OAS Admission Redux

(Traveling so infrequent access for posting over the next two weeks)

Apparently within a couple of weeks, OAS Secretary General José Miguel Insulza will present a report to the OAS on conditions in Honduras. The report will address the state of human rights in Honduras, and Zelaya's safe return to Honduras.

Insulza says the report will present enough information to let governments decide if they want to readmit Honduras to the OAS or not. He said that in the coming days he hopes he will have more positive information to complete his report, sufficient to convene the OAS and contemplate the changes.

"If you consider those two points resolved you can vote for the readmission of Honduras into the OAS,"

said Insulza. He added

"If those who carried out the coup would have known the bad that was going to come to them, probably they would have waited until the elections; they were only 6 months [away]. What happened was that there, among them were some that thought they would stay for more time, the reaction of the international community stopped them."

Insulza repeated his belief that the solution to the problems in Honduras lies with Honduras a member of the OAS rather than outside it.

El Heraldo seems to have missed this story so far, and instead covered a separate Insulza statement, one he made a couple of days ago in Mexico to the effect that the constitutional altercation will be over in Honduras when those responsible for the coup are tried in court. Insulza added,

"Its not a caprice the solidarity that the OAS countries maintain on this theme, but it deals with a key element to guarantee the existence of an effective democracy in Honduras"

OAS Report on Honduras

Yesterday José Miguel Insulza presented to the President of the OAS Permanent Council, Maria Isabel Salvador, the 12 page report of the High Commission appointed to report on conditions in Honduras. The full report has not yet been released, but its conclusions just appeared in the Honduran press.

As reported in El Tiempo, the High Commission proposed seven points that could make it possible for Honduras to return to the OAS:

1. The Commission considers it appropriate to end the legal cases initiated during the de facto regime against ex President Zelaya and his associates under the laws of Honduras. To adopt this recommendation, the Commission has considered that, although the two cases pending against ex-President Zelaya correspond to events that occurred well before the coup, these cases and the action of the Prosecutor's office were formalized shortly after ex-President Zelaya was overthrown in his duties as president of the country, at the same time that they presented other accusations against him like reason, abuse of authority, and others, in the middle of a negative political climate following the coup. It is evident that at the time of initiating those cases [Honduras] lived in a state of constitutional breakdown which it is not possible to ignore. Therefore , these accusations are perceived as politically motivated.

2. The Commission emphasizes the readiness of President Porfirio Lobo to give former President Zelaya the protection he is entitled to as former President of the Republic of Honduras and recommends it be implemented once former President Zelaya returns home.

3. We recommend that ex-President Zelaya ask the Directive Council of PARLACEN to incorporate him into that organization. The Commission considers that said incorporation recognizes ex-President Zelaya as the previous Constitutional President of the Republic of Honduras before President Porfirio Lobo.

4. The Commission considers that the collaboration offered by the Government of Honduras during the visit of the IACHR last May, the communications sent by President Lobo to the Secretary General about this subject, the subsequent actions reported by the Minister Advisor on Human Rights and the Special Prosecutor on Human Rights, and the presence of an external advisor for the investigation of the crimes against journalists and human rights activists, among others, are positive steps. At the same time, the Commission recognizes the necessity of concrete steps in fulfilling the recommendations of the IACHR, especially the following:

4a. Steady progress in the investigations to clarify the murder of various persons, among them journalists and human rights activists.

4b. The adoption of measures to put an end to the threats and attacks on human rights activists, journalists, social communicators, teachers, members of the Frente Nacional de Resistencia Popular, judges who participated in activities against the coup and the effective implementation of fulfilling the protective measures dictated to protect the life and integrity of numerous at-risk persons. The Commission received the communication of the Minister Advisor on Human Rights informing it that the Secretary of Security had created a Human Rights unit to support the Special Prosecutor of Human Rights.

4c. Provide the Inter-Institutional Commission on Human Rights of Honduras the qualified staff and resources sufficient for them to respond in an efficient manner to defend the human rights of Hondurans and the protective measures of the IACHR. The Commission has seen the letter of the Minister Advisor on Human Rights which reports on the decision of the government to create a Ministry of Justice and Human Rights.

4d. An end to impunity for violations of Human Rights, including those verified by the IACHR and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights of the UN. The Commission knows about the creation of a Unit for the Investigation of Human Rights Violations in the Special Prosecutor for Human Rights office to support investigations in these cases.

