Jorge Reina a terrorist? Ideas are not bombs

As new Honduras cables continue to emerge through Wikileaks, those of us with interests in Honduras are finding the revelations for the most part unsurprising, if distasteful.

Latest case in point is a patronizing summary by ex-Ambassador to Honduras Charles A. Ford providing his "insights" into then-President Zelaya. On Daily Kos, Charles II of Mercury Rising has provided a good analysis of the disturbing tenor of this cable, which can be read in full on quotha for those who can take it, courtesy of the inimitable Adrienne Pine.

Both Charles and Adrienne point out some of the more wretched indictments of a kind of easy assumption of US privilege, including the contempt Ford showed for Zelaya's roots in Olancho and Zelaya's apparent failure to understand that Tegucigalpa was not the big city, a role played in Ford's universe of model Honduran behavior by New Orleans or Miami. You know, where the Honduran elites go to shop so they don't look so, well, Honduran.

Charles also points to one of the curious and almost unintelligible opinions Ford expresses as facts:

Ford is also loose with accusations. He accuses Jorge Antonio Reina Idiaquez of having terrorist connections. At the time, Reina was UN Ambassador and no charges had ever been brought against him, nor have been. I am unable to discover any substantiation for this allegation, and it may well come out of the Contra Wars.

This had bothered me in reading the cable as well, but not because I had not heard such implications. Instead, for me it rang a bell. So I tried to trace back what I remembered, and I think the story is even less sensible than Charles thought.

In September of 2006-- barely nine months into the Zelaya administration, long before the independent actions that led Ford to express frustration with him-- Proceso Digital published an article about Mel knowing "since December 2005" that his chosen Ambassador to the UN, Jorge Arturo Reina, did not have a visa to enter the US.

According to an earlier Proceso Digital article, this lack of a visa was due to Reina being blocked for what the US embassy described as unspecified "terrorist acts".

But Reina himself volunteered what he thought were the actions at issue. Again quoting Proceso Digital:

Reina, brother of the ex-president Carlos Roberto Reina, now dead, remembered that in the 70s he had been accused of placing a bomb on the Palmerola air base, in the central Department of Comayagua, where the US military forces were based.

Reina went on to say that he had been legally cleared of these charges:

he denied his participation in this act, and said that owing to the fact that this was not true the judicial authorities exonerated him of the action and they sent him home in a kind of dismissal of charges.

The reporters, primed by this information, asked the US consul, Ian Brownlea, whether these were the "terrorist acts" in question, getting this gnomic response:

"ideas are not evils, but rather bombs...the place where the acts occurred doesn't matter".

Indeed. It would seem that the place where the acts occurred does actually matter, if the first half of this statement is, as it appears to be, a grudging agreement that the terrorist actions imputed to Reina involved bombs.

There is something confused in Reina's own account: Palmerola only became operational in 1981. I remember vividly reports of a bomb set off in a restaurant in Comayagua during the 1980s when I was living in the country, a restaurant my Honduran friends said was targeted because the US forces ate there. The New York Times story on this incident in 1987 says six US soldiers and six Hondurans were wounded.

Trying to find press accounts to date these events was a painful reminder that the US presence at Palmerola was not accepted peacefully, no matter what the US would like to tell its citizenry now.

The period from 1987 to 1989 saw a series of bombs or grenades exploded near places frequented by US forces, in La Ceiba, San Pedro Sula, and Comayagua, according to reports in the LA Times gathered in its archives. An LA Times article from 1989 reported two other incidents of attacks on US troops, one a bombing that definitely took place on the road from Comayagua to Palmerola. As late as 1994, the Orlando Sentinel reported on the explosion of a bomb in Comayagua that authorities said was intended for Palmerola.

Bombings drew a lot of press attention but there were other forms of protest as well. An Orlando Sentinel article from 1986 reported on a rally where Juan Almendares spoke out against the bad social effects of the base, promoting prostitution in Comayagua.

But Jorge Arturo Reina was not mentioned as a suspect in any English-language coverage of bombings on or near Palmerola. What he was, without doubt, was an outspoken critic of what he repeatedly called the US "occupation" of Honduras, which he said strengthened the right wing. He called for the withdrawal of US troops, and warned that death lists were circulating with names of many, including his own. (The news articles I consulted are pay for view, so I do not link to them here.)

