Adrienne Pine: "U.S. foreign policy backs abusive Honduran state"

An op ed under this title appeared in the San Francisco Chronicle today, following the implications of the Comayagua prison fire which killed 360 people.

Pine sharply cuts through the obfuscation of the real issues that started once US investigators identified the source of the fire as a cigarette. For some, this seemed to relieve pressure for the Lobo Sosa administration to be held accountable for the inferno and the deaths it produced.

But as Pine writes

it was neither accident nor oversight that the Lobo administration did not implement changes ordered by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to prevent more prison deaths.

As she reminds readers, this is not the first time prisoners have died in similar incidents in Honduras:

Police were found to be involved in planning and executing the 2003 and 2004 massacres that killed nearly 200 inmates.

In the Comayagua fire, first hand reports by survivors describe guards shooting at prisoners desperate to escape the overcrowded death trap. The overcrowding, Pine emphasizes, is caused by detention of excessive numbers of people under anti-gang, and more recently, anti-terrorism, laws, without ensuring timely trials. More than half of the prisoners in the Comayagua disaster had not yet been tried.

Pine calls for us to listen to Honduran human rights activists who, in her words

assert that justice requires accountability at the highest levels for the Comayagua fire and all other human rights violations. They demand the implementation of due process for prisoners and a reworking of the penal code by a publicly accountable judiciary.

And they call on the United States to withdraw military and police aid to the Honduran government.

It is long past time for the US to recognize that the Lobo Sosa administration is not advancing reconciliation and peace in Honduras; instead, it has deepened corruption, impunity and privilege of the powerful factions behind the 2009 coup.

And people are dying.

"Conversations in Washington by the Representative of Zelaya, Rodolfo Pastor F."

Vos el Soberano today posted a press release under the above title that reads as follows:

The Secretary General of the OAS, Jose Insulza, having solicited that he send his representative to talk with the OAS High Level Commission formed by the past Assembly of the organization to analyze the problem generated in Honduras by the coup d'Etat of 28-06-09, the ex-President Manuel Zelaya R. ordered me to present myself in Washington. There I attended two meetings between July 5 and 8, one meeting with the Commission as a whole and the other with the Juridical Commission of advisors, that had previously visited Honduras.

I explained our position in the meeting with the Commission of ambassadors, which is the same as the declarations of the OAS and of the authorities of almost all the governments represented in it, which is that, in Honduras on the 28th of June of 2009, there was produced a coup d'etat, underlining that, in it, there had participated in coordination the military, the Congress of that time (which accepted a falsified resignation before naming its president as Head of State), and the present Supreme Court that, in the days following the coup, generated a series of exculpatory documents for the military and a political persecution with a series of accusations against President Zelaya and against various cabinet ministers. We argued that for the present government to be able to be recognized in the assembly as the legitimate representative of our country, it would have to fulfill the demands subscribed to in the proposal of the OAS, and sustained in its democratic charter, otherwise leaving this crime unpunished as a disastrous precedent and abdication of the principles of the organization.

The conversations with Secretary Insulza coincided in

1. Arranging for the end of the judicial prosecution of ex-President Zelaya and his collaborators.

2. Commiting the present government to strengthen the Human Rights Prosecutor.

3. Proposing international accompaniment in the fight against impunity.

4. Enlargening the Truth Commission formed by the government, with a representative to be proposed by the opposition; and

5. Convening a broad National Dialogue, with genuine representation of the opposition and with an open agenda to study the right to the Constitutional Assembly process.

Secretary Insulza informed me without details that President Lobo had sent his own representative but he didn't accept that agreed to [above]. That they were additionally accusing the ex-President, of a payment for publicity and for the investment to finance the logistics of the poll about the Cuarta Urna, which had been indispensable in view of the fact that the military did not return the money they were given for that purpose, when they rebelled two days before the Coup. That is to say that the present government, elected without opposition, under a State of Emergency and without the observation of the OAS nor any official international organization demands that ex-President Zelaya should submit himself, for these accusations, to the justice of the perpetrators and sponsors of the coup that was carried out against him. That they would give him the grace to permit himself to defend himself outside the jail. Secretary Insulza did not explain what would be the proposal for international accompaniment for the struggle against the impunity that the Coup participants enjoy and explained that President Lobo wished that it would be the official Truth Commission itself that would incorporate a representative of the opposition.

