On November 25th the Constitutional branch of the Honduran Supreme Court emitted a ruling finding the government responsible for defaulting on a payment to a Honduran pharmaceutical company, and ordering it to pay immediately 126 million lempiras.
Or did they?
On December 3 of this year, the Honduran press covered the release of a Constitutional Branch of the Supreme Court legal decision, upholding a lower court ruling that the government of Honduras owed Farmasula S.A. de C.V. 126 million lempiras (about $6 million) based on the government defaulting on a payment of about 61.5 million lempiras (about $2.9 million) to the company.
The order was "signed" by Justices Silvia Trinidad Santos Moncada (president of the Constitutional branch of the Supreme Court), Jose Elmer Lizardo Carranza, Jorge Alberto Rivera Aviles, Tomas Arita Valle, Reina Sagrario Solarzano Juarez, and Lidia Estela Cardona Padilla.
Now, there are several problems with this order. First, it supposedly has six signatures of justices, but each branch of the Honduran Supreme Court consists of five justices, not six. Where did that sixth justice come from?
Second, there are the names of several justices there that don't ordinarily belong on a Constitutional branch opinion. I refer of course to justices Alberto Rivera Aviles, Tomas Arita Valle, and Reina Sagrario Solarzano Juarez. They are not listed as members of the Constitutional branch, and so could come to sign an opinion there only if some of the assigned justices were absent.
This turns out to be the case. Three of the justices assigned to the case, Lidia Estela Cardona Padilla, German Padilla, and Victor Lozano, were out of the country the day the case was supposedly decided, attending a judicial seminar.
By being out the country with her colleagues at a judicial seminar, Lidia Estela Cardona Padilla could not have participated in any debate or signed the decision on November 25th. She flat out denies that her legitimate signature appears on the document.
The accuracy of the order is supposedly guaranteed by the signature and seal of Carlos Alberto Almendarez Calix, secretary of the Constitutional branch. Did he goof and add her name to the list of signatories?
But more importantly, why was this case, which had been tabled for further study and not scheduled to be decided, suddenly brought up and replacement justices assigned while the three normal members of the Constitutional branch were out of the country attending a legal seminar?
Someone needs to ask Justice Silvia Santos Moncada that question.
Showing posts with label Jorge Rivera Avíles. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Jorge Rivera Avíles. Show all posts
Thursday, December 4, 2014
Sunday, September 15, 2013
Fiscal Irresponsibility and the Security Tax
Who would think it was OK to spend 1,800 million lempiras ($90 million dollars) from a fund whose balance is only 500 million lempiras ($25 million dollars)?
That's spending more than 3 times your current balance!
Juan Ferrera, head of the government commission that decides how to spend the income from the security tax, thinks it's OK. Not only that, but he plans to borrow perhaps 600 million lempiras ($30 million dollars) to cover the shortfall from his commission's irresponsible spending, as short term loans from domestic Honduran banks which will be at high interest rates. He proposes to pay the loans back with the projected income from the security tax in 2014.
The security tax, new in 2012, is a tax on bank transactions intended to pay for additional security efforts in the country in general. After the tax was approved, it was modified by Congress so that in addition to reinforcing security, it could be used to "fortify the finances" of the government. It has been used as a candy jar for everyone's pet idea of how to spend government funds, and ultimately, they spent more than they will take in this year, by a lot.
Ferrera made the astounding admission that his commission, which was set up to make decisions about administering funds from the security tax, has made no decisions. Instead, he says the decisions were made by the Secretary of Defense and Security (Arturo Corrales), the Supreme Court (Jorge Rivera Aviles), the Public Prosecutor's office (formerly Luis Rubi, now Oscar Fernando Chinchilla), and municipalities.
Basically, if anyone proposed using funds from the security tax for any old project, it simply was done. The commission headed by Ferrera totally abdicated its responsibility.
Naturally they overspent. There was no one accountable.
The biggest winner by far has been the Secretary of Defense and Security, who assigned himself a whopping 716.7 million lempiras ($35.8 million dollars). This includes paying for both the new Military Police (24.5 million lempiras), and a Police Special Operations Unit (los Tigres), both championed by Juan Orlando Hernandez and approved by the Honduran Congress. While the Military police unit has started operations, with between 600 and 1000 troops chosen from existing soldiers, the Tigres unit has not even begun organizing itself, despite having been authorized last spring.
The latest proposed charge to the security tax: 800,000 lempiras to electrify the island of Isla Conejo, subject of a dispute with El Salvador. Ferrera said
Has any of this spending spree made a significant change in the security of the Honduran people?
Not significantly by any of the measures that matter. The government predicts that the murder rate will be around 80 per 100,000 population, while the National University's Observatory of Violence sees the rate continuing at 85 per 100,000 for the rest of the year, off slightly from its observed rate of 91 per 100,000 in 2012.
More militarization of policing, and intensifying a border dispute with a neighbor over an uninhabited island hardly seems like enough to justify the over-spending and lack of accountability demonstrated.
That's spending more than 3 times your current balance!
Juan Ferrera, head of the government commission that decides how to spend the income from the security tax, thinks it's OK. Not only that, but he plans to borrow perhaps 600 million lempiras ($30 million dollars) to cover the shortfall from his commission's irresponsible spending, as short term loans from domestic Honduran banks which will be at high interest rates. He proposes to pay the loans back with the projected income from the security tax in 2014.
The security tax, new in 2012, is a tax on bank transactions intended to pay for additional security efforts in the country in general. After the tax was approved, it was modified by Congress so that in addition to reinforcing security, it could be used to "fortify the finances" of the government. It has been used as a candy jar for everyone's pet idea of how to spend government funds, and ultimately, they spent more than they will take in this year, by a lot.
Ferrera made the astounding admission that his commission, which was set up to make decisions about administering funds from the security tax, has made no decisions. Instead, he says the decisions were made by the Secretary of Defense and Security (Arturo Corrales), the Supreme Court (Jorge Rivera Aviles), the Public Prosecutor's office (formerly Luis Rubi, now Oscar Fernando Chinchilla), and municipalities.
Basically, if anyone proposed using funds from the security tax for any old project, it simply was done. The commission headed by Ferrera totally abdicated its responsibility.
Naturally they overspent. There was no one accountable.
The biggest winner by far has been the Secretary of Defense and Security, who assigned himself a whopping 716.7 million lempiras ($35.8 million dollars). This includes paying for both the new Military Police (24.5 million lempiras), and a Police Special Operations Unit (los Tigres), both championed by Juan Orlando Hernandez and approved by the Honduran Congress. While the Military police unit has started operations, with between 600 and 1000 troops chosen from existing soldiers, the Tigres unit has not even begun organizing itself, despite having been authorized last spring.
The latest proposed charge to the security tax: 800,000 lempiras to electrify the island of Isla Conejo, subject of a dispute with El Salvador. Ferrera said
"There's no doubt that it's part of our territory and we need to exercise sovereignty in this place and because of that the petition [to electrify the island] was immediately approved....the money is already in the hands of the company that will carry out the project."
Has any of this spending spree made a significant change in the security of the Honduran people?
Not significantly by any of the measures that matter. The government predicts that the murder rate will be around 80 per 100,000 population, while the National University's Observatory of Violence sees the rate continuing at 85 per 100,000 for the rest of the year, off slightly from its observed rate of 91 per 100,000 in 2012.
More militarization of policing, and intensifying a border dispute with a neighbor over an uninhabited island hardly seems like enough to justify the over-spending and lack of accountability demonstrated.
Tuesday, March 5, 2013
Controlling the Supreme Court
The Honduran Supreme Court last week rolled over and offered its belly to Congress, voting 10-3 to open a disciplinary investigation into justice Marco Zuniga.
Zuniga, you will recall, wrote a scathing letter which he made public to chief justice Jorge Rivera Aviles in which he accused Rivera Aviles of being an alcoholic.
The Supreme Court vote came shortly after Congress threatened to dismiss Zuniga if he maintained his confrontational attitude with Rivera Aviles. The threat came from Congressman Oswaldo Ramos Soto, chief author of many of the laws the previous Constitutional Branch of the Supreme Court found unconstitutional. Ramos Soto says that Congress gave Rivera Aviles special powers to have full authority over personnel within the court, to re-assign justices to other positions within the Supreme Court, and to appoint the new council that will in the future, review and appoint judges.
Ramos Soto said:
The Supreme Court took the action of opening an disciplinary investigation into justice Marco Zuniga after voting 10-3 to confirm that Chief Justice Rivera Aviles was authorized by Congress to move judges around between the branches of the court, an unprecedented action. Neither Rivera Aviles nor Marco Zuniga participated in the voting.
Congressional threats are not limited to the Supreme Court. Now that Congress has given itself the power to remove anyone in government, it is considering removing the Public Prosecutor, Luis Rubí, who has a lousy investigation and conviction record.
During the discussion of a revision to the law code to address hate crimes against women, Juan Orlando Hernandez said:
This statement comes just after the Comisión de Reforma de la Seguridad Pública (CSRP) issued a report requesting the anti-corruption prosecutor be removed for corruption and incompetence, and a second report supposedly financed by the US Embassy was produced, recommending a complete reorganization of the public prosecutor's office.
Marvin Ponce, vice president of Congress, confirmed he's heard of these reports, but the actions that might be taken are just rumors.
As Rafael Padilla of the Lawyers Against Corruption said:
As if to underscore Padilla's point, the Supreme Court ruled 9-4 with two abstentions to uphold the police cleanup law, the very same law that the four justices illegally fired by Congress said was unconstitutional because it failed to provide for the due process rights of the accused. So Congressional moves to remove justices who dared to disagree with them worked: from here on, expect Congress to be able to act with impunity.
Zuniga, you will recall, wrote a scathing letter which he made public to chief justice Jorge Rivera Aviles in which he accused Rivera Aviles of being an alcoholic.
The Supreme Court vote came shortly after Congress threatened to dismiss Zuniga if he maintained his confrontational attitude with Rivera Aviles. The threat came from Congressman Oswaldo Ramos Soto, chief author of many of the laws the previous Constitutional Branch of the Supreme Court found unconstitutional. Ramos Soto says that Congress gave Rivera Aviles special powers to have full authority over personnel within the court, to re-assign justices to other positions within the Supreme Court, and to appoint the new council that will in the future, review and appoint judges.