Palmerola had already come to represent US occupation by 1983, when Reina was widely quoted criticizing increasing tensions with Sandinista Nicaragua as not in Honduras' interest. US newspapers, with remarkable uniformity, characterized Reina at the time as "leftist", at times taking care to note he was "not Marxist".

Reina criticized US basing at Palmerola for dragging Honduras into El Salvador's civil war as well. An article in 1983 in El Pais of Spain, describing him as secretary general of the "Liberal Alliance of the People" (Alianza Liberal del Pueblo, a movement within the Liberal Party), quoted him as saying

"The US refused to negotiate in El Salvador because it has an exclusively military version of the facts and considers that the cause of the Salvadoran crisis was Cuba and its solution uniquely military", adding that "Washington discovered later that the cause was not Cuba and that the situation does not have a military solution, but before this change of view thousands of deaths were produced".

These are the kind of views that undoubtedly made Reina, like Zelaya, appear not to be a friend of the US. But they hardly qualify him as a terrorist.

After all, as the US consul himself said, "ideas are not evils". Nor are they bombs.

But apparently unsubstantiated rumors are fine fodder for a US Ambassador's briefings to his successor.

Recognition or Probation?

A recent email asked us which countries have officially recognized the Lobo Sosa government. Our reply to this correspondent, a fellow academic, was disappointing for his purposes, but encouraged us to consider a post; because the answer is, it depends. Depends on what "recognition" means; depends on who's identifying "recognition"; and depends on what is being recognized.

Honduran Secretary of State Mario Canahuati claims that the total is up to 50 countries. He had been previously quoted as saying Honduras had "succeeded in re-establishing relations with 29 countries of the 39 which which we have relations of diplomatic representation". Clearly, even he is using shifting criteria for what "recognition" means.

So let's start with the easy things first. Honduras is still, as of this writing, outside the OAS. Of course, the OAS feels this is a result of their expulsion of Honduras; but wait, remember: Micheletti claimed that Honduras withdrew from OAS before it was expelled.

As US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton explained in her road trip throughout Latin America, the US recognizes the November election as legitimate (despite the lack of any independent international observers) and thus the Lobo Sosa government has US recognition. And she wonders what some Latin American countries are waiting for. Except that as of this writing, the US has not in fact accepted the credentials of a proposed ambassador to Washington. According to La Tribuna on March 21, the current candidate is Jorge Ramón Hernández Alcerro, who some sources say was selected from a short list of five candidates proposed to the US, after Roberto Flores Bermúdez, who notoriously aligned himself with the regime of Roberto Micheletti, was not given US approval. And of course, the US laid down a set of conditions for Lobo Sosa to fulfill for recognition, including the farce of a "reconciliation government" and the (apparently permanently stalled) "truth commission", so even US recognition has been complicated. Most significantly, it has meant letting aid money flow again.

International lending agencies have in fact led the way in "recognizing" the Lobo Sosa administration, opening the purse strings for the kinds of loans that are critical for a government facing a treasury exhausted by the policy of Roberto Micheletti. Among those back in Honduras are the IMF, BID, World Bank, and the BCIE. Some countries that have agreed to restart financial assistance have been counted as "recognizing" Honduras, but not all of these have sent diplomats back to Tegucigalpa, or those diplomats have not tendered their credentials to the Lobo Sosa government.

Here's the crux of the matter: international diplomacy is not an on/off switch. Diplomatic protocol provides an exquisite variety of ways to establish relations, even with what are considered rogue states. On January 26, when Lobo Sosa was inaugurated, only the presidents of Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Taiwan attended, and only the US, Costa Rica, Colombia, Panama, and Peru were counted as fully recognizing Lobo Sosa's government. As of April 5, Honduran Foreign Minister Mario Canahuati reported approval of the Honduran ambassador to Costa Rica, and expected approval this week of those to Panama, Colombia, Spain, Guatemala, and El Salvador, out of a dozen nominations reportedly proposed by March 21.

The spectrum of available diplomatic approaches provides the international community, even the booster-ish US, with options to apply pressure on the Lobo Sosa administration. Some of that pressure can be seen as directed to whitewashing the coup and its aftermath. And some may be less cynical than that-- but the more serious the pressure, the less likely we will see it reflected in news media.

So. Who's recognized the Lobo Sosa government fully, by which I mean, sent a new ambassador, sent back the ambassador they had withdrawn, or either accepted the credentials of the Honduran ambassador or indicated that they will?