4e. Effective support for the work of the Special Prosecutor of Human Rights and the Office of the Minister Advisor on Human Rights. The Commission values the work that both institutions does, in spite of the precariousness of financial and human resources. We consider this work could have a significant impact on the validity of human rights, if they were assigned the necessary resources to carry out an effect oversight, protection, and transformation of the State to a culture of promotion and protection of human rights. The Commission notes with satisfaction the proposal of the Honduran Government to assign resources to these institutions and supports its prompt implementation. It also knows the requests for collaboration sent to the governments of Colombia and the US for investigation of violations of human rights.

5. The Commission considers the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission must count on the full support and collaboration of all sectors of Honduran society to determine what happened on June 28, 2009. The Commission notes with satisfaction the disposition of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to examine the theme of human rights violations in the context of the coup.

6. The Commission notes the willingness of President Lobo to convoke a national dialogue between the political sectors, in which they would discuss themes of interest to all the parties, with the objective to reach a reconciliation of Honduran society. For this it is necessary to avoid any impediments or hostility towards them, especially towards those opposed to the present government. Their security and protection must be guaranteed by the authorities.

7. The Commission presents this report for consideration by the General Assembly so that, in conformity with the Charter of the OAS and the Inter-American Democratic Charter, it can adopt the decisions it considers appropriate with respect to the situation of Honduras.

These conclusions will not be well received by some sectors in Honduras.

Point 3 makes explicit that the de facto government of Roberto Micheletti should not be recognized as having had any legitimacy. For this international body, presidential succession went from Manuel Zelaya to Porfirio Lobo Sosa. At the same time , the report implicitly recognizes as legitimate the November 2009 elections despite the lack of normal institutional international election observers.

If you read our previous post on Rodolfo Pastor Fasquelle's press release on his conversations in Washington with Insulza, representing Manuel Zelaya, many of these points will not be a surprise.

Pastor Fasquelle reported substantial agreement between Insulza and himself on what steps Honduras needed to take to return to the OAS. It was, he reported, Arturo Corrales, representing Lobo, who could not accept some of the points.

Of the five points that Pastor Fasquelle reported he and Insulza agreed on, only his fourth point, a proposal to enlarge the official Truth and Reconciliation Commission by adding a FNRP member, is not mirrored clearly in the final report by the OAS High Commission. In the OAS report, point five presents a watered down wording that calls for the Commission to have the full support and collaboration of all sectors of Honduran society, leaving it to the Honduran government, how to achieve that (or not).

Pastor Fasquelle's fifth point, calling for a broad national dialogue to study the right to a Constitutional Assembly, is redirected in the OAS conclusion six as simply a broad national dialogue, with no mention of a Constitutional Assembly. As it is written in the OAS version, conclusion 6 is a bit puzzling. It calls for a discussion between the political sectors, which would explicitly leave out the FNRP, which is not a political party. There can be no meaningful reconciliation in Honduras without bringing the FNRP to the table.

As the OAS report has just been reported, it's too early to tell what the reaction in Honduras will be. Pay attention to how it gets spun in the different press stories that report on it over the next several days, to get an idea of who feels they have won or lost in this step of the OAS process.

"Conversations in Washington by the Representative of Zelaya, Rodolfo Pastor F."

Vos el Soberano today posted a press release under the above title that reads as follows:

The Secretary General of the OAS, Jose Insulza, having solicited that he send his representative to talk with the OAS High Level Commission formed by the past Assembly of the organization to analyze the problem generated in Honduras by the coup d'Etat of 28-06-09, the ex-President Manuel Zelaya R. ordered me to present myself in Washington. There I attended two meetings between July 5 and 8, one meeting with the Commission as a whole and the other with the Juridical Commission of advisors, that had previously visited Honduras.

I explained our position in the meeting with the Commission of ambassadors, which is the same as the declarations of the OAS and of the authorities of almost all the governments represented in it, which is that, in Honduras on the 28th of June of 2009, there was produced a coup d'etat, underlining that, in it, there had participated in coordination the military, the Congress of that time (which accepted a falsified resignation before naming its president as Head of State), and the present Supreme Court that, in the days following the coup, generated a series of exculpatory documents for the military and a political persecution with a series of accusations against President Zelaya and against various cabinet ministers. We argued that for the present government to be able to be recognized in the assembly as the legitimate representative of our country, it would have to fulfill the demands subscribed to in the proposal of the OAS, and sustained in its democratic charter, otherwise leaving this crime unpunished as a disastrous precedent and abdication of the principles of the organization.