Ramos Soto said:
It's too bad that in the highest court of justice you have this type of problems. I recommend to the magistrates involved that they moderate their tempers, calm down, because if it comes to Congress, Congress is ready to make the call, including firing them for insubordination in the Court.
The Supreme Court took the action of opening an disciplinary investigation into justice Marco Zuniga after voting 10-3 to confirm that Chief Justice Rivera Aviles was authorized by Congress to move judges around between the branches of the court, an unprecedented action. Neither Rivera Aviles nor Marco Zuniga participated in the voting.
Congressional threats are not limited to the Supreme Court. Now that Congress has given itself the power to remove anyone in government, it is considering removing the Public Prosecutor, Luis Rubí, who has a lousy investigation and conviction record.
During the discussion of a revision to the law code to address hate crimes against women, Juan Orlando Hernandez said:
In advance, I tell you, I would not take it badly that as we are evaluating the performance of the Supreme Court and the Police, that this be done with the public prosecutors.Marvin Ponce has said Rubí will be the first political justice case tried under the new law.
This statement comes just after the Comisión de Reforma de la Seguridad Pública (CSRP) issued a report requesting the anti-corruption prosecutor be removed for corruption and incompetence, and a second report supposedly financed by the US Embassy was produced, recommending a complete reorganization of the public prosecutor's office.
Marvin Ponce, vice president of Congress, confirmed he's heard of these reports, but the actions that might be taken are just rumors.
As Rafael Padilla of the Lawyers Against Corruption said:
The tragedy of Honduras is that justice is political, not legal, a product of the autocratic government that prevails.
As if to underscore Padilla's point, the Supreme Court ruled 9-4 with two abstentions to uphold the police cleanup law, the very same law that the four justices illegally fired by Congress said was unconstitutional because it failed to provide for the due process rights of the accused. So Congressional moves to remove justices who dared to disagree with them worked: from here on, expect Congress to be able to act with impunity.
Monday, January 14, 2013
Third Time's the Charm?
Today Honduran Supreme Court Chief Justice Rivera Aviles named a new special Constitutional Branch of the Supreme Court.
We are now up to the third Constitutional Branch named to hear the legal appeals concerning the dismissal of four Supreme Court justices in an illegal act by the Honduran Congress last December 12.
The first attempt at a new Constitutional Branch, formed when Rivera Aviles seated the four de-facto justices named by Congress, recused itself from hearing this case.
The second, made up of Supreme Court justices who had signed a letter in support of the dismissed justices, recused itself because of personal friendship with the parties in the case.
Today Rivera Aviles named himself, Víctor Manuel Martínez, José Tomás Arita Valle, and Raúl Antonio Henríquez, all currently Supreme Court justices, to a specially constituted panel to hear the case, along with Judith Utrecho Lopez, head of the Judicial School.
The panel now has 72 hours to decide if it can hear the appeal.
Arita Valle, you may recall, is the justice who claims to have signed the secret warrant that purportedly authorized the military to arrest President Mel Zelaya in the coup of 2009, an action for which the US Embassy temporarily removed his visa to enter the US.
This third panel may still recuse itself because Justice Raul Henriquez did speak out against the firings as an unconstitutional act and more or less called the Chief Justice Rivera Aviles a liar when Rivera Aviles claimed not to have participated in negotiation sessions leading to the Congressional action with Juan Orlando Hernandez.
This latest attempt to set in place a hearing panel, by the way, exhausts the occupants of the Supreme Court. Should this panel recuse itself, Rivera Aviles will have to turn to appeals court judges, or the list of 30 nominees to the Supreme Court from last time that weren't elected by Congress to serve.
And meanwhile, the Honduran Supreme Court remains in limbo, with four current serving justices whose status has been questioned, and four others who seek to regain their position.
We are now up to the third Constitutional Branch named to hear the legal appeals concerning the dismissal of four Supreme Court justices in an illegal act by the Honduran Congress last December 12.
The first attempt at a new Constitutional Branch, formed when Rivera Aviles seated the four de-facto justices named by Congress, recused itself from hearing this case.
The second, made up of Supreme Court justices who had signed a letter in support of the dismissed justices, recused itself because of personal friendship with the parties in the case.
Today Rivera Aviles named himself, Víctor Manuel Martínez, José Tomás Arita Valle, and Raúl Antonio Henríquez, all currently Supreme Court justices, to a specially constituted panel to hear the case, along with Judith Utrecho Lopez, head of the Judicial School.
The panel now has 72 hours to decide if it can hear the appeal.
Arita Valle, you may recall, is the justice who claims to have signed the secret warrant that purportedly authorized the military to arrest President Mel Zelaya in the coup of 2009, an action for which the US Embassy temporarily removed his visa to enter the US.
This third panel may still recuse itself because Justice Raul Henriquez did speak out against the firings as an unconstitutional act and more or less called the Chief Justice Rivera Aviles a liar when Rivera Aviles claimed not to have participated in negotiation sessions leading to the Congressional action with Juan Orlando Hernandez.
This latest attempt to set in place a hearing panel, by the way, exhausts the occupants of the Supreme Court. Should this panel recuse itself, Rivera Aviles will have to turn to appeals court judges, or the list of 30 nominees to the Supreme Court from last time that weren't elected by Congress to serve.
And meanwhile, the Honduran Supreme Court remains in limbo, with four current serving justices whose status has been questioned, and four others who seek to regain their position.
Monday, January 7, 2013
Supreme Recusal
When the US Embassy stated that a solution to the crisis about separation of powers would come from the Honduran Supreme Court, they endorsed a ludicrous legal process that got underway today.
To catch up: last week Chief Justice Rivera Aviles seated the four new de facto justices appointed by Congress, without comment.
He did so despite his so-called statement of solidarity with the deposed justices, at least one of whom was sitting in her office in the Supreme Court building at the time. No surprise since we surmised Rivera Aviles was actually in favor of the Congressional action.
In his role as Chief Justice he assigned the new judges to the Sala Constitucional, replacing the four deposed justices. He then asked them to determine if they could hear the appeal of unconstitutionality submitted on behalf of the four justices dismissed, and if they ruled they could, to issue their ruling on said appeal.
Let's be sure you understand this: the four justices whose appointment is at issue were asked by the Chief Justice of the Honduran Supreme Court to decide whether to hear an appeal of their appointment.
Today that group of four judges, plus Oscar Chinchilla, the lone justice in the Sala Constitucional not fired, took up the appeal of the four justices fired by Congress. They promptly recused themselves, sending the appeal back to Rivera Aviles for disposition.
Rivera Aviles' next step will either be to try and conform a special Sala Constitucional to hear just this appeal, selecting from the remaining justices, or he may turn to the list of 30 or so judges nominated by Congress as potential candidates for the court who were not chosen, to compose a special bench to hear this one appeal.
Since eight of the remaining justices on the Supreme Court wrote a letter supporting the fired justices, and therefore should recuse themselves from hearing this appeal, Rivera Aviles should be able to choose the judges he wants to hear the case from this judicial back bench, to craft the outcome he desires.
Meanwhile, Ramon Custodio, the Human Rights ombudsman, stated that if this case gets to the Interamerican Court of Human Rights at the OAS, it is given that the government of Honduras will lose the case and be condemned, yet again, by the court. Custodio releases his own report on the incident tomorrow, so stay tuned.
To catch up: last week Chief Justice Rivera Aviles seated the four new de facto justices appointed by Congress, without comment.
He did so despite his so-called statement of solidarity with the deposed justices, at least one of whom was sitting in her office in the Supreme Court building at the time. No surprise since we surmised Rivera Aviles was actually in favor of the Congressional action.
In his role as Chief Justice he assigned the new judges to the Sala Constitucional, replacing the four deposed justices. He then asked them to determine if they could hear the appeal of unconstitutionality submitted on behalf of the four justices dismissed, and if they ruled they could, to issue their ruling on said appeal.
Let's be sure you understand this: the four justices whose appointment is at issue were asked by the Chief Justice of the Honduran Supreme Court to decide whether to hear an appeal of their appointment.
Today that group of four judges, plus Oscar Chinchilla, the lone justice in the Sala Constitucional not fired, took up the appeal of the four justices fired by Congress. They promptly recused themselves, sending the appeal back to Rivera Aviles for disposition.
Rivera Aviles' next step will either be to try and conform a special Sala Constitucional to hear just this appeal, selecting from the remaining justices, or he may turn to the list of 30 or so judges nominated by Congress as potential candidates for the court who were not chosen, to compose a special bench to hear this one appeal.
Since eight of the remaining justices on the Supreme Court wrote a letter supporting the fired justices, and therefore should recuse themselves from hearing this appeal, Rivera Aviles should be able to choose the judges he wants to hear the case from this judicial back bench, to craft the outcome he desires.
Meanwhile, Ramon Custodio, the Human Rights ombudsman, stated that if this case gets to the Interamerican Court of Human Rights at the OAS, it is given that the government of Honduras will lose the case and be condemned, yet again, by the court. Custodio releases his own report on the incident tomorrow, so stay tuned.
Monday, December 17, 2012
Supreme Court Chief Justice Role in Congressional Purge
We can add Supreme Court Chief Justice Jorge Rivera Aviles to the list of those disdaining the Honduran constitution.
That will come as no surprise to our gentle readers. Rivera Aviles is a politician out for himself, and only secondarily a justice. We saw that first with his "opinions" (really acts of legal fiction) during the 2009 coup and after.
That he has aligned himself with Juan Orlando Hernandez seems clear. He met with the president of Congress and the president of Honduras on Saturday, and they all agreed to work together in harmony. It was just after that meeting that Lobo Sosa explained his ridiculous theory of constitutional law: that the Executive and Judicial branches of government should follow the Legislative branch.
Rivera Aviles claims that he had no foreknowledge of what Juan Orlando Hernandez had planned for his court, nor was he involved in the negotiations. He claims he supports the dismissed justices.
But his actions say otherwise.