It was expressed to the Secretary and the Commission our agreement that, by different procedures, the same end could be arrived at and that what worried us, above all, was the state of defenselessness of Hondurans against the everyday violations and crimes against humanity, certified by its own Commission on Human Rights, about which they were not ruling given that-- due to the complicity of the Public Prosecutor and the judiciary in the coup-- the conditions to put a brake on these abuses or deduce responsibilities did not exist. But he was reminded that the agreement was the end of persecution.

The jurists that have studied the accusations assured us that they have progressed in the discussion with the Prosecutor and the Court in Honduras, but they repeated that, for formality's sake, the President would have to present himself before this judiciary, to ask that it grant him amnesty, and submit himself to trial for the two remaining accusations. To them as well it was explained that the ex-President could submit himself to justice for any accusation made before the day of the coup or before any international judicial body that would offer the conditions of objectivity, but he would not humiliate himself before the court that had administered him the coup d'etat. Later, and at the end of our visit and in view of the fact that agreement had not advanced, we presented before the High Commission a Position Paper, prepared personally by ex-President Manuel Zelaya, today coordinator of the National Resistance Front, demanding that the OAS act in congruence with its Democratic Charter (whose substance is the right of the people), with its own reiterated declarations, and with its commitment not to recognize the government as long as the situation created by the coup is not reversed and full rights have not been restored.

Since then Secretary General Insulza has traveled throughout Latin America lobbying its governments to accept Honduras by majority vote, dismissing those that oppose it, and has lobbied recently in the meeting of SICA in El Salvador in which, despite the fact that the norms of the organization demand a total consensus, in the absence of a country and of three of the presidents, President Funes announced the reincorporation of Porfirio Lobo in the System and solicited, as had been announced many times that he would for pragmatism, the reincorporation of its representative in the OAS.

A Year of Suspension

On July 5, 2009, the Organization of American States adopted a resolution suspending Honduras's right to participate in that body.

That resolution stated that "a coup d'etat against the constitutional government" had "produced an unconstitutional alteration of the democratic order." The OAS reaffirmed the principal of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states, but also noted that a suspended member of the OAS continues to be bound by the organization's charter and treaty obligations.

The resolution made reference to Articles 20 and 21 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter which urges the OAS member states to take diplomatic actions to restore the democratic order, and authorizes the suspension of the member state when those diplomatic actions fail.

Article 21 notes that although suspended, the suspended member "shall continue to fulfill all its obligations to the Organization, in particular, its human rights obligations." The same clauses require the active member states to maintain diplomatic initiatives to restore democracy in the suspended state.

Article 22 of the Charter covers reincorporation after suspension, "once the situation that led to the suspension has been resolved". This requires that two-thirds of the member countries agree it is resolved.

There was vigorous debate in June in the OAS meeting in Lima, Peru, between OAS members who believe the Honduran situation is resolved, and those who believe more needs to be done. The one thing that was clear at that meeting is that there is not currently the required two-thirds support for readmission.

Instead, the OAS voted to appoint a commission to deliver a report on the state of democracy and human rights in Honduras, with a report due July 30th. At the time, the OAS press release said

All Member States present in Lima agreed that "the situation in Honduras is a matter of concern for all," and that they "need more information on the current status of the political process in Honduras."

This commission should have been appointed several weeks ago according to statements Jose Miguel Insulza made at the time. It still has not been appointed or begun its work. It is not clear what such a commission can do that has not already been accomplished by the several reports of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and it seems very clear that there is little scope for the OAS to change the conditions that make many member states dubious about simply reintegrating Honduras, unrepentant about the coup d'Etat.

We've debated what the international community could do to make a real difference in Honduras, and rejected many ideas. Here's the little that survived that debate:

(1) Recognize the Frente Nacional de Resistencia Popular as a legitimate civil (not political) voice and respond to their initiatives as representatives of a civil organization, and as the opposition to the coup and its continued consequences. Stop treating the coup as a having been a confrontation between the traditional political parties in Honduras. Without involving the Frente, there can be no reconciliation.

(2) Stop treating President Zelaya's return as the sole or most important necessary step in reconciliation. His continued exile is a symptom of larger problems, including continued political persecution of coup opponents by the courts and public prosecutor. Recognize that many Hondurans have left the country for their own safety and security, and that Zelaya, while certainly a powerful symbol, is not the only one, nor is he the sole leader of the opposition.