The conversations with Secretary Insulza coincided in

1. Arranging for the end of the judicial prosecution of ex-President Zelaya and his collaborators.

2. Commiting the present government to strengthen the Human Rights Prosecutor.

3. Proposing international accompaniment in the fight against impunity.

4. Enlargening the Truth Commission formed by the government, with a representative to be proposed by the opposition; and

5. Convening a broad National Dialogue, with genuine representation of the opposition and with an open agenda to study the right to the Constitutional Assembly process.

Secretary Insulza informed me without details that President Lobo had sent his own representative but he didn't accept that agreed to [above]. That they were additionally accusing the ex-President, of a payment for publicity and for the investment to finance the logistics of the poll about the Cuarta Urna, which had been indispensable in view of the fact that the military did not return the money they were given for that purpose, when they rebelled two days before the Coup. That is to say that the present government, elected without opposition, under a State of Emergency and without the observation of the OAS nor any official international organization demands that ex-President Zelaya should submit himself, for these accusations, to the justice of the perpetrators and sponsors of the coup that was carried out against him. That they would give him the grace to permit himself to defend himself outside the jail. Secretary Insulza did not explain what would be the proposal for international accompaniment for the struggle against the impunity that the Coup participants enjoy and explained that President Lobo wished that it would be the official Truth Commission itself that would incorporate a representative of the opposition.

It was expressed to the Secretary and the Commission our agreement that, by different procedures, the same end could be arrived at and that what worried us, above all, was the state of defenselessness of Hondurans against the everyday violations and crimes against humanity, certified by its own Commission on Human Rights, about which they were not ruling given that-- due to the complicity of the Public Prosecutor and the judiciary in the coup-- the conditions to put a brake on these abuses or deduce responsibilities did not exist. But he was reminded that the agreement was the end of persecution.

The jurists that have studied the accusations assured us that they have progressed in the discussion with the Prosecutor and the Court in Honduras, but they repeated that, for formality's sake, the President would have to present himself before this judiciary, to ask that it grant him amnesty, and submit himself to trial for the two remaining accusations. To them as well it was explained that the ex-President could submit himself to justice for any accusation made before the day of the coup or before any international judicial body that would offer the conditions of objectivity, but he would not humiliate himself before the court that had administered him the coup d'etat. Later, and at the end of our visit and in view of the fact that agreement had not advanced, we presented before the High Commission a Position Paper, prepared personally by ex-President Manuel Zelaya, today coordinator of the National Resistance Front, demanding that the OAS act in congruence with its Democratic Charter (whose substance is the right of the people), with its own reiterated declarations, and with its commitment not to recognize the government as long as the situation created by the coup is not reversed and full rights have not been restored.

Since then Secretary General Insulza has traveled throughout Latin America lobbying its governments to accept Honduras by majority vote, dismissing those that oppose it, and has lobbied recently in the meeting of SICA in El Salvador in which, despite the fact that the norms of the organization demand a total consensus, in the absence of a country and of three of the presidents, President Funes announced the reincorporation of Porfirio Lobo in the System and solicited, as had been announced many times that he would for pragmatism, the reincorporation of its representative in the OAS.

Honduras back in SICA or, what about the bylaws?

The headlines in many newspapers across Central America, like this one from El Salvador's El Mundo, pronounced Wednesday morning that Honduras was "approved to reincorporate itself into SICA" (emphasis added).

But is that really true? The Presidents of all the Central American countries except Nicaragua met in El Salvador and reportedly issued a proclamation urging the OAS to rapidly reincorporate Honduras back into the OAS. That would be news, but of course, is not the same thing as being reincorporated into SICA.

There is also a claim that Honduras was readmitted to SICA as a fully functioning member yesterday, but interestingly there is no such announcement or resolution on SICA's website. [See below for updates on this point.]

The only posted result of the most recent SICA meeting makes no mention of the reincorporation of Honduras, and lacks a signature from the representative of Nicaragua. Maybe they're just not into transparency?

Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega decided last night to reprimand the other Central American presidents for their "ridiculousness" in issuing the proclamation that Honduras was reincorporated in SICA.

In a speech broadcast Tuesday evening, Ortega dismissed his Central American colleagues as "ridiculous" and as "challenging Central American integration", the NOTIMEX news service reported.