Both Marvin Ponce, UD party Congressman, and Juan Orlando Hernandez have said that Rivera Aviles was involved in the negotiations to dismiss the four justices. Ponce also states that Rivera Aviles indicated that he had problems with the four because he didn't agree with many of their rulings. Hernandez says Rivera Aviles was involved in the selection of the new justices. That seems to be confirmed since newly appointed justice de-facto Elmer Lizardo has said that he was contacted by Rivera Aviles to find out if he would accept the post.
Two of the dismissed justices (Jose Francisco Ruiz and Rosalinda Cruz Sequeira) have spoken out to say that if Rivera Aviles supports them, he hasn't bothered to express it to them in person. They both said that they had been contacted with personal messages of support from everyone on the court except Rivera Aviles, who only spoke with the press.
Justice Raul Henriquez said that he will not participate in Supreme Court sessions where the [his word] usurpers are present. He also indicated that the Supreme Court, which can only be called into a plenary session by Rivera Aviles, will probably not meet until after the seasonal judicial vacation. He called Juan Orlando Hernandez a serious man, someone who wouldn't lie to the public about having met with Rivera Aviles.
You can reach your own conclusion, but to us it is clear based on his actions that Rivera Aviles does not support the dismissed justices; that his words were a smoke screen designed to cloud the political stand he's taken with its long range implications for Honduras's (lack of) constitutional democracy.
Justice Henriquez left it up to Rivera Aviles to clarify his own actions, but closed his interview with these thoughts:
That will come as no surprise to our gentle readers. Rivera Aviles is a politician out for himself, and only secondarily a justice. We saw that first with his "opinions" (really acts of legal fiction) during the 2009 coup and after.
That he has aligned himself with Juan Orlando Hernandez seems clear. He met with the president of Congress and the president of Honduras on Saturday, and they all agreed to work together in harmony. It was just after that meeting that Lobo Sosa explained his ridiculous theory of constitutional law: that the Executive and Judicial branches of government should follow the Legislative branch.
Rivera Aviles claims that he had no foreknowledge of what Juan Orlando Hernandez had planned for his court, nor was he involved in the negotiations. He claims he supports the dismissed justices.
But his actions say otherwise.
Both Marvin Ponce, UD party Congressman, and Juan Orlando Hernandez have said that Rivera Aviles was involved in the negotiations to dismiss the four justices. Ponce also states that Rivera Aviles indicated that he had problems with the four because he didn't agree with many of their rulings. Hernandez says Rivera Aviles was involved in the selection of the new justices. That seems to be confirmed since newly appointed justice de-facto Elmer Lizardo has said that he was contacted by Rivera Aviles to find out if he would accept the post.
Two of the dismissed justices (Jose Francisco Ruiz and Rosalinda Cruz Sequeira) have spoken out to say that if Rivera Aviles supports them, he hasn't bothered to express it to them in person. They both said that they had been contacted with personal messages of support from everyone on the court except Rivera Aviles, who only spoke with the press.
Justice Raul Henriquez said that he will not participate in Supreme Court sessions where the [his word] usurpers are present. He also indicated that the Supreme Court, which can only be called into a plenary session by Rivera Aviles, will probably not meet until after the seasonal judicial vacation. He called Juan Orlando Hernandez a serious man, someone who wouldn't lie to the public about having met with Rivera Aviles.
You can reach your own conclusion, but to us it is clear based on his actions that Rivera Aviles does not support the dismissed justices; that his words were a smoke screen designed to cloud the political stand he's taken with its long range implications for Honduras's (lack of) constitutional democracy.
Justice Henriquez left it up to Rivera Aviles to clarify his own actions, but closed his interview with these thoughts:
I respectfully call out to the Congressmen; I know there are very good lawyers. The president of Congress is a lawyer. He is an intelligent man. I ask him to talk about it, to think of his family, of his children and what he's doing to them. Do not do harm to anyone else in the country or the rule of law. I make a public plea that he ponder what has happened. We can all fix what has happened and we cannot continue in this situation of anxiety that he is making 8 million Hondurans suffer.
Sunday, December 2, 2012
Lobo: Supreme Court Is Enemy of the State
Porfirio Lobo Sosa said over the weekend that the Supreme Court, whose Constitutional branch recently concluded that the police cleanup law is unconstitutional, is an enemy of the state.
Speaking after the ruling, Lobo Sosa said:
What Lobo Sosa is attempting to do is to shame the whole Supreme Court, which must still vote on the police cleanup law because the Constitutional branch's vote was not unanimous. In theory they have 10 days to do so. Until they vote, the cleanup goes on.
After calling the court out as enemies, he later said that he was confident that Chief Justice Jorge Rivera Avilés would give the Executive branch time to remedy the parts of the law that affect the accused's due process rights.
This is, of course, a tacit admission by Lobo Sosa that the law as written actually is flawed.
As if to underline his willful ignorance of the separation of powers, Lobo Sosa told HRN radio later in the day that he was urging the president of Congress, Juan Orlando Hernandez, to push through the Referendum and Plebiscite law so that the people can decide if the government should continue with the police cleanup or not.
Lobo Sosa doesn't seem to be acknowledging that an unconstitutional act passed by plebiscite or referendum would still be unconstitutional and subject to court review under the Honduran constitution.
(This is a situation not unlike the one that led to the coup d'etat overthrowing ex-President José Manuel Zelaya. Then, based on Zelaya's interpretation of existing laws, he wanted to put in place a public poll-- much less than a referendum or "plebiscite"-- about whether or not to convene a constitutional convention.)
The current Executive Branch (under Lobo Sosa) and Legislative Branch (led by Orlando Hernández) have had particular problems with writing legislation that preserves people's constitutional rights.
No one, not even the Honduran Supreme Court, would argue that there isn't corruption in the police, and that it must be removed. Instead of doing things the easy, unconstitutional way, the Lobo Sosa administration is being urged to do it in a legal, somewhat harder, fashion.
After all, lie detector tests are fallible, drug tests can record false positives, and someone accused of corruption must be able to defend themselves against the charge, if it's false.
So says the Honduran constitution. That's the opinion of the Sala Constitucional of the Supreme Court.
Which the President of Honduras says makes the Supreme Court the enemy of Honduras.
Speaking after the ruling, Lobo Sosa said:
"This is like fighting for a way, but there is an enemy of Honduras there, and everything that we do it overturns, as in the case of the Regiones Especiales de Desarrollo or model cities; it's like the court is playing against the country....The police cleanup will continue despite the opposition of the Supreme Court."OK, the finer points of constitutional separation of powers seem to be beyond the Lobo Sosa administration's grasp, but that's hardly news for any of our gentle readers. But there is more to this story, and the more is one word: intimidation.
What Lobo Sosa is attempting to do is to shame the whole Supreme Court, which must still vote on the police cleanup law because the Constitutional branch's vote was not unanimous. In theory they have 10 days to do so. Until they vote, the cleanup goes on.
After calling the court out as enemies, he later said that he was confident that Chief Justice Jorge Rivera Avilés would give the Executive branch time to remedy the parts of the law that affect the accused's due process rights.
This is, of course, a tacit admission by Lobo Sosa that the law as written actually is flawed.
As if to underline his willful ignorance of the separation of powers, Lobo Sosa told HRN radio later in the day that he was urging the president of Congress, Juan Orlando Hernandez, to push through the Referendum and Plebiscite law so that the people can decide if the government should continue with the police cleanup or not.
Lobo Sosa doesn't seem to be acknowledging that an unconstitutional act passed by plebiscite or referendum would still be unconstitutional and subject to court review under the Honduran constitution.
(This is a situation not unlike the one that led to the coup d'etat overthrowing ex-President José Manuel Zelaya. Then, based on Zelaya's interpretation of existing laws, he wanted to put in place a public poll-- much less than a referendum or "plebiscite"-- about whether or not to convene a constitutional convention.)
The current Executive Branch (under Lobo Sosa) and Legislative Branch (led by Orlando Hernández) have had particular problems with writing legislation that preserves people's constitutional rights.
No one, not even the Honduran Supreme Court, would argue that there isn't corruption in the police, and that it must be removed. Instead of doing things the easy, unconstitutional way, the Lobo Sosa administration is being urged to do it in a legal, somewhat harder, fashion.
After all, lie detector tests are fallible, drug tests can record false positives, and someone accused of corruption must be able to defend themselves against the charge, if it's false.
So says the Honduran constitution. That's the opinion of the Sala Constitucional of the Supreme Court.
Which the President of Honduras says makes the Supreme Court the enemy of Honduras.
Friday, June 3, 2011
Backdated Charges?
Was the paperwork that provided the flawed legal justification for the coup backdated?
A cable recently posted to Wikileaks provides hints supporting this conclusion, widely held by opponents of the coup.
This cable, send on June 28, 2009 from Ambassador Hugo Llorens to the State Department, announced the forced expatriation of Zelaya. It notes that the Honduran military told the US Defense Attaché that they had acted on instructions from the National Congress and Supreme Court to prevent President Manuel Zelaya Rosales from carrying out the Cuarta Urna poll scheduled for that day.
However, the very next paragraph of the cable notes that members of Congress and the Public Prosecutor, Luis Rubí, when contacted by the Embassy, said they had only ordered the military to confiscate the polling materials, and had not requested that Zelaya be arrested.
Roberto Micheletti, when contacted by the Embassy that day, repeated the claim that Zelaya had planned to convene a National Constituent Assembly right after the poll, and "that Congress had acted to preempt him."
The contradiction between what Micheletti, then head of Congress, and other members of congress told the US ambassador simply underlines what has long been clear: Micheletti and other agents of the coup deliberately ignored due process, denying many members of congress who opposed the coup the right to participate in the voting that attempted to legitimize the coup after the fact on Sunday morning.
But the reported comments of the public prosecutor, Luis Rubí, add something new to the mix.
Shortly after the coup, the Supreme Court posted online voluminous documents they claimed justified the actions legally. This included a long legal case, said to have been filed by Rubí under a request for secrecy, dated June 26, two days before the coup.
This date would have come just after Ambassador Llorens had a conversation with Chief Justice Jorge Rivera Aviles, in which Rivera Aviles said the only way a sitting president could be constitutionally removed from office was through the Public Prosecutor filing a criminal case with the Supreme Court, and being adjudicated guilty of a crime.