(3) Fund the Honduran Human Rights Platform and its alternative truth commission. Its budget would be a tiny amount compared to what the international community gives to Honduras every year, and it has more of a chance of actually bringing some light onto the human rights issues in Honduras than the official truth and reconciliation commission, which can't even say the word "coup".

We would like to have said, demand that Porfirio Lobo Sosa formally acknowledge that there was a coup, demand that the Honduran Congress retract its vote illegally installing Roberto Micheletti as "president", but these are things that only Honduran leaders could do, if they had the will to do so.

What seems self-evident is that the international community entirely failed, throughout the months of the de facto regime, to communicate to Honduran political leaders the real seriousness of what they had done, and the fact that it could not be overlooked or easily put behind. The mixed messages sent by the US were especially destructive to any firm international rebuke to Honduras. The control of most news media in Honduras by coup supporters guarantees even today that Honduran press will spin every international statement until black is white, and a refusal to readmit the country to the OAS is a step toward readmission.

Maybe there is no hope of countering this propaganda. But if those behind the 2009 coup don't get the message that it really was unacceptable in the contemporary world, there will be no reason for them to ignore this weapon in future political conflicts.

One Year of Resistance: What Could Porfirio Lobo Sosa Do?

As I write this on June 26, one year has passed since the day we left Honduras. We had tickets to return in a couple of weeks to continue our work. We also knew we would be returning later, in August or September, for another event.

The political situation was tense enough that we told the students who were staying to be careful. In particular, despite any interest they might have, we suggested they stay away from the central square in San Pedro Sula on Sunday, when the polling for the cuarta urna initiative would take place. We were concerned there would be violence, given the passion and at times, frenzied irrationality, of those protesting Manuel Zelaya's proposal to test the depth of support for constitutional reform.

But despite conversations about rumors of a coup with Honduran colleagues, we did not believe, truly believe, that Honduras could turn back to that past. So when we were wakened on June 28 by a call from one of our students with the news of President Zelaya's kidnapping and expatriation, the disruptions of media and internet service, and cut-offs of electricity, we struggled to come to terms with this failure of democratic process.

We are still struggling to understand it, and the events that followed under the de facto regime, and continue under the administration of Porfirio Lobo Sosa. We have, with many others, found the actions of the United States disappointing, and determinative in breathing new life into the de facto regime at points when it seemed that a restoration of the elected government might be possible. Instead, Roberto Micheletti held on to his delusional "presidency", destroying any chance for elections to be held that would allow for participation by dissenting politicians and that might have honestly acknowledged the level of nonparticipation and open repudiation of elections held after such a breach of public order.

One of the things we struggle with constantly is the question, what could a real leader in Honduras do at this point to begin a process that might allow the country to come to terms with these events sooner rather than later? We have, like others, been horrified at the cynicism of the US position that ticks off a list of gestures in order to claim that the coup is behind us. We think there is ample evidence that the gestures Porfirio Lobo Sosa is performing satisfy no one except the US, and have further weakened Honduran government and civil society.

So we debate, constantly, the question: what might Lobo Sosa do now that could genuinely make a difference? Is Honduras doomed to spend an entire presidential administration in this state of suspended animation? In commemoration of one year of Honduran resistance to this coup and its aftermath, we offer the following list of actions that a Honduran president who truly wanted to start a process of national dialogue would have to take:

(1) Declare officially that the coup d'etat was an unconstitutional disruption of the rule of law. We know from his candid statements to Spanish media that Lobo Sosa admits that a golpe took place. But Lobo Sosa not only was incapable of leading the members of his own party to repudiate the coup after the November elections, he assented to the Congressional resolution reaffirming the illegitimate actions of June 28, 2010. As long as the official line in Honduras is that what happened was legal, there is no possibility of coming to terms with what happened.

(2) Recognize the existence of the FNRP as a legitimate voice of opposition, respect the insistence of the FNRP on determining its own structure and leadership, and acknowledge its communications as legitimate political statements of an autonomous public opinion that cannot be dismissed as "radical". This one is complicated. Honduran politicians want to neutralize the FNRP by drawing attention to its internal debates (as if such differences in opinion are absent in other political groups), by characterizing it as radical, and if those attempts do not work, by suggesting it is simply a typical political movement that will be converted into a conventional party. It will be a challenge for Lobo Sosa to craft a statement that accepts the legitimacy of the Frente without also attempting to redefine it or minimize its importance. But it is critical that he acknowledge that the conventional political parties whose presidential candidates he drafted into his cabinet do not represent the opposition to the coup, and thus, that his government is not one of "reconciliation and unity".