Ortega also said Nicaragua does not recognize the reintegration of Honduras in SICA, and that any such resolution passed at the extraordinary session held in El Salvador on July 20 lacks legal validity because SICA resolutions require unanimity under SICA bylaws. Nicaragua did not vote for any such resolution. Ortega said the announcement by his colleagues violates the basis of the SICA treaty. He said he considers that his colleagues "did something ridiculous" because SICA has its rules and establishes consensus as the rule, and consensus "requires unanimity"; without it, "you simply cannot make such decisions".

We first pointed out this SICA bylaw problem when SICA Secretary General Juan Daniel Alemán Gurdián (a Nicaraguan opponent of the current government of that country) unilaterally declared that no resolution was necessary to reincorporate Honduras into SICA, and that it had never been suspended, patently ignoring the SICA resolution of June 29, 2009.

There was no reaction at the time from any member government, not even President Mauricio Funes of El Salvador, who Alemán accused of just "getting it wrong" for reporting that no consensus had been reached. Which, given that President Ortega would have to be part of any consensus, shows that Funes was correct and Alemán is, lets say, playing fast and loose with the truth.

Meanwhile, Mario Canahuati, the Honduran Foreign Minister, boasted today that he had "24 or 25" votes for Honduras's readmission to the OAS. Under OAS bylaws he only needs 22 votes, a two-thirds majority.

But Boz, in a comment on an earlier post, noted that the OAS normally operates with consensus. He predicted that until the vote could be 30-0 or 28-0 with the remaining countries abstaining, the OAS is unlikely to consider a motion to readmit Honduras.

The reason that SICA coming to a consensus about reintegrating Honduras is important, is that it is the group most likely to accept Honduras back first, for pragmatic reasons: the need for economic integration, negotiation over contested territorial limits in the ocean that can otherwise lead to seizing of fishing boats, and the like.

Boz mentioned such pragmatic considerations in his post earlier today on early reports of "formal reintegration" of Honduras in SICA. There, he argued that it was unlikely that the other Central American presidents would have acted in Ortega's absence, against his expressed position:

I have a hard time believing that the region's presidents, particularly Colom and Funes, would have done this without Ortega's knowledge. I think [Ortega] chose not to attend as a way to abstain from having to either vote in favor or against. That way he can continue his opposition at the OAS and elsewhere, which only has political consequences, while having Honduras back within the Central American community, which benefits the region's economic health.

And this sounds about right to us. But when the other presidents announced that they were in favor of full reintegration of Honduras into the OAS-- assuming that report is true-- Ortega would have had every reason to be outraged. Having arranged not to stand in the way of the necessary (for the people of Honduras, and the region) economic reintegration, while maintaining opposition to the political reintegration into OAS, he finds himself bypassed and blind-sided.

Which we expect will increase, not decrease, his vocal opposition to OAS reintegration. And it is not just Nicaragua, of course (although having one's close neighbor oppose this should rhetorically count for quite a bit).

As the rabidly pro-coup Honduran online Proceso Digital put it, "Even though Central America wants it, South America confirms blockade of Honduras":

from the South they sent a jar of cold water to get across to Tegucigalpa that they will not permit the country to return to the institutional system.

As always, it was incumbent on the aggressive Ecuadorian president Rafael Correa not to fail to take advantage of a visit with the open enemy of Honduras into which the secretary general of the OAS, José Miguel Insulza, has converted himself, to affirm that he will not permit the return of the country to the continental organization, unless it accedes to his desires to see imprisoned all those that removed from power his friend and partner José Manuel Zelaya.

Ecuadorian news media, while being far less colorful in their characterizations of the diplomats involved, basically confirmed that Correa told Insulza he was opposed to reintegration of Honduras in the OAS as long as those who participated in the coup enjoy impunity. The actual statement of Ecuadorian foreign minister Ricardo Patiño did not call for mass imprisonment, but it does call for justice:

"For Ecuador the return of Honduras to the OAS is not acceptable as long as there is no clear sanction or initiation of judgment against those responsible for the coup".

"We believe that it is a very bad precedent for democracy in the hemisphere that a country should carry out a coup d'Etat and organize elections in the next months, as if nothing had happened."

And so, if Boz is right in his assessment of the normal operating procedure of the OAS, it will be a long time before there is an agreement, because there is no indication that anyone in Honduras understands that they have to repudiate the coup, they have to take steps to rid the current government of the hangover coup appointees, and they have to do something substantive and believable about the impunity for the coup authors that was created by the passage of amnesty just before the Micheletti regime stepped down.