Yet on June 28, Luis Rubí denied to Llorens that he had requested the arrest of Zelaya; the military did not say they were acting for the Public Prosecutor; and Micheletti attributed the orders to "preempt Zelaya" to Congress, not the Supreme Court or the Public Prosecutor.
Either the Supreme Court paperwork was backdated to June 26, or everyone was lying to Ambassador Llorens on June 28.
A subsequent cable dated July 2, 2009 contains a timeline of events written by Ambassador Llorens to the State Department.
This timeline has no entry for charges filed by Public Prosecutor Luis Rubí on Friday, June 26, as claimed in the documents posted by the Supreme Court.
It only states that on June 30, e.g., two days after the coup d'etat, that Rubí filed 18 charges against Manuel Zelaya Rosales, in an ordinary criminal court, following a document issued by the Supreme Court that categorized Zelaya as a private citizen as a consequence of the congressional actions of June 28.
Llorens writes:
These cables also go to the heart of the justification offered for the actual timing of the coup.
The crux of the justification is the allegation that Zelaya was going to call a National Constituent Assembly right after the Cuarta Urna poll. This was a rumor spread by the online newspaper Proceso Digital. On June 27, 2009, it falsely claimed that the proclamation establishing the Cuarta Urna published in the official Gaceta said this.
Llorens writes on July 2:
A cable recently posted to Wikileaks provides hints supporting this conclusion, widely held by opponents of the coup.
This cable, send on June 28, 2009 from Ambassador Hugo Llorens to the State Department, announced the forced expatriation of Zelaya. It notes that the Honduran military told the US Defense Attaché that they had acted on instructions from the National Congress and Supreme Court to prevent President Manuel Zelaya Rosales from carrying out the Cuarta Urna poll scheduled for that day.
However, the very next paragraph of the cable notes that members of Congress and the Public Prosecutor, Luis Rubí, when contacted by the Embassy, said they had only ordered the military to confiscate the polling materials, and had not requested that Zelaya be arrested.
Roberto Micheletti, when contacted by the Embassy that day, repeated the claim that Zelaya had planned to convene a National Constituent Assembly right after the poll, and "that Congress had acted to preempt him."
The contradiction between what Micheletti, then head of Congress, and other members of congress told the US ambassador simply underlines what has long been clear: Micheletti and other agents of the coup deliberately ignored due process, denying many members of congress who opposed the coup the right to participate in the voting that attempted to legitimize the coup after the fact on Sunday morning.
But the reported comments of the public prosecutor, Luis Rubí, add something new to the mix.
Shortly after the coup, the Supreme Court posted online voluminous documents they claimed justified the actions legally. This included a long legal case, said to have been filed by Rubí under a request for secrecy, dated June 26, two days before the coup.
This date would have come just after Ambassador Llorens had a conversation with Chief Justice Jorge Rivera Aviles, in which Rivera Aviles said the only way a sitting president could be constitutionally removed from office was through the Public Prosecutor filing a criminal case with the Supreme Court, and being adjudicated guilty of a crime.
Yet on June 28, Luis Rubí denied to Llorens that he had requested the arrest of Zelaya; the military did not say they were acting for the Public Prosecutor; and Micheletti attributed the orders to "preempt Zelaya" to Congress, not the Supreme Court or the Public Prosecutor.
Either the Supreme Court paperwork was backdated to June 26, or everyone was lying to Ambassador Llorens on June 28.
A subsequent cable dated July 2, 2009 contains a timeline of events written by Ambassador Llorens to the State Department.
This timeline has no entry for charges filed by Public Prosecutor Luis Rubí on Friday, June 26, as claimed in the documents posted by the Supreme Court.
It only states that on June 30, e.g., two days after the coup d'etat, that Rubí filed 18 charges against Manuel Zelaya Rosales, in an ordinary criminal court, following a document issued by the Supreme Court that categorized Zelaya as a private citizen as a consequence of the congressional actions of June 28.
Llorens writes:
While there have been claims that the Supreme Court issued a warrant for Zelaya's arrest, the president of the Supreme Court has told us that this is not true. The only warrant we are aware of is one issued either late on June 25 or early on June 26 by a lower court ordering the seizure of polling material. It appears that the Attorney General, the military conspired with Micheletti and other leaders of Congress to remove Zelaya based on their fear that he planned to convene a Constituent Assembly immediately after the June 28 poll.Either Rivera Aviles was lying to Ambassador Llorens, or there was no arrest warrant issued on Friday June 26, secret or otherwise, as stated in the Supreme Court documents.
These cables also go to the heart of the justification offered for the actual timing of the coup.
The crux of the justification is the allegation that Zelaya was going to call a National Constituent Assembly right after the Cuarta Urna poll. This was a rumor spread by the online newspaper Proceso Digital. On June 27, 2009, it falsely claimed that the proclamation establishing the Cuarta Urna published in the official Gaceta said this.
Llorens writes on July 2:
The online newspaper Proceso Digital prints an article alleging Zelaya's decree, published in the 25 June issue of the official paper La Gaceta, states that the 28 June poll will immediately convoke a constituent assembly. The newspaper reports that Zelaya has changed the rules at the last minute, and the poll will have consequences not previously reported.This fits. It's the justification provided by Micheletti to Ambassador Llorens for the coup d'etat on the day of the coup. Llorens continues:
Micheletti's supporters say that publication calls for the convening of the Constituent Assembly. However, this is patently false, the publication simply states: "Are you in agreement that in the general elections of 2009, there be a fourth urn in which the people decide the convocation of a National Constituent Assembly."What these cables are clarifying is precisely how much evidence there is for a conspiracy to sanitize the coup d'etat, a conspiracy that included producing documents purportedly from the Friday before the coup, documents that on the day of the coup, all involved disclaimed.
Thursday, June 2, 2011
Hugo Llorens in the Run-up to the Coup d'Etat
Wikileaks has released another cable from Ambassador Hugo Llorens to the US State Department, this one dated June 26, 2009 and covering the events of the night of June 25, 2009, three days before the military carried out a coup d'etat.
A Spanish translation of the cable was published by Tiempo, although none of the other Honduran papers seem to be motivated to cover it.
In the summary paragraph, Llorens reports:
We already knew this. We were in Honduras watching events unfold on television, and we had been told to expect something like that.
Ambassador Llorens discusses how he and other senior US diplomats in the country worked to deter Congress from taking this step. He reports that they successfully deflected Congress into opening an inquiry into President Zelaya's possible legal violations. We believe this is the first confirmation of the rumored role of the Ambassador in ending the rush toward a vote by the Honduran Congress that night.
Immediately following the passage above, Llorens goes on to write
In other words, the Chief Justice of the Honduran Supreme Court told Ambassador Llorens on June 25, 2009, that Congress had no power to impeach a sitting President.
Notice that this cable is sent the same day, Friday May 26, that the filing by prosecutor Luis Rubí of criminal charges against Zelaya before the Supreme Court is dated as accepted by the court (Zelaya government members say this document was actually produced later and back-dated).
This is what later serves as the purported legal grounding for removing Zelaya from office, and replacing him with Roberto Micheletti.
The timing seems, at the very least, interesting.
Justice Rivera's analysis of how one can legally remove a sitting Honduran President matched our own arguments in the wake of the military kidnapping of Zelaya on Sunday, June 28.
In paragraph 4 of the cable, Llorens makes it clear when his conversation with Justice Rivera Aviles took place:
The "legal succession" was illegal. This will come as no surprise to any of our regular readers.
The cable portrays Roberto Micheletti, head of the congress, as actively pursuing the position of president through organizing votes and working for Zelaya's removal, rather than passively receiving the presidency by "legal" succession.
The cable portrays Ambassador Llorens in somewhat ambiguous relation to the unfolding pressures for a coup. In his dealings with the congress, he urges no "premature" action. That is somewhat less than arguing that they refrain from trying to remove the sitting president at all.
In his conversations with the head of the supreme court, he seems to be seeking to define a legal procedure for removing the president-- again, not precisely discouraging the effort to do so. And while we would not say he produced the rationale, what he reports on June 25 becomes the basis for those who claim the coup was legitimate: a case brought by the public prosecutor before the supreme court.
(We assume that the Ambassador understood that such a case would have had to be tried, not merely brought; on the Honduran side, for a complex series of reasons, simply bringing the charges seemed to be enough reason to consider the president impeached.)
Ambassador Llorens comes across as a confidante of those who become the authors of the coup d'etat.
An earlier cable from June 18, 2009 documents a breakfast meeting between Llorens and Generals Romeo Vasquez Velasquez and Miguel Garcia Padgett in which he told the Generals that "the heavens would fall" if the military made any unconstitutional move.
Of course, it didn't happen that way. The US was reluctant to cut off military aid after the coup, only taking that step months later.
Diplomacy is of course a difficult dance. Llorens does report talking to President Zelaya in his June 25 cable. But the tenor of his reported remarks there is much less pointed: he says he urged Zelaya to "to do everything he could to lower the tensions and send conciliatory public messages and engage in dialogue with the opposition". He reports urging Zelaya to remember that he is president of "all Hondurans".
Comparing the two sides of his diplomacy, it is clear that Ambassador Llorens wanted actions of a specific kind from President Zelaya; whereas he himself makes no reports of urging the Congress to engage in dialogue.
Is it any wonder why many Honduran intellectuals believe that the US was complicit in formulating the coup?
While former Minister of Culture Rodolfo Pastor Fasquelle, in a recent interview, absolved the ambassador of direct responsibility, he concluded that the US
This legacy of distrust is not going to disappear because Honduras was readmitted to the OAS. It has not been healed by the agreement that allowed Zelaya to return to the country without facing immediate imprisonment.
It will remain a lasting legacy of US diplomacy that, while attempting not to take sides in a Honduran dispute, managed to give the authors of the coup the impression that if they just did things with an appearance of legality, everything would be fine.
When the US actually reacted, initially denouncing the coup, and much later, imposing modest sanctions, the outrage expressed by the de facto regime and the Honduran Congress told one side of the story: these authors of the coup were not expecting to be punished.
Now we have a glimpse at the other side: the communications that gave these actors the impression that removing the sitting president would not be problematic, as long as it was done using the correct legal procedure, and as long as it did not lead to the imposition of a military junta-- even for the short six months of Zelaya's remaining term of office.