(3) Fund Sandra Ponce, the Fiscalia de Derechos Humanos (who has the investigative and prosecutorial authority for responding to complaints of human rights abuses) and direct her to immediately investigate the human rights abuses documented by the IAHRC. State clearly and in public that he accepts the IAHRC's findings and acknowledge that abuses continue today.

(4) While we doubt Lobo Sosa has the political power to do it (and we question whether he has the support to accomplish even the first three items we list) if he could, he should remove from executive branch offices those proponents of the coup d'etat appointed by Micheletti who are still to be found throughout the Honduran government.

(5) Acknowledge formally that he cannot guarantee Manuel Zelaya Rosales that if he returned to Honduras, which is his legal right, he would be free of politically-motivated prosecution. By insisting that Zelaya can return anytime, without admitting that the judicial branch, full of adherents of the de facto regime and complicit in the coup d'etat, is primed to pursue prosecution of a frivolous list of charges, Lobo Sosa is being disingenuous. Hondurans were encouraged in the months leading to the coup to be afraid of political differences, and were inspired to call for adherence to narrow orthodoxies of thought, belief, and action. Zelaya is one of the most powerful symbols of the purging of political diversity, and if Lobo Sosa would acknowledge that the country cannot tolerate his presence, he would be acknowledging that the country is not capable of healthy political debate.

(6) Finally, we would hope that Lobo Sosa could find the courage to reject the utility of the artificial performance of the steps outlined for Micheletti in the Tegucigalpa-San Jose Accord. He needs to be the one to admit that having politicians from other parties in his cabinet is not "a government of unity and reconciliation". He should be the one to say that Honduras is not ready for a "Truth Commission" constructed simply to give cover to a few powerful international allies that want to stop having to deal with Honduras. He could do more good by saying clearly what everyone in Honduras knows: the truth of what happened on June 28, 2009 is well established. There is nothing about the events that is unclear. It is how people in support of the coup justify those events, in contrast to how the opposition understands them, that is separating Hondurans. And those are not matters of truth: they are matters of interpretation. If Honduras needs to move on, what it needs to move on from is precisely the terms of the Accord, which never worked, never really stemmed from Honduran intentions, and stands in the way of the country beginning to confront the fissures that broke open one year ago today.

Political Expediency

On May 7 the Honduran Supreme Court dismissed 4 judges and a magistrate allegedly for participating in political activity opposed to the coup. It has taken no action against those judges who marched in favor of the coup. We blogged about their dismissal at the time. At the time, NGO's like the Center for Justice and International Law (CEJIL) denounced the dismissals as "significant reprisals" and as a "clear intimidating message" for other justices in Honduras. No one in Honduras said much of anything about it, except the Frente de Resistencia.

Fast forward to yesterday, when the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IACHR) released a statement on the state of human rights in Honduras after a fact finding visit to the country. The IACHR release called out the dismissal of the judges as particularly troubling.

"Of particular concern are the acts of harassment directed against judges who participated in activities against the coup d’état. The Commission met with members of the Association of Judges for Democracy who were dismissed from their posts by the Supreme Court of Justice (CSJ). Notwithstanding the formal reasons that could be argued by the Supreme Court, the reasons that motivated the process and the final decision are undoubtedly linked to participation in anti-coup demonstrations or to having expressed an opinion against the coup d’état. The inter-American human rights system has repeatedly underscored the central role of the judiciary in the functioning of a democratic system. It is unacceptable that those persons in charge of administering justice who were opposed to the democratic rupture would face accusations and dismissals for defending democracy. The IACHR urgently calls for a reversal of this situation that seriously undermines the rule of law."