OAS Commission Named

We mentioned in a previous post that the OAS had not yet formed the commission to report on the evolution of the situation in Honduras since Lobo Sosa took office. Now it has.

The commission will consist of high level representatives from all of the Central American countries (Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama), Peru, Ecuador, the United States, Canada, Mexico, Argentina, and Jamaica, according to EFE.

According to Jose Miguel Insulza, Secretary General of the OAS, there are two major themes voiced by those who oppose Honduras's readmission to the OAS. The first of these is a desire for Manuel Zelaya Rosales to be able to return to Honduras with all of his rights intact. The other is for an improvement in human rights conditions in Honduras.

Insulza revealed today that he had met privately with Zelaya on Friday, and with Lobo Sosa on Monday to communicate to each of them his ideas for a possible solution to these problems. He indicated that there was no disagreement between Zelaya and Lobo Sosa but "many things still had to be worked out and solidifying them is going to be held up a bit."

The working group of the commission, he emphasized, is not negotiating with either side:

"Our mission is not to achieve an accord between the two parties. There are other political actors in Honduras also and we aren't organizing a kind of national accord...What we have to do is find the conditions under which all the countries are in agreement for the return of Honduras to the OAS."

Insulza noted that no country has rejected the proposals that he presented to Lobo Sosa and Zelaya.

No date has been set for the commission to travel to Honduras. The working group of the commission has already had meetings with representatives of both Zelaya and Lobo Sosa. Wednesday, Insulza met with Arturo Corrales, for Lobo Sosa, and Rodolfo Pastor Fasquelle, representing Zelaya, on the topic of completing all the points of the Tegucigalpa/San Jose accords.

Meanwhile, Lobo Sosa is getting flak within Honduras for even talking to Jose Miguel Insulza.

Today the president of the Consejo Hondureño de la Empresa Privada (COHEP), Santiago Ruiz, asked Lobo Sosa to "stop playing Insulza's game." Ruiz said

"I believe that he is playing Jose Miguel Insulza's game; if there's one thing Hondurans have recovered it's our dignity and we have to maintain it, working with those that already recognize us."

Ruiz had harsh words for Insulza, who he accused of "damaging Honduran interests," and of "not worrying about trampling on millions of Hondurans who are voiceless."

"We should not continue in this game of satisfying the outsiders who have harmed us and made the Honduran people uncertain," Ruiz concluded.

If anyone thought this was going to be easy, Ruiz's comments should be a wake up call. What if Porfirio Lobo Sosa agrees to OAS conditions and cannot find enough support at home to follow through?

A Year of Suspension

On July 5, 2009, the Organization of American States adopted a resolution suspending Honduras's right to participate in that body.

That resolution stated that "a coup d'etat against the constitutional government" had "produced an unconstitutional alteration of the democratic order." The OAS reaffirmed the principal of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states, but also noted that a suspended member of the OAS continues to be bound by the organization's charter and treaty obligations.

The resolution made reference to Articles 20 and 21 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter which urges the OAS member states to take diplomatic actions to restore the democratic order, and authorizes the suspension of the member state when those diplomatic actions fail.

Article 21 notes that although suspended, the suspended member "shall continue to fulfill all its obligations to the Organization, in particular, its human rights obligations." The same clauses require the active member states to maintain diplomatic initiatives to restore democracy in the suspended state.

Article 22 of the Charter covers reincorporation after suspension, "once the situation that led to the suspension has been resolved". This requires that two-thirds of the member countries agree it is resolved.

There was vigorous debate in June in the OAS meeting in Lima, Peru, between OAS members who believe the Honduran situation is resolved, and those who believe more needs to be done. The one thing that was clear at that meeting is that there is not currently the required two-thirds support for readmission.

Instead, the OAS voted to appoint a commission to deliver a report on the state of democracy and human rights in Honduras, with a report due July 30th. At the time, the OAS press release said

All Member States present in Lima agreed that "the situation in Honduras is a matter of concern for all," and that they "need more information on the current status of the political process in Honduras."

This commission should have been appointed several weeks ago according to statements Jose Miguel Insulza made at the time. It still has not been appointed or begun its work. It is not clear what such a commission can do that has not already been accomplished by the several reports of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and it seems very clear that there is little scope for the OAS to change the conditions that make many member states dubious about simply reintegrating Honduras, unrepentant about the coup d'Etat.