Shortly after the November elections, Panama, Colombia, Costa Rica and Peru were the first Latin American nations to indicate they would do so. They were joined in early 2010 by El Salvador, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic, in an openly reported quid pro quo for safe conduct out of Honduras for former president Zelaya.

Mexico's position appears a little ambiguous, despite my best attempts to confirm reports that they have also recognized Lobo Sosa. Taiwan and Israel never actually clearly withdrew recognition from the Micheletti de facto regime, and both countries are said to be actively supporting the new Honduran government. And while Canada followed the US lead in supporting Lobo Sosa's advocacy for normalization, to the disgust of progressives in our northern neighbor, its official website on relations with Honduras as of March 4 said Canada was just "moving to normalize relations with the new, elected government of President Pepe Lobo".

Adamantly resisting are, as expected, the ALBA nations (most important being Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela). The largest South American nations-- Brazil and Argentina-- were rather polite but firm in resisting Secretary of State Clinton's coaxing to come on board. Speaking more diplomatically than Clinton, Brazil's Foreign Minister Celso Amorim noted that a coup is hard to forgive and forget.

On February 21, Mario Canahuati counted ten countries that were resisting re-establishing diplomatic missions with Honduras, including Brazil, Uruguay, México, Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Chile. While Uruguay has been recorded consistently as not recognizing Lobo Sosa's government, Chile was briefly counted by the Honduran press as recognizing Lobo Sosa by virtue of Lobo Sosa's plans to attend the inauguration of its new president, plans he had to cancel after Honduras charge d'affaires in Chile communicated that he was not, in fact, invited to Pinera's inauguration.

France and Spain were noted as returning recalled ambassadors to Honduras in early March, yet coverage on April 2 of Spain's advocacy of including Honduras in EU discussions of an economic agreement with the Central American nations quoted Spanish minister of Foreign Affairs Miguel Ángel Moratinos as saying that Spain "has decided that its ambassador should return to Tegucigalpa" as a first action toward the normalization of diplomatic ties.

On March 24, El Heraldo reported on seven ambassadors presenting credentials to the Lobo Sosa government, from Finland, Germany, Israel, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Czech Republic, and India. Several will serve at the same time as ambassadors for other Central American countries. Other coverage cites Canahuati as listing Italy among those recognizing the Lobo Sosa government.

Meanwhile, Honduras has yet to confirm its ambassador to the United Nations, although the Zelaya appointee, Jorge Arturo Reina, was happy to announce that he would be staying on (prematurely, and perhaps inaccurately, as he is also reported to be Lobo Sosa's delegate to represent Honduras to the ALBA countries). Honduran press counted the UN as "tacitly" recognizing the Lobo Sosa government as of February 1, by including it in documents.On April 1, Mario Canahuati attended a meeting about aid to Haiti at the UN, credited as having recognized Lobo Sosa as of February 3.

So perhaps the best way to think about all this is that the Lobo Sosa administration is on global probation.

Skepticism about the new administration will not be easily erased as long as it continues to incorporate supporters of the coup d'Etat in prominent posts. The fact remains that Lobo Sosa never has disclaimed the Micheletti regime, or the coup itself. There are countries more scrupulous than the US that, while accepting that electoral politics is never completely clean, balk at affirming an election conducted under transparently repressive conditions.

Instead of thinking of this as a recognition tally, what should concern us more is how the nations skeptical of Honduras will exercise whatever influence they have on the new regime. By so quickly accepting the new government as entirely legitimate, and refusing to even acknowledge the existence of a broad popular movement for constitutional reform, the US has given up the potential to encourage new directions. Worse, it seems committed to policies of co-optation and token representation of other voices that ignore the wider community mobilizing for a new Honduras.

The Liberal Party, the Resistance, the President and the Ambassador

A controversy is boiling in Honduras over reports that Jorge Arturo Reina, Zelaya's ambassador to the UN, is being named as "ambassador to ALBA" by the Lobo Sosa government, or has been confirmed to continue as UN ambassador for the present Honduran administration.

These reports of apparent collaboration by a former supporter of Zelaya led to critique on Vos el Soberano of Reina for his chameleon-like changes of alignment, and his network of contacts with

interests distant from the people, for example, Arturo Echenique and Olvin Rodríguez, previously members of the liberal movement of the Reinas, the democratic left and the Liberal Alliance of the People; here participated Rosenthal, Jorge Bueso Arias who declared himself "proudly golpista", Armando Aguilar Cruz one of the negotiators of the golpistas, and also the Villeda Bermúdezes [negotiators for and supporters of Roberto Micheletti].