Suddenly there's a flurry of condemnations of the Supreme Court's action. UD party member Marvin Ponce introduced a bill to form a commission to study the dismissal in Congress, but the President of Congress, Juan Orlando Hernandez suspended discussion saying it needed more time than could be allotted to the discussion yesterday. Also yesterday Porfirio Lobo Sosa, in Spain, said it was hurting his efforts to win recognition for Honduras. Then he said

"This is a subject that I've discussed with the President of the Court (Jorge Rivera Avilez), and I said you should not take any action that is not appropriate for peace and stability in Honduras, and although they suggested that they were not going to do it, they did."

Lobo expressed support for the Congressional investigation.

The question is, where were these people 12 days ago when the Supreme Court acted? Why did it take them this long to express their concerned. Could it be there's only concern now because there's political cover in the IACHR report for being concerned? Only time will tell.

Blacklisted

The Interamerican Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) issued its annual black list of countries that do not respect human rights. For the first time since 2006, a new country appears on the list, Honduras. The inclusion of Honduras is based on the report of the IACHR visit to the country last August. Chapter 4 of the report, which can be downloaded here, is an executive summary of the longer IACHR report on Human Rights and the Coup, issued in December, 2009. Compare that report with the rather sparse State Department report on Human Rights in Honduras.

The response in Honduras has been dismissive.Porfirio Lobo Sosa's newly minted Human Rights advisor, Ana Pineda, is quoted on Radio America's website as saying "this is not the time for Honduras to say whether it endorses the report of the Interamerican Commission on Human Rights." She is reported to have said that the report of the IACHR, in general, reflects the problems of the country after the expulsion of Manuel Zelaya Rosales. In other words, she thinks this is old stuff.

"Now, Honduras is trying to take into account the recommendations of the IACHR and investigate specific cases of human rights violations."

Except querida Human Rights advisor, the Human Rights prosecutor, Sandra Ponce, has come forward recently to say that her office cannot investigate and file human rights cases because she has no budget to do so.

Apparently, the naming of Honduras to the list bothered President Lobo Sosa, who came out and said "Its not the policy of the state to violate human rights." He continued:

"The important thing for me is that it is not a state policy, I acknowledge that we have inherited a country with high crime and are doing our best ; there is no State policy of violating human rights."

State policy is not the issue, Mr. President, its are you prepared to stop the abuses that are undeniably being denounced daily. Denial is a step on the road to recovery, I'm told.

But moments ago the AP reported that Lobo Sosa had rejected the IACHR report. The same story quotes Human Rights Ombudsperson Ramón Custodio as calling the report "a form of manipulation with the goal of hurting Honduras. The IACHR has lost its ethics."

The Center for Justice and International Law told the UN that the Honduran government has taken no action to protect the majority 134 people named in IACHR demands for protective orders. It found this lack of action worrying.

At the same time, a motion introduced by the representatives of the UD party in the National Congress to replace Human Rights Ombudsperson Ramón Custodio Lopez because he has not properly carried out his functions was defeated by a 122-6 vote. La Tribuna calls this a "unanimous rejection" bringing new meaning to the word "unanimous". Lobo Sosa said that this is not the time for such a motion, rather that it is the time for reconciliation.

Responsible journalism?

An article published in the Honduran Proceso Digital online newspaper today says that Porfirio Lobo Sosa will be holding a meeting Monday between different government offices to discuss the wave of attacks, many fatal, on journalists in Honduras.

As the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) noted in a report published this week, in March alone, five journalists were killed. This makes March 2010 the most deadly month ever for Honduran journalists, according to Thelma Mejía reporting on the IPS website. The CPJ says that this has "led to widespread self-censorship in the local media".

Independent and informed media point to the coup as triggering an increase in repression of media, including acts of extreme violence. Mejía writes that "local and international human rights groups warn that since the Jun. 28, 2009 coup that overthrew then president Manuel Zelaya, the wave of repression targeting the movement against the coup, as well as journalists, has not let up."

The Proceso Digital article instead takes the curious approach of tracing the beginning of violence against journalists back to 2007, mentioning a series of incidents in April 2008, the recovery of remains of a missing journalist in March 2009, and another death in April 2009. Even when citing the death of Gabriel Fino in July 2009, after the coup d'etat, Proceso Digital manages not to so much as mention the coup and its aftermath as a context.