We've debated what the international community could do to make a real difference in Honduras, and rejected many ideas. Here's the little that survived that debate:

(1) Recognize the Frente Nacional de Resistencia Popular as a legitimate civil (not political) voice and respond to their initiatives as representatives of a civil organization, and as the opposition to the coup and its continued consequences. Stop treating the coup as a having been a confrontation between the traditional political parties in Honduras. Without involving the Frente, there can be no reconciliation.

(2) Stop treating President Zelaya's return as the sole or most important necessary step in reconciliation. His continued exile is a symptom of larger problems, including continued political persecution of coup opponents by the courts and public prosecutor. Recognize that many Hondurans have left the country for their own safety and security, and that Zelaya, while certainly a powerful symbol, is not the only one, nor is he the sole leader of the opposition.

(3) Fund the Honduran Human Rights Platform and its alternative truth commission. Its budget would be a tiny amount compared to what the international community gives to Honduras every year, and it has more of a chance of actually bringing some light onto the human rights issues in Honduras than the official truth and reconciliation commission, which can't even say the word "coup".

We would like to have said, demand that Porfirio Lobo Sosa formally acknowledge that there was a coup, demand that the Honduran Congress retract its vote illegally installing Roberto Micheletti as "president", but these are things that only Honduran leaders could do, if they had the will to do so.

What seems self-evident is that the international community entirely failed, throughout the months of the de facto regime, to communicate to Honduran political leaders the real seriousness of what they had done, and the fact that it could not be overlooked or easily put behind. The mixed messages sent by the US were especially destructive to any firm international rebuke to Honduras. The control of most news media in Honduras by coup supporters guarantees even today that Honduran press will spin every international statement until black is white, and a refusal to readmit the country to the OAS is a step toward readmission.

Maybe there is no hope of countering this propaganda. But if those behind the 2009 coup don't get the message that it really was unacceptable in the contemporary world, there will be no reason for them to ignore this weapon in future political conflicts.

Tirzah Flores: "profound reform" of judicial system needed

Let's give Tirzah Flores Lanza the last word.

In a letter she addressed to the head of the OAS, José Miguel Insulza, Flores Lanza appeals to the OAS not to readmit Honduras.

She writes:

The political crisis that the State of Honduras has experienced since the events of the Coup d'Etat of the past 28th of June, 2009, will continue to deepen unless there are envisioned, from the governmental sector, democratic alternatives to re-establish the institutionality of the State of Law.

The break of constitutional order has left its mark on the judicial power, where its authorities understand the events as a 'constitutional succession' and a sector of judges and magistrates, officials and employees, in particular, the Association of Judges for Democracy, have assumed a position of condemning the coup d'Etat, implicating us in peaceful demonstrations, public denunciations and legal actions oriented to the guardianship of constitutional guarantees and to obtain the return of constitutional order.

...

In the face of this situation, the Asociación de Jueces por la Democracia, solicits you, Secretary General of the OAS, that prior to any recognition or reincorporation of Honduras in the OAS, there is demanded of the government of Porfirio Lobo Sosa, that it assumes a true commitment to promotion and defense of human rights that would include:

1.- That the Honduran State will assume its responsibility for all the violations of human rights that occurred during and after the coup d'Etat, which implies the punishment of all those responsible for those crimes and the reparation of the victims and their families.

2.- That there be produced a reorganization of all the system of justice, for which it is necessary that there is immediately realized a profound reform of the Judicial Power and the Public Prosecutor.

3.- That there proceeds the reintegration of the judges and magistrate.

Honduras is the new Cuba: Mario Canahuati

Mario Canahuati, Porfirio Lobo Sosa's Foreign Minister, is perhaps not very good at his job. His response to the fact that the reintegration of Honduras is not on the agenda of the OAS meeting in Lima, Peru, starting tomorrow, was to send a report to each of the 32 member countries demonstrating that Honduras has complied with all the international demands since June 28, 2009!

Canahauti's report lays out everything that has happened since the beginning of internal elections in 2008:

"It gives an account of where we've come to, everything we've done to get the international community to recognize us."

The report will be shared with the 32 current members of the OAS on Monday.

Canahuati told La Tribuna that the attitude of the UNASUR and ALBA countries was unacceptable, and he hoped that this report would change their mind.

Canahauti said that "today, after the document we sent, we expect a positive reaction."

If that doesn't result in what is hoped for,

"we will have to initiate a different attitude with respect to initiatives which are remote from the fundamentals and oriented towards damaging the country. We have to revise a little, our position and our strategy to continue."