A Spanish translation of the cable was published by Tiempo, although none of the other Honduran papers seem to be motivated to cover it.
In the summary paragraph, Llorens reports:
On the evening of June 25, the National Congress came close to bringing to the floor a vote on the removal of President Zelaya from office.
We already knew this. We were in Honduras watching events unfold on television, and we had been told to expect something like that.
Ambassador Llorens discusses how he and other senior US diplomats in the country worked to deter Congress from taking this step. He reports that they successfully deflected Congress into opening an inquiry into President Zelaya's possible legal violations. We believe this is the first confirmation of the rumored role of the Ambassador in ending the rush toward a vote by the Honduran Congress that night.
Immediately following the passage above, Llorens goes on to write
Supreme Court President Rivera told us that Congress does not have the power to impeach the President, since the repeal of such a law in 2005. Currently the only means to remove a sitting President is through the filing of a criminal case filed by the Public Ministry with the Supreme Court itself.
In other words, the Chief Justice of the Honduran Supreme Court told Ambassador Llorens on June 25, 2009, that Congress had no power to impeach a sitting President.
Notice that this cable is sent the same day, Friday May 26, that the filing by prosecutor Luis Rubí of criminal charges against Zelaya before the Supreme Court is dated as accepted by the court (Zelaya government members say this document was actually produced later and back-dated).
This is what later serves as the purported legal grounding for removing Zelaya from office, and replacing him with Roberto Micheletti.
The timing seems, at the very least, interesting.
Justice Rivera's analysis of how one can legally remove a sitting Honduran President matched our own arguments in the wake of the military kidnapping of Zelaya on Sunday, June 28.
In paragraph 4 of the cable, Llorens makes it clear when his conversation with Justice Rivera Aviles took place:
In a meeting on June 25, Honduran Supreme Court President Jorge Rivera Aviles told the Ambassador that he was extremely worried about the planned Congressional action against the President. Rivera said that congressional leaders had approached him about their plans to remove the President. Rivera said he advised against such action, which he described as illegal. Rivera said that in 2005 the Congress repealed the impeachment law. Currently the only means to remove a President was through the filing of a criminal case by the Public Ministry (Attorney General) with the Supreme Court. In such circumstances, the Supreme Court would appoint a Supreme Court Magistrate to hear the case. A ruling by the Magistrate against the President represented the only means to legally separate him/her from the office.Thus the Supreme Court's opinion confirms that when the Honduran Congress pretended to remove President José Manuel Zelaya Rosales on June 29, 2009, it was a patently illegal act for which it had no constitutional powers.
The "legal succession" was illegal. This will come as no surprise to any of our regular readers.
The cable portrays Roberto Micheletti, head of the congress, as actively pursuing the position of president through organizing votes and working for Zelaya's removal, rather than passively receiving the presidency by "legal" succession.
The cable portrays Ambassador Llorens in somewhat ambiguous relation to the unfolding pressures for a coup. In his dealings with the congress, he urges no "premature" action. That is somewhat less than arguing that they refrain from trying to remove the sitting president at all.
In his conversations with the head of the supreme court, he seems to be seeking to define a legal procedure for removing the president-- again, not precisely discouraging the effort to do so. And while we would not say he produced the rationale, what he reports on June 25 becomes the basis for those who claim the coup was legitimate: a case brought by the public prosecutor before the supreme court.
(We assume that the Ambassador understood that such a case would have had to be tried, not merely brought; on the Honduran side, for a complex series of reasons, simply bringing the charges seemed to be enough reason to consider the president impeached.)
Ambassador Llorens comes across as a confidante of those who become the authors of the coup d'etat.
An earlier cable from June 18, 2009 documents a breakfast meeting between Llorens and Generals Romeo Vasquez Velasquez and Miguel Garcia Padgett in which he told the Generals that "the heavens would fall" if the military made any unconstitutional move.
Of course, it didn't happen that way. The US was reluctant to cut off military aid after the coup, only taking that step months later.
Diplomacy is of course a difficult dance. Llorens does report talking to President Zelaya in his June 25 cable. But the tenor of his reported remarks there is much less pointed: he says he urged Zelaya to "to do everything he could to lower the tensions and send conciliatory public messages and engage in dialogue with the opposition". He reports urging Zelaya to remember that he is president of "all Hondurans".
Comparing the two sides of his diplomacy, it is clear that Ambassador Llorens wanted actions of a specific kind from President Zelaya; whereas he himself makes no reports of urging the Congress to engage in dialogue.
Is it any wonder why many Honduran intellectuals believe that the US was complicit in formulating the coup?
While former Minister of Culture Rodolfo Pastor Fasquelle, in a recent interview, absolved the ambassador of direct responsibility, he concluded that the US
was, of course, directly involved. Of course, who—I’m not able to signal and say that Ambassador Llorens was directly involved in promoting the coup. Some people believe that. I know for a fact that CIA operatives and military personnel of the United States were in direct contact with the conspirators of the coup d’état and aided the conspirators of the coup d’état. The coup was not something improvised. It was something that was laboriously and in a very punctilious manner prepared in time, so that from January onwards, you have this media campaign. All national newspapers, all major television chains and stations are involved, in this long period, in a propaganda campaign against the government, Zelaya’s government.
This legacy of distrust is not going to disappear because Honduras was readmitted to the OAS. It has not been healed by the agreement that allowed Zelaya to return to the country without facing immediate imprisonment.
It will remain a lasting legacy of US diplomacy that, while attempting not to take sides in a Honduran dispute, managed to give the authors of the coup the impression that if they just did things with an appearance of legality, everything would be fine.
When the US actually reacted, initially denouncing the coup, and much later, imposing modest sanctions, the outrage expressed by the de facto regime and the Honduran Congress told one side of the story: these authors of the coup were not expecting to be punished.
Now we have a glimpse at the other side: the communications that gave these actors the impression that removing the sitting president would not be problematic, as long as it was done using the correct legal procedure, and as long as it did not lead to the imposition of a military junta-- even for the short six months of Zelaya's remaining term of office.
Sunday, April 17, 2011
Honduras and the OAS: The Plot Thickens
The issue of what to do about Honduras will come up again at the next OAS General Assembly in early June. As readers will recall, Honduras has failed to fulfill the requirements set by members of the OAS opposed to readmission. Most discussed has been the failure to find a way to dismiss politically motivated charges against former president José Manuel Zelaya Rosales, which would allow him to return to the country. This has come even to overshadow the concerns expressed about continued human rights abuses in post-coup Honduras.
Porfirio Lobo Sosa asked again on April 15, for the Supreme Court of Honduras to do what is necessary to make it possible for Manuel Zelaya Rosales to return to Honduras.
Jorge Rivera Aviles, the Supreme Court Chief Justice, says that if it does, it will just be "a happy coincidence", not because of Lobo Sosa's pressure on the court.
This battle has been going on since Lobo Sosa took office in January 2010. Porfirio Lobo Sosa has done all he can to make it possible for Zelaya to return, but ultimately it is beyond his power. He cannot command the Supreme Court, and so far, they've declined to cooperate with him.
It took the negotiations of Arturo Corrales, once negotiator for Roberto Michelleti, and currently head of Lobo Sosa's Strategic Planning Commission, and the brainstorming of a legal team, to find a legal way the court can dismiss the remaining charges: nullification.
Here's what will happen next with the Zelaya legal case:
In any event, if the Supreme Court does not drag its feet again by mid-May it should have heard all the possible appeals and ruled definitively and finally on the charges against Zelaya, either dismissing them or allowing them to go to trial.
There is a lot more now riding on what Rivera Aviles claims would only be a "happy coincidence" being the outcome.
After meeting in Colombia with Lobo Sosa, and with Zelaya and representatives of the Frente de Resistencia yesterday, Hugo Chavez has said that if Lobo Sosa can deliver on the long-demanded dismissal of charges against Zelaya, then he will support reintegration of Honduras in the OAS.
He has promised both Lobo Sosa and Zelaya he would work to bring about a resolution favorable to both sides. Juan Barahona, on behalf of the Frente de Resistencia, has said they put their trust in Chavez as a mediator as well.
There are still, of course, things that making it possible for Zelaya to return will not heal.
At the same OAS General Assembly, the government-sponsored Truth Commission (which isn't really a truth commission because its charter fails to conform to the UN standards for truth commissions), will brief OAS members on the contents of its final report.
Eduardo Stein said the report will be submitted without the help of Zelaya, who refused to give testimony to the commission, because they have a large body of press releases and statements by members of his cabinet to the press to confirm what happened, and that those statements are consistent with other reports made to the commission.
Contradicting himself, he noted that there were some topics where only Zelaya could provide information about his intentions and actions, and he regretted that Zelaya had refused to cooperate.
So, the Truth Commission, which has been touted as providing a means to reconcile Hondurans divided by the coup, is not likely to add much forward momentum. And the human rights situation in Honduras has not been improving. Both the US State Department and the Inter-American Human Rights Commission have recently condemned deteriorating human rights conditions in Honduras.
But it is probably a reasonable bet that Honduras will return to the OAS soon-- that is, if the Supreme Court delivers its "happy coincidence".
Porfirio Lobo Sosa asked again on April 15, for the Supreme Court of Honduras to do what is necessary to make it possible for Manuel Zelaya Rosales to return to Honduras.
Jorge Rivera Aviles, the Supreme Court Chief Justice, says that if it does, it will just be "a happy coincidence", not because of Lobo Sosa's pressure on the court.
This battle has been going on since Lobo Sosa took office in January 2010. Porfirio Lobo Sosa has done all he can to make it possible for Zelaya to return, but ultimately it is beyond his power. He cannot command the Supreme Court, and so far, they've declined to cooperate with him.
It took the negotiations of Arturo Corrales, once negotiator for Roberto Michelleti, and currently head of Lobo Sosa's Strategic Planning Commission, and the brainstorming of a legal team, to find a legal way the court can dismiss the remaining charges: nullification.
Here's what will happen next with the Zelaya legal case:
--on or about April 20, a three judge appeals panel of the Supreme Court will rule on an appeal by the Public Prosecutor's office to reinstate the arrest warrants for Zelaya that have previously been vacated.