CPJ reporting at the time of the death of Fino, a local radio reporter on the Atlantic coast and contributor to national programs, noted no specific motive had been identified; nor has any progress been reported in the succeeding months. Spanish language coverage at the time rejected any political motivation for Fino's death, with some stories suggesting it might have related to his reporting on drug trafficking. Nonetheless, a report by Daniel Kovalik published July 22, 2009 in the Pittsburgh Post Gazette identified Fino as "openly opposed to the coup", and numerous stories pointed out that the general repression of the press by the de facto regime created an unsafe atmosphere for reporters.

As Mejía notes in her IPS article, that atmosphere continues today. And so does murkiness about the motivations for these killings. This encourages US media outlets like the Los Angeles Times to present a distorted "fair and balanced" suggestion that "both the extreme right, long the dominant power in Honduras, and the extreme left would have reasons for sowing fear", citing Honduran law professor Leo Valladares. While Jose Osman Lopez, president of the Committee for Free Expression in Honduras, is quoted as saying "the killings of the journalists are part of a wider deterioration in human rights that has especially hurt opponents of the coup and belied talk of reconciliation", the impression left with the reader is that there might be anti-journalist violence by supporters of the resistance as much as by the repressive right wing.

The quote from Valladares is especially misleading, as this former commissioner of human rights has been a clear voice against violence and repression by the de facto regime installed after the coup d'Etat. In a widely reproduced interview from November 2009, Valladares made clear his support for mobilization in defense of human rights, and his condemnation of the right-wing coup that took over Honduras. In October, he was quoted in press coverage of repression as saying "all the actions of the de facto government have been nothing more than another strategy to cut off the voices that denounce human rights [violations]."

There are reasons to suspect that at least some of the recent surge in assassinations of journalists might be related to continuing repression of dissent. Many of those killed come from the north coast, where the conflict between the campesinos seeking land rights in the Bajo Aguan and private landowners, their security forces, and complicit media and police forces, continues to be heated.

This March, José Bayardo Mairena, a radio reporter, died while driving from Catacamas to Juticalpa, Olancho, as did another reporter accompanying him, Manuel Juarez. CPJ characterizes Bayardo Mairena as a "veteran journalist" who "handled general assignments that included coverage of organized crime and a land dispute in the Aguán region". Not included in the mainstream Honduran press coverage was the information that Bayardo Mairena "strongly questioned the coup d'etat carried out June 28, 2009. He also had systematically denounced the constant human rights violations carried out by the army and police against citizens in resistance on the radio station in Olancho where he worked".

Previously murdered was Nahúm Palacios Arteaga, of Channel 5 TV and Radio Tocoa in Tocoa, Atlántida, also reporting on the Aguan struggle. CPJ's report on Palacios correctly recalls that in June 2009, he "had been threatened by members of the military for his critical coverage of the coup" with his home and office raided and equipment confiscated. Despite a request in summer 2009 for protection for Palacios by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, none was provided.

Also killed in March on the Atlantic coast was David Meza Montesinos, a radio journalist on reporter La Ceiba station El Patio and a correspondent for Radio America, described by CPJ as covering drug trafficking and organized crime. His death has been attributed to drug traffickers.

So where does the insinuation of "extreme leftwing" violence against journalists come from? One attack has been linked, with great drama but no evidence, to the Honduran resistance, by radio personality Karol Cabrera, who survived it. Joseph Hernández Ochoa, the fifth journalist killed in March, died in the attack in Tegucigalpa. CPJ reported that Hernández Ochoa hosted an entertainment program on Tegucigalpa TV station Channel 51, and it was widely assumed that the principal target was Cabrera. Cabrera, who worked as a presenter on state-owned Canal 8 for the Micheletti regime, accused "Zelaya militants" of the attack on her, a charge she previously made in the unfortunate death of her daughter, a death investigators associated instead with acquaintance gang violence. In the more recent attack, the parents of Hernández Ochoa have actually accused Cabrera of engineering it to eliminate him.

The two attacks on Karol Cabrera, and her unsubstantiated claims that they were the work of opponents of the coup d'Etat, are the only reported examples of violence against journalists that have even been imputed, unconvincingly, to the progressive movement in Honduras. But leave it to the fair and balanced media in the US not only to give these claims equal weight, but to fail to provide the context that makes it clear that there is a pattern to the journalistic bloodbath of March.

That pattern points to the contested terrain of the north coast, where reporters seeking to spread real news put their lives in danger, in an atmosphere of violent repression fostered by the regime of the golpe de estado of 2009 and continuing under the Lobo Sosa administration.