Remarkably, his model is apparently that paragon of continued economic success: Cuba.

Cuba has been excluded from the OAS for 50 years, and its economy is still expanding, Canahauti told La Tribuna, and because of this the Honduran population should have confidence in the diplomatic gestures of the Chancellery.

Really? Cuba is the model? I don't think that's going to give the business community in Honduras more confidence in the government.

Canahuati is ignoring the uncomfortable truths that the international community has been telling him all along: that a coup is an interruption of democracy that requires corrective action.

He is selectively listening to the Lobo Sosa government's partners like Arturo Valenzuela, US Undersecretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs, who says the return of Zelaya to Honduras is not important, instead of OAS Secretary General José Miguel Insulza, who is telling him that for many of the OAS member nations, it is important.

Canahauti isn't listening to the public statements of the UNASUR governments, who are being very clear that this is their main condition for considering the reincorporation of Honduras in the OAS.

Mr. Canahauti should know it takes a positive vote from two-thirds of the 32 member countries for Honduras to be reincorporated into the OAS. By the Lobo Sosa government's own vote count in May, Honduras only has about half the votes it needs to be restored. UNASUR, with 12 countries, represents more than half of the remaining votes necessary to restore Honduras.

"There exist a few important obstacles for the return of Honduras" said Insulza, the biggest of which is the impossibility of the return of Zelaya:

"The construction of the present Honduran government is based on the idea of national reconcilliation. The truth is I don't see how you can produce this reconcilliation when the principal protagonist of the crisis is prevented from returning to his country."

Insulza noted that there are many countries that see restoring Honduras to the OAS without Zelaya's return as "legitimating the coup that continues to administer justice."

This is the official position of UNASUR.

The other obstacle that Insulza mentioned is the firing of the judges by the Supreme Court:

"Those judges were fired from the Judicial branch for having the opinion that in their country there had been a coup d'etat, and that is unacceptable."

It is Insulza, as Secretary General of the OAS, who will guide the OAS to restoring Honduras when the political will is there, not Arturo Valenzuela, who appears to be as out of touch as Mario Canahauti in this process. Restoring Honduras is a political process. To get the necessary consensus, and achieve his goal, Canahauti should listen to Insulza, not Valenzuela.

Bitter Pill for Lobo Sosa

In a rare moment of candor, Porfirio Lobo Sosa admitted a setback in his program to get Honduras back to its pre-coup place in the international community. That would include reincorporation back into SICA, the Central American Integration System, and the OAS.

For weeks we've heard from the Lobo administration that that the process was proceeding ahead smoothly, and that they were confident that Honduras would be reincorporated back into SICA and the OAS early this summer, if not earlier.

The first evidence that this might all be bravado came when OAS Secretary General Miguel Insulza gave an interview to El Tiempo earlier this month, and revealed that the reincorporation of Honduras was not even on the program to be discussed at the June OAS meeting in Lima, Peru, as we reported at the time. In that interview Insulza revealed that many members of the OAS still had concerns, particularly about human rights in Honduras, and the continued pursuit of the political charges against Manuel Zelaya Rosales that prevent him from returning to Honduras, despite the Congressional amnesty bill. Insulza also mentioned that the verification commission appointed under the ill-fated Guaymuras Accords, made up of Ricardo Lagos and Hilda Solis, would have to return to Honduras and submit a report to the OAS before reincorporation could be discussed.

Now Porfirio Lobo Sosa tells us there's another problem.

Despite the best wishes of Guatemalan President Álvaro Colom and Panamanian President Ricardo Martinelli, it looks like the reincorporation of Honduras back into SICA has hit a roadblock. In comments made to the press yesterday as he left an education event, Lobo Sosa said, "Look, it depends on what Nicaragua decides, but Honduras, with SICA or without SICA will move ahead, you don't have to lose hope about it." Lobo admitted that reincorporation into SICA depends on Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega, who ducked the Saturday lunch where Honduras's reincorporation was supposed to be discussed. Nicaragua does not recognize Lobo's government as legitimate and has not re-established normal diplomatic relations with Honduras since Lobo's inauguration.

Ortega also, Tiempo reports, changed the agenda for the Wednesday meeting of the Central American Presidents in Guatemala; they will discuss the proposed economic treaty between Central America and the European Union. "Possibly Wednesday we will go to Guatemala to revise the free trade agreement with Europe," Lobo said, "although there was no opportunity to consult; its not certain if he [Ortega] will attend or that the meeting is confirmed."