Samuel Trigueros, a Honduran poet deeply engaged in resistance to the coup and its aftermath, responded to discussion about whether this appointment should be tolerated by the resistance and its supporters with a critique of deference toward the opinion of former President Zelaya. Trigueros indicted

the wave of recalcitrant zelayists that insist on seeing the popular struggle solely through a party lens, perhaps with the intention of capitalizing, in some probable future, on their liberal militancy in the manner in which many men and women are accustomed: achieving honors through clientism or political chamberism...

The zelayists ought to consider the possibility of not insisting on imposing (as an unwavering dogmatic assertion) our dear ex-president as the ineluctable leader of the Resistance...

If Mel were to return tomorrow to Honduras, would he try to mend the Liberal Party? If the Resistance were to decide that the person in whom it wished to deposit its leadership is not Manuel Zelaya, would the zelayists remain in a disciplined manner in the bosom of the Frente?

Trigueros' post drew a response from Oscar Amaya Armijo. Amaya Armijo describes himself as a poet and novelist born in Talanga, and a faculty member of the Universidad Pedagógica Nacional, and has commemorated his kinship with the recently assassinated resistance member José Manuel Flores Armijo. In summer 2009, in the wake of the coup d'etat, he published eloquent statements about what needed to happen in Honduras to address the political breach, and continues to write about the situation in Honduras.

Amaya Armijo argues in part that

The liberals in resistance should, as well, demonstrate that they are unconditionally with the Resistance, which is the immense majority of Honduras, by quitting this old oligarchic and fascist party that Micheletti, Elvin Santos, and Romeo Vásquez lead, and organize a new type of political structure, calling this the Socialist Liberal Party, Liberal Hope, Citizen Power, with new ideology and political platform, so that they can really distinguish themselves from the shells of bipartisanship.

In the Honduran context, Amaya Armijo is reminding us, a sufficiently large defection of progressives from the Liberal Party could have the effect of unsettling the long established two party system that is only lightly masked by the participation of other parties at the margins of national elections.

His post is a kind of counterpoint to the repeated claims that the Frente de Resistencia is, or should be, forming a new political party. While the Frente itself continues to emphasize an alternative form of political deliberation and leadership, parallel transformation of existing political parties would by no means be in conflict. Amaya Armijo presents the moral authority of the Frente as the spur for "liberals in resistance" to consider forming a new party-- illustrating that the Frente has the potential to influence broader politics in Honduras without occupying the role of a standard party.

Amaya Armijo accuses members of the Liberal Party of being wary of joining the Resistance out of "petty bourgeois" fears of supposed Socialist leanings of popular leaders, reminding them that it was Zelaya who began talk of socialism, and indicting the Liberal Party for a history of adhesion to the "foreign oligarchy that has the country kidnapped". He continues:

In any case, why fear the people and their utopias, their yearnings for social, political, and economic transformation, if what we are concerned with here is to initiate a path toward justice, equity, and human solidarity, characteristics of developed and inclusive societies.

Amaya Armijo concludes by saying that for Zelaya

there remains no other way out than to unite himself with the Resistance, if not the resistance and the conjunctures [of history] will continue creating new leaders capable of surmounting him....

Of course, in Honduras, the political map has changed enormously and anyone who does not know how to interpret it will be fodder for the implacable punishment of the Honduran masses, those that now don't aim at traditional bipartisanship.

I do not know if this is radical: but whether or not the liberals in resistance, the zelayists and the reina-ists are in the Resistance; even without them... the constituyente, the new constitution and the refounding of Honduras is coming, and there is no oligarchic power that can hold it back.

In a second response, Honduran journalist Ricardo Arturo Salgado Bonilla reminds Trigueros that whether or not a politician like Reina acts like a politician, taking an appointment from the new government as easily as from the previous one, is not the most urgent question:

It seems to me that all this sterile discussion is distracting us from many more serious realities: the fiscal paquetazo; the selective political assassinations, the terrorist character of the Honduran confessional state; and other less evaluated crises such as the increase in hunger in the south; the drought, the traffic in concessions, and much more...

what is resulting will be no more nor less than the dismantling of the national state, and the conversion, finally, to Honduras Inc., without anyone saying anything... The ambassadors of the oligarchy are an immaterial topic, in the face of the challenges that we must confront.