--after that, there's another motion pending before Judge Chinchilla to dismiss the two remaining charges because of procedural errors by the Public Prosecutor, Luis Rubi.
(The procedural errors? Under Honduran law, Rubi had to formally notify Zelaya he was the subject of an investigation, and that notification had to occur before any charges were filed. Rubi filed charges in July 2009, just after the coup, without ever notifying Zelaya. This seems to be the core of the argument for nullification of the charges.)
--if the charges are dismissed, Rubi's office can be expected to appeal, prolonging the case for up to two more weeks.
In any event, if the Supreme Court does not drag its feet again by mid-May it should have heard all the possible appeals and ruled definitively and finally on the charges against Zelaya, either dismissing them or allowing them to go to trial.
There is a lot more now riding on what Rivera Aviles claims would only be a "happy coincidence" being the outcome.
After meeting in Colombia with Lobo Sosa, and with Zelaya and representatives of the Frente de Resistencia yesterday, Hugo Chavez has said that if Lobo Sosa can deliver on the long-demanded dismissal of charges against Zelaya, then he will support reintegration of Honduras in the OAS.
He has promised both Lobo Sosa and Zelaya he would work to bring about a resolution favorable to both sides. Juan Barahona, on behalf of the Frente de Resistencia, has said they put their trust in Chavez as a mediator as well.
There are still, of course, things that making it possible for Zelaya to return will not heal.
At the same OAS General Assembly, the government-sponsored Truth Commission (which isn't really a truth commission because its charter fails to conform to the UN standards for truth commissions), will brief OAS members on the contents of its final report.
Eduardo Stein said the report will be submitted without the help of Zelaya, who refused to give testimony to the commission, because they have a large body of press releases and statements by members of his cabinet to the press to confirm what happened, and that those statements are consistent with other reports made to the commission.
Contradicting himself, he noted that there were some topics where only Zelaya could provide information about his intentions and actions, and he regretted that Zelaya had refused to cooperate.
So, the Truth Commission, which has been touted as providing a means to reconcile Hondurans divided by the coup, is not likely to add much forward momentum. And the human rights situation in Honduras has not been improving. Both the US State Department and the Inter-American Human Rights Commission have recently condemned deteriorating human rights conditions in Honduras.
But it is probably a reasonable bet that Honduras will return to the OAS soon-- that is, if the Supreme Court delivers its "happy coincidence".
Sunday, April 10, 2011
Chavez, Lobo, and readmitting Honduras to the OAS
News reports have appeared claiming that Honduras will be reintegrated to the OAS following a meeting between Hugo Chavez and Porfirio Lobo Sosa in Cartagena, Colombia.
AFP's story probably hews closest to the truth: talks were held, that is true. But nothing really has changed, so press coverage claiming a breakthrough would appear to be premature. As AFP correctly described the situation
The Chinese publication People's Daily (in English) quotes Lobo Sosa as its main source, saying
The problem remains that the will to acknowledge that the coup of 2009 was a coup is absent in Honduras. So various parties cling to their claims of corruption-- not that these would, in fact, have justified a coup.
Lobo Sosa has pretty successfully distanced himself from the coup, but does so, among other things, by pushing to the forefront the Supreme Court-- still the same group that claimed it was entirely legal in documents widely believed by anti-coup activists to have been post-dated and essentially doctored. And the head of the Supreme Court has no intention of taking one step more to facilitate international recognition. In fact, he said earlier this week that
Time, Rivera Aviles thinks, to draw a firm line in the sand.
AFP's story probably hews closest to the truth: talks were held, that is true. But nothing really has changed, so press coverage claiming a breakthrough would appear to be premature. As AFP correctly described the situation
Zelaya is currently in exile in the Dominican Republic, and will not return to Honduras until he is guaranteed immunity from legal action. His return is a condition for the OAS to re-admit Honduras.
What that means is that someone with the ability to do so would have to guarantee that the remaining charges against Zelaya were dismissed. Lobo Sosa, the head of the executive branch of government, cannot make such a guarantee, because the charges are being defended by the judicial branch.
While the most obvious political charges against Zelaya were recently dismissed, there remain charges on which the court still demands Zelaya be tried. Lobo Sosa has made overtures before, and has been briskly pushed back by Honduran factions who want the OAS to back down.
The head of the Honduran Supreme Court Jorge Rivera Aviles, recently reiterated that the judicial branch-- which is, we re-emphasize, not controlled by Lobo Sosa-- thinks it has done enough to satisfy the international community:
“From my point of view all the requirements for Honduras to be in the OAS have already been completed...Honduras should be reintegrated without greater conditions (since it has complied) with the aspects of national reconciliation and government respect for human rights, to give accounts to international organizations and many other activities since Lobo took office”.
Speaking specifically to the question of Zelaya still being under threat of trials that, given the extreme nature of his removal from office and the open hostility of the courts to him, we might assume will be somewhat less than fair, the head of the Supreme Court continued:
"He can come anytime, he doesn't have any warrant for arrest pending".
For pro-coup Honduras, this is reality, even if the rest of the world sees things otherwise.
A call for charges to be dropped against ex-President Zelaya is reinterpreted: see, we won't arrest him (at least right away) so why should he be afraid to come back?
So it seems wildly unlikely that Lobo Sosa will shift their position, especially not on the promise that Hugo Chavez-- reviled by the Honduran right-- would then change his position.
And notice that in fact, Chavez has not changed his position. Santos may have managed a surprise meeting with Lobo Sosa, but the "agreement" is that Lobo Sosa needs to deliver the immunity from prosecution which has always been the requirement for readmission to the OAS.
The Chinese publication People's Daily (in English) quotes Lobo Sosa as its main source, saying
"I am very glad the meeting has initiated the incorporation of Honduras into regional bodies like the OAS".Santos, on the other hand, sounded more cautious even in this highly spun story:
"I hope this meeting will become a further step toward the final settlement of Honduras' problem with the OAS and that the OAS will accept Honduras' return as a full member of that organization."A "further step" is a long way from "initiating incorporation" in OAS. Indeed, coverage in the English-language Colombia Reports is more measured:
The Honduran president said he agreed to allow ousted former leftist President Zelaya to return to the country with immunity from prosecution. This is a condition of the readmission of Honduras to the OAS.
The problem remains that the will to acknowledge that the coup of 2009 was a coup is absent in Honduras. So various parties cling to their claims of corruption-- not that these would, in fact, have justified a coup.
Lobo Sosa has pretty successfully distanced himself from the coup, but does so, among other things, by pushing to the forefront the Supreme Court-- still the same group that claimed it was entirely legal in documents widely believed by anti-coup activists to have been post-dated and essentially doctored. And the head of the Supreme Court has no intention of taking one step more to facilitate international recognition. In fact, he said earlier this week that
"the President, Porfirio Lobo, has made enormous efforts and has attended to many international requirements, in such a way that to the extent that he acceeds, they ask even more".
Time, Rivera Aviles thinks, to draw a firm line in the sand.
More egregious than his refusal to recognize the difference between immunity from prosecution and removing an arrest warrant, even if it is not what the press or the three presidents meeting in Cartagena talked about, is River Aviles' claim that the Lobo Sosa government has met international demands on human rights.
It just is not so. But then, in Rivera Aviles' circles-- and most likely in the view of Lobo Sosa as well-- it is just unfair of the rest of the world to insist on such conditions for Honduras, because the people being beaten in the streets, tear gassed, and hit with water cannons, asked for it by not accepting the iron fist of control exercised over their country.
Wednesday, January 12, 2011
Congress versus the Supreme Court
There's an interesting fight brewing between Juan Orlando Hernandez, President of the National Congress, and Jorge Rivera Aviles, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
Yesterday, Juan Orlando Hernández told the television program Frente a Frente there was a possibility that Congress would remove some of the magistrates of the Supreme Court. Proceso Digital has a transcript of the interview with Juan Orlando Hernández. The transcript in Proceso Digital disagrees with some of the details in the reporting in El Heraldo, La Tribuna, and La Prensa.
He said this in answering a question about pressure on the Supreme Court.
The contention is that the legal warrant used to dismiss the 4 judges and a magistrate, was falsified, and that false document was used to justify their dismissal. He said that the Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH) has opened an investigation, and that the information sent to the CIDH and to Congress by the Supreme Court was incomplete and false.
El Heraldo claims that 4 of the Supreme Court magistrates are in Congress's sites.
In the meantime, Jorge Rivera Avilés, the Chief Justice, denies there was any falsification.
The Chief Justice said that if Congress wants to investigate the Court,
So in Jorge Rivera Avilés's world, Congress can only investigate the Supreme Court if the Secretary of Security (Oscar Alvarez, an Executive branch appointment) and the Prosecutor (Luis Rubí, appointed by Congress) agree they have a good reason to proceed.
I have not found the above procedure codified in any Honduran law. I have not been able to locate the scans of the dismissal letter which Hernandez says are circulating on the internet.
Reading between the lines, the four magistrates of the Supreme Court who signed the original dismissal letter before the full court reviewed the dismissal of the judges and magistrates last year are the ones that are being investigated by Congress.
Apparently at issue for Hernándezis whether or not the Court issued a permission for members to march in support of the de facto regime or the UCD, yet sanctioned members who marched against the de facto regime. Voselsoberano used to have a scan of a circular that purported to be such a permission, but the story archive appears to be empty now.
Stay tuned.
Yesterday, Juan Orlando Hernández told the television program Frente a Frente there was a possibility that Congress would remove some of the magistrates of the Supreme Court. Proceso Digital has a transcript of the interview with Juan Orlando Hernández. The transcript in Proceso Digital disagrees with some of the details in the reporting in El Heraldo, La Tribuna, and La Prensa.
He said this in answering a question about pressure on the Supreme Court.
"As President of Congress, I can't be inconsistent, that is false, there are documents that wish to discredit members of the Court and assure us that the documents by which some judges were dismissed were falsified, and this is the object of a demand at international organizations that will condemn us it that's true; and I hope to know the document, I need to see view and see it, and if I can't do it...I should be dismissed."