Add to the uncertainty about whether this meeting will happen that Honduras's reincorporation into SICA is no longer on the agenda, and this is really bad news for Porfirio Lobo Sosa.

He and his Foreign Minister, Mario Canahuati, have been emphasizing that all of this was on track to happen soon, and that there were no obstacles to returning Honduras's international relations to normal. Looks like reality caught up with them.

Miguel Insulza told Tiempo on May 5 that Honduras would need to be reincorporated into SICA before the OAS could take up reincorporation into the OAS. As long as reintegration in SICA is deferred, so is consideration of returning to the OAS. And while that is a bitter pill for Lobo Sosa to swallow, it may be the medicine Honduras needs to stop ignoring the continued legacy of the coup.

Not Automatic Afterall

Mario Canahuati, Honduras's Foreign Minister, said April 25 that the reincorporation of Honduras into the OAS was all but a done deal, that it should be automatic, and will happen this June at the OAS assembly in Lima, Peru. Miguel Insulza, the OAS Secretary General, just threw a bucket of cold water on Honduras's hopes for that meeting.

In an interview with the Honduran daily, El Tiempo, Insulza said

"It won't be resolved in the OAS assembly in Lima, but I also don't think it will take until December to resolve it. Most of the Foreign Ministers of the countries I've talked to don't want this general assembly in Lima, which will discuss important themes, to end up an assembly about Honduras ."

Insulza added, Tiempo reports, that setting up the Truth Commission is not the last thing Honduras needs to do before being readmitted to the community of nations.

"Tiempo Reporter: Is the installation of the Truth Commission a ticket whereby Honduras automatically is reincorporated in the OAS?

Insulza: Its one of the topics. At this point the issues raised mainly are: the clarification of issues of public interest such as the human rights issue, not necessarily the investigation of each case, but a better understanding of what the real situation of human rights and persecutions occurring in Honduras, and the issue of regularizing the situation of President José Manuel Zelaya."

Insulza also noted that the members of the Verification (not the Truth) Commission, Ricardo Lagos, and Hilda Solis, need to return to Honduras to evaluate all that has occurred, write a report, and present it to the Permanent Council of the OAS. This bucket of cold water on Canahuati's pronouncement that reincorporation into the OAS was automatic and would happen in June, is political reality, not the PR message Canahuati has been advancing.

Insulza's comments are no doubt tempered by the results of the UNASUR meeting just a few days ago. UNASUR is composed of the governments of the 12 countries of South America. Honduras was one of their topics of discussion. Only two of their member governments, Columbia and Peru, have recognized Porfirio Lobo Sosa as President of Honduras. The rest consider him an illegitimate President.

In that meeting, UNASUR appointed Ecuadorian President, Rafael Correa, its spokesperson to communicate to President Zapatero of Spain their unhappiness with his invitation of Porfirio Lobo Sosa to the May 18 meetings between the European Union and Latin America. In a letter addressed to Zapatero, UNASUR communicated that if Porfirio Lobo Sosa was invited, several of the member governments would boycott the meeting.

La Jornada, a Mexican newspaper, reports that President Lula of Brazil, wrote in a letter to Zapatero, that Lobo is moving forward with "reconciliation" via a "truth commission" to "establish the fiction of democracy, based on forgetting the crimes and pardoning the criminals", all the while putting down the popular Resistance by "selectively assassinating the leaders, independent journalists, and the violent eviction of struggling communities."

"The coup in Honduras is a threat to Latin America, it favors the re-articulation of the conservative right and militarism on the continent, strengthening policy of invasions, wars, interfering, criminalization and prosecution of social struggles, promoted by the government and sectors of American and world power.

Asked specifically about UNASUR and Lula by the Tiempo reporter, José Miguel Insulza said

"This has all the impact that the opinion of a member country has. We make decisions by consensus and naturally the opinion of Brazil is fundamental. Now President Lula spoke of not rushing, and that may mean some delay in reexamining the issue, but it does not mean a veto of the return of Honduras to the OAS."

No, its not a veto, but it does mean Insulza's job is much harder, since a consensus will be difficult if most of the UNASUR countries continue to oppose reincorporation under Article 22 of the OAS charter. Consensus according to Article 22, requires a two-thirds vote to approve readmission of a suspended government.

This is why Insulza said its not automatic, and its not on the agenda for the June OAS meeting.