but does so, among other things, by pushing to the forefront the Supreme Court-- still the same group that claimed it was entirely legal in documents widely believed by anti-coup activists to have been post-dated and essentially doctored. And the head of the Supreme Court has no intention of taking one step more to facilitate international recognition. In fact, he said earlier this week that

"the President, Porfirio Lobo, has made enormous efforts and has attended to many international requirements, in such a way that to the extent that he acceeds, they ask even more".

Time, Rivera Aviles thinks, to draw a firm line in the sand.

More egregious than his refusal to recognize the difference between immunity from prosecution and removing an arrest warrant, even if it is not what the press or the three presidents meeting in Cartagena talked about, is River Aviles' claim that the Lobo Sosa government has met international demands on human rights.

It just is not so. But then, in Rivera Aviles' circles-- and most likely in the view of Lobo Sosa as well-- it is just unfair of the rest of the world to insist on such conditions for Honduras, because the people being beaten in the streets, tear gassed, and hit with water cannons, asked for it by not accepting the iron fist of control exercised over their country.