The contention is that the legal warrant used to dismiss the 4 judges and a magistrate, was falsified, and that false document was used to justify their dismissal. He said that the Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH) has opened an investigation, and that the information sent to the CIDH and to Congress by the Supreme Court was incomplete and false.
"They [several magistrates] sent me a scanned copy of the dismissal letter which didn't agree with the report sent by the Court to the CIDH.He answered a few more questions, and then he said perhaps the most interesting thing.
"Today the Court said that the Congress cannot remove a prosecutor, but it warranted that it can remove a President, and that is contradictory and they need to be consistent in their actions and this is a topic we will deeply tackle next."
El Heraldo claims that 4 of the Supreme Court magistrates are in Congress's sites.
In the meantime, Jorge Rivera Avilés, the Chief Justice, denies there was any falsification.
"There has been no falsification of any document, the information that has come to the President of Congress has no relationship to reality."
The Chief Justice said that if Congress wants to investigate the Court,
"First it has to qualify a just cause,which then they have to make known to the Secretary of Security and the Prosecutor's office; once that's established, they will analyze if there is a just cause for the Congress to continue."
So in Jorge Rivera Avilés's world, Congress can only investigate the Supreme Court if the Secretary of Security (Oscar Alvarez, an Executive branch appointment) and the Prosecutor (Luis Rubí, appointed by Congress) agree they have a good reason to proceed.
I have not found the above procedure codified in any Honduran law. I have not been able to locate the scans of the dismissal letter which Hernandez says are circulating on the internet.
Reading between the lines, the four magistrates of the Supreme Court who signed the original dismissal letter before the full court reviewed the dismissal of the judges and magistrates last year are the ones that are being investigated by Congress.
Apparently at issue for Hernándezis whether or not the Court issued a permission for members to march in support of the de facto regime or the UCD, yet sanctioned members who marched against the de facto regime. Voselsoberano used to have a scan of a circular that purported to be such a permission, but the story archive appears to be empty now.
Stay tuned.
Friday, December 10, 2010
Trash Talk
No, I'm not going to discuss the back and forth between Manuel Zelaya Rosales and Porfirio Lobo Sosa. You can read about that trash talking somewhere else.
I'm talking about what politicians do. Politicians say things for many reasons, but generally because they are politically expedient, truth doesn't matter.
Rodolfo Irias Navas did some trash talking to La Tribuna on December 9, 2010, saying he was tired of the double standard of foreign leaders when it comes to impunity. He says they are asking for impunity for Manuel Zelaya Rosales, in violation of Honduran law.
Who is the politician, you ask? He's a former president of the Honduran Congress and a conservative leader for the National Party. What he said, exactly is
What Irias Navas's statement is really all about is clearer when you combine it with a new statement by Chief Justice Jorge Rivera Avilés, who says
But of course, Rivera Avilés has already prejudged the case. He continues
Apparently exoneration is not a possibility in Rivera Avilés's universe.
All of this political talk, because that's what it is, is about taking up a position in opposition to Porfirio Lobo Sosa and his attempts to regain international recognition for Honduras. Irias Navas told La Tribuna
Yup, and its people like Rodolfo Irias Navas and Jorge Rivera Avíles and Luis Rubí who make it difficult.
I'm talking about what politicians do. Politicians say things for many reasons, but generally because they are politically expedient, truth doesn't matter.
Rodolfo Irias Navas did some trash talking to La Tribuna on December 9, 2010, saying he was tired of the double standard of foreign leaders when it comes to impunity. He says they are asking for impunity for Manuel Zelaya Rosales, in violation of Honduran law.
Who is the politician, you ask? He's a former president of the Honduran Congress and a conservative leader for the National Party. What he said, exactly is
"When they ask you to accept ex-president Zelaya, and that we forget the crimes that he committed that are not covered by the amnesty, it appears to me that they are requiring us to violate the constitution of the Republic and the rule of law.....It is sad and it makes me sad when foreign functionaries come here with the double morality, they come to say that there's impunity in Honduras, and on the other hand, they're twisting our arm behind our back to get us to violate the constitution and the laws of the country."That would be sad, if it were true, but politicians say things that aren't true all the time, if it advances their cause.
What Irias Navas's statement is really all about is clearer when you combine it with a new statement by Chief Justice Jorge Rivera Avilés, who says
"Ex-President Zelaya, in the moment he comes to Honduras, must be captured and placed at the order of the courts.....They have to defend him oportunistically, in the sense that some interpretations can be made, but on this I may not pronounce, because despite having my own criteria, that would be prejudging."
But of course, Rivera Avilés has already prejudged the case. He continues
"They'll send him to jail, or they'll give him an alternative sentence."
Apparently exoneration is not a possibility in Rivera Avilés's universe.
All of this political talk, because that's what it is, is about taking up a position in opposition to Porfirio Lobo Sosa and his attempts to regain international recognition for Honduras. Irias Navas told La Tribuna
"The situation of President Lobo is difficult"
Yup, and its people like Rodolfo Irias Navas and Jorge Rivera Avíles and Luis Rubí who make it difficult.
Tuesday, June 8, 2010
Is the firing of justices actually legal? Part I
Honduras' Supreme Court has voted, 10-5, to reaffirm its firing of justices who were opposed to the coup d'Etat that removed President José Manuel Zelaya Rosales in June of 2009, insisting this is a necessary defense of legality. With this, as we have previously noted, they reinforce their history of obstinate self-defense of actions that align the court with the coup.
But what, precisely, is the legal basis that the majority on the court claims? and what can this tell us about the nature of the Honduran Supreme Court, and its role in what is clearly a fragile constitutional state? To answer this, we need to trace through the thicket of Honduran law yet again, which will require more than a single post.
The president of the court has been firm: his actions were not retaliation for the opinions of the dismissed justices; they were a judgment that those justices had violated ethical rules. Yet to date, he has been unwilling to release the actual document of the court's decision, that might clarify this puzzling claim, even in response to the request by Sandra Ponce, Fiscal de Derechos Humanos in the Lobo Sosa government.
Let's go back to an article published in La Prensa on May 6, quoting Supreme Court spokesman Danilo Izaguirre, that gives us a beginning point to trace the specific violations for which the anti-coup justices were supposedly disciplined. According to Izaguirre, the following crimes were charged against each:
While the specific charges against the other two dismissed at the same time, justice Luis Alonso Chévez de la Rocha and public defender Osman Fajardo Morel, are not noted, they are described in other sources as being accused for having taken part in the same demonstration as Guillermo López, on the day that Manuel Zelaya attempted to return to Honduras by air the first week after the coup.
It would seem almost impossible to deny that these individuals were punished by the Supreme Court for being on the other side of the debate about the legality of the coup.
The same article, relying on the spokesman of the Supreme Court, provides us the beginning point to trace the purported legal basis for these actions, giving citations of specific legal codes held to be violated for López, Barrios, and Flores Lanza.
To follow the apparent logic of the Supreme Court, we need to turn to those legal claims, a task that will take us back into questions of the organization of Honduran government and the still weak integration of judicial reforms that has been underway in the past decade. The complexity of these issues requires a series of separate posts.
But at the end of the day-- regardless of the way that legal codes are being marshaled-- the Supreme Court's own spokesman confirmed, on May 6, that the actions for which these justices are being disciplined were their expressions of opposition to the coup.
No matter what the legal framework, the choice to pursue these individuals is political, as even Porfirio Lobo Sosa points out.
But what, precisely, is the legal basis that the majority on the court claims? and what can this tell us about the nature of the Honduran Supreme Court, and its role in what is clearly a fragile constitutional state? To answer this, we need to trace through the thicket of Honduran law yet again, which will require more than a single post.
The president of the court has been firm: his actions were not retaliation for the opinions of the dismissed justices; they were a judgment that those justices had violated ethical rules. Yet to date, he has been unwilling to release the actual document of the court's decision, that might clarify this puzzling claim, even in response to the request by Sandra Ponce, Fiscal de Derechos Humanos in the Lobo Sosa government.
Let's go back to an article published in La Prensa on May 6, quoting Supreme Court spokesman Danilo Izaguirre, that gives us a beginning point to trace the specific violations for which the anti-coup justices were supposedly disciplined. According to Izaguirre, the following crimes were charged against each:
- Adán Guillermo López: "having participated in the violent demonstration in the outskirts of Toncontín airport on July 5, 2009 that concluded with a confrontation with police agents"; specifically, ending up with a wound in his left knee is described as "conduct incongruent with the legal norms that rule the discharge of justices and magistrates"
- Ramón Enrique Barrios "made declarations in a newspaper affirming that there was not a constitutional succession, published on August 18, 2009". Barrios argued that his statements, made in the course of teaching law at the UNAH campus in San Pedro Sula and only later published, were protected under academic freedom.
- Tirza Flores Lanza "absented herself from her judicial office on the 30th of June, 2009, being found that day in Tegucigalpa taking actions that are not inherent in her position without having a leave", in particular, taking part in filing a legal document.
While the specific charges against the other two dismissed at the same time, justice Luis Alonso Chévez de la Rocha and public defender Osman Fajardo Morel, are not noted, they are described in other sources as being accused for having taken part in the same demonstration as Guillermo López, on the day that Manuel Zelaya attempted to return to Honduras by air the first week after the coup.
It would seem almost impossible to deny that these individuals were punished by the Supreme Court for being on the other side of the debate about the legality of the coup.
The same article, relying on the spokesman of the Supreme Court, provides us the beginning point to trace the purported legal basis for these actions, giving citations of specific legal codes held to be violated for López, Barrios, and Flores Lanza.
To follow the apparent logic of the Supreme Court, we need to turn to those legal claims, a task that will take us back into questions of the organization of Honduran government and the still weak integration of judicial reforms that has been underway in the past decade. The complexity of these issues requires a series of separate posts.
But at the end of the day-- regardless of the way that legal codes are being marshaled-- the Supreme Court's own spokesman confirmed, on May 6, that the actions for which these justices are being disciplined were their expressions of opposition to the coup.
No matter what the legal framework, the choice to pursue these individuals is political, as even Porfirio Lobo Sosa points out.
Saturday, June 5, 2010
Rivera Avilez: "I'd rather resign...."
Supreme Court Chief Justice Jorge Rivera Avilez said yesterday that he'd rather resign than give in to political and economic pressures, international and national. Rivera Avilez spoke yesterday in response to Lobo Sosa's comments on Tuesday about the Supreme Court's reaffirmation of its decision to fire four judges and a magistrate for opposing the coup.
He said that the upper levels of the three branches meet regularly to discuss and analyze the political problems of the country, "but they have never pressured us to twist the law, in this way we keep applying [the law] in a straightforward manner." In referring to Lobo Sosa's comments on the Court's decision, he said "He looked at it from the point of view of politics, and possibly, for his politics, it affects it, but politics should never be above the regulations, and we have to respect the constitution and the laws." Rivera Avilez denied that Lobo Sosa had interfered with the Court, as some organizations such as the Unión Civica Democratica had alleged.
Rivera Avilez also denied that the judges had been fired for opposing the coup, and said that the court file lists the causes, but the Court has not made the reasons public. Congress has asked for a report into the reasoning behind the decision, and the Prosecutor for Human Rights, Sandra Ponce, has asked the court for its decision so she can open an investigation.
Meanwhile, Lobo Sosa said that if Rivera Avilez wants to give up his position because of political pressure, "Its his decision."
He said that the upper levels of the three branches meet regularly to discuss and analyze the political problems of the country, "but they have never pressured us to twist the law, in this way we keep applying [the law] in a straightforward manner." In referring to Lobo Sosa's comments on the Court's decision, he said "He looked at it from the point of view of politics, and possibly, for his politics, it affects it, but politics should never be above the regulations, and we have to respect the constitution and the laws." Rivera Avilez denied that Lobo Sosa had interfered with the Court, as some organizations such as the Unión Civica Democratica had alleged.
Rivera Avilez also denied that the judges had been fired for opposing the coup, and said that the court file lists the causes, but the Court has not made the reasons public. Congress has asked for a report into the reasoning behind the decision, and the Prosecutor for Human Rights, Sandra Ponce, has asked the court for its decision so she can open an investigation.
Meanwhile, Lobo Sosa said that if Rivera Avilez wants to give up his position because of political pressure, "Its his decision."
Friday, May 21, 2010
Supreme Court to Lobo Sosa: "No Thanks"
The chief justice of the Honduran Supreme Court, Jorge Rivera Avilez, in response to question from the press, said that Porfirio Lobo Sosa, in discussions with him, asked him to postpone the dismissal of judges who opposed the coup d'Etat. But the Supreme Court asserted its independence and specifically claimed it would not "go backwards".
Lobo Sosa said yesterday that he asked the Supreme Court not to "take any actions that were not appropriate for the peace and stability in Honduras."
Daniel Izaguirre, court spokesperson, told reporters that what Lobo Sosa asked of his boss (Rivera Aviles) was that he postpone the dismissal of the judges.
Izaguirre is quoted as saying
"The president of the Court promised that he would make the proposal to the whole court, and in the whole court it was batted around and they said this is a decision which has been made."
Izaguirre indicated that the 10 justices who voted for the firings are not willing to reconsider their decision.
Lobo Sosa said yesterday that he asked the Supreme Court not to "take any actions that were not appropriate for the peace and stability in Honduras."
Daniel Izaguirre, court spokesperson, told reporters that what Lobo Sosa asked of his boss (Rivera Aviles) was that he postpone the dismissal of the judges.
Izaguirre is quoted as saying
"The president of the Court promised that he would make the proposal to the whole court, and in the whole court it was batted around and they said this is a decision which has been made."
Izaguirre indicated that the 10 justices who voted for the firings are not willing to reconsider their decision.
Tuesday, March 23, 2010
Retaliation Against Honduras' National University
Student correspondents at the Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Honduras (UNAH) write, alarmed at proposals to close the university "temporarily", which they believe are a pretext to dismiss existing faculty and hire new professors, who our correspondents suspect will be selected on ideological grounds.
The threat to close the university has been widely reported in the Honduran press. While today's coverage in La Tribuna says the proposal has been discarded, it also reports the head of Congress saying that
The most recent news reports say that the heads of the three branches of government, Porfirio Lobo Sosa, Juan Orlando Hernández (on behalf of Congress), and Jorge Rivera Avilés (from the Supreme Court) met with Julieta Castellanos, rector of UNAH, and decided against closing the university.
Yet today, the university has reportedly been closed for a period of ten days, although not apparently by the National Congress: the Ministry of Health says it is closing the campus due to unhealthy conditions created by garbage accumulated when workers went on strike. The Health Ministry claims in particular that dengue (a mosquito born illness) and H1N1 (spread by contact with someone already affected) will be promoted by the trash that has built up on campus and the uncleaned bathrooms. This suggests the ministry of health has a novel view of disease processes, one that we might have hoped was not the understanding of the officials charged with improving health conditions in the country.
The current irritation to the government that is behind the proposal floated this week is the continuing strike by SITRAUNAH, the union that represents labor at UNAH. SITRAUNAH has been on strike since February 23 in a power struggle over reforms at the university. One of the keys to the controversy is the University's unwillingness to continue with the requirement to make payments of over two years of salary upon the death of an employee. As a result, SITRAUNAH has gone on strike and taken over buildings.
The union appears to have some faculty and student support, with recent reports of strikes by some faculty and students, although these also concern proposed financial policies that directly affect students. But SITRAUNAH does not have support from the administration of the university: according to today's report in La Tribuna, Julieta Castellanos requested the congress declare this strike illegal.
The Public Prosecutor, Luis Rubi, would go further: he wants to charge union members with sedition, usurpation, and coercion and has asked a judge in Tegucigalpa to issue arrest orders for the entire leadership of the union.
Sedition? Really? Sedition is an illegal action against lawful authority, directed at a government, tending towards insurrection, but which does not itself amount to treasonous conduct.
What makes the university such a target? Among other things, UNAH is full of intellectuals who have written critical analyses of the conditions that led to the coup d'etat, and of the overall system of government in the country. As we noted in a previous post, UNAH has been criticized for hiring former members of the Zelaya administration, people well-qualified for the jobs they took on.
During the months of open aggression by the Micheletti regime, UNAH students and faculty, even the rector, were subjects of violence. UNAH, and the national teaching university, the Pedagógica, were accused of being sites where bombs/Molotov cocktails were constructed and stored, despite the documented fact that the chemistry lab where the police claimed this was going on had burned years earlier, and not been repaired or replaced.
UNAH is a continuing irritation to government because it is in the nature of a university to encourage free expression of opinions and the development of critical perspectives. The fact that the national congress and public prosecutor are using a labor dispute as a pretext to discuss shutting the whole place down, and even re-directing public funding to private universities, is another indication that Honduras remains far from the ideal of reconciliation and far from conditions that would allow a real pursuit of the truth about the political events of 2009.
The threat to close the university has been widely reported in the Honduran press. While today's coverage in La Tribuna says the proposal has been discarded, it also reports the head of Congress saying that
“there has been talk of distinct options to approach this problem, we're not going to hide it, there are congress members that have advised that if this continues it might be more profitable to give a grant to a student so that he could study in a private university, the amount that a student at the autonoma [UNAH] costs the State so much that it has been said, but no decision has been taken."Rigoberto Chang Castillo, secretary of the National Congress, reportedly proposed closing UNAH as "ungovernable". News coverage notes that Chang Castillo is a faculty member of the school of law, and cites a precedent (although unsuccessful) when in 2008, then-president of the Junta de Dirección Universitaria, Olvin Rodríguez, called for a two year closure of the university which quite obviously was not implemented.
The most recent news reports say that the heads of the three branches of government, Porfirio Lobo Sosa, Juan Orlando Hernández (on behalf of Congress), and Jorge Rivera Avilés (from the Supreme Court) met with Julieta Castellanos, rector of UNAH, and decided against closing the university.
Yet today, the university has reportedly been closed for a period of ten days, although not apparently by the National Congress: the Ministry of Health says it is closing the campus due to unhealthy conditions created by garbage accumulated when workers went on strike. The Health Ministry claims in particular that dengue (a mosquito born illness) and H1N1 (spread by contact with someone already affected) will be promoted by the trash that has built up on campus and the uncleaned bathrooms. This suggests the ministry of health has a novel view of disease processes, one that we might have hoped was not the understanding of the officials charged with improving health conditions in the country.
The current irritation to the government that is behind the proposal floated this week is the continuing strike by SITRAUNAH, the union that represents labor at UNAH. SITRAUNAH has been on strike since February 23 in a power struggle over reforms at the university. One of the keys to the controversy is the University's unwillingness to continue with the requirement to make payments of over two years of salary upon the death of an employee. As a result, SITRAUNAH has gone on strike and taken over buildings.
The union appears to have some faculty and student support, with recent reports of strikes by some faculty and students, although these also concern proposed financial policies that directly affect students. But SITRAUNAH does not have support from the administration of the university: according to today's report in La Tribuna, Julieta Castellanos requested the congress declare this strike illegal.
The Public Prosecutor, Luis Rubi, would go further: he wants to charge union members with sedition, usurpation, and coercion and has asked a judge in Tegucigalpa to issue arrest orders for the entire leadership of the union.
Sedition? Really? Sedition is an illegal action against lawful authority, directed at a government, tending towards insurrection, but which does not itself amount to treasonous conduct.
What makes the university such a target? Among other things, UNAH is full of intellectuals who have written critical analyses of the conditions that led to the coup d'etat, and of the overall system of government in the country. As we noted in a previous post, UNAH has been criticized for hiring former members of the Zelaya administration, people well-qualified for the jobs they took on.
During the months of open aggression by the Micheletti regime, UNAH students and faculty, even the rector, were subjects of violence. UNAH, and the national teaching university, the Pedagógica, were accused of being sites where bombs/Molotov cocktails were constructed and stored, despite the documented fact that the chemistry lab where the police claimed this was going on had burned years earlier, and not been repaired or replaced.
UNAH is a continuing irritation to government because it is in the nature of a university to encourage free expression of opinions and the development of critical perspectives. The fact that the national congress and public prosecutor are using a labor dispute as a pretext to discuss shutting the whole place down, and even re-directing public funding to private universities, is another indication that Honduras remains far from the ideal of reconciliation and far from conditions that would allow a real pursuit of the truth about the political events of 2009.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
