Showing posts with label COALIANZA. Show all posts
Showing posts with label COALIANZA. Show all posts

Friday, May 6, 2016

Palmerola Airport Contract Bad for Honduras?

On March 18, 2016, President Juan Orlando Hernandez representing the Government of Honduras, and Lenir Perez, representing the bid winner, EMCO, signed a contract to build an international air terminal and supporting facilities in Soto Cano Air Base (also known as Palmerola) in Comayagua.  Such an airport is necessary since Toncontin airport in the capitol city of Tegucigalpa has a dangerous approach and short runway which cannot be lengthened.  The contract was negotiated by COALIANZA, which if past practice is any evidence, makes it suspicious.  COALIANZA has negotiated a number of contracts that are not financially good for Honduras, but great for the company receiving them.

Palmerola air base was built from nothing during the 1980s by the US military to become a staging area for air support missions for the Contra's then trying to overthrow the Sandanista government of Nicaragua.  I still remember the twice weekly flights of C5a and later C17 cargo planes landing at Ramon Villeda Morales International Airport near San Pedro Sula and offloading truckloads of military supplies and equipment onto the staging area to be ferried up to Palmerola for its construction.  Today it is a key strategic foothold of the US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) in Latin America, and home of Joint Taskforce Bravo with an 8000 foot runway.

At the time of the signing the contract terms were not publicly disclosed, but government statements outlined some of the terms.  First, the concession period in which EMCO would have the right to operate it was 30 years.  The contract required $23 million in funding from the Honduran government, and a further $53 million provided by the government of Spain.  EMCO will supply $87 million.

However, as the contract is now before Congress for ratification, terms are becoming public that lead one to question what Honduran authorities were thinking when they signed this contract, and raise questions about whether it can be ratified, even by this Congress controlled by the National party.

Salvador Nasralla pointed out that if the government of Honduras decides to keep Toncontin airport open, even if just for flights within Honduras, it will have to pay EMCO 20 million Lempiras (about $953,000) a month until Toncontin is closed .  Eduardo Facussé noted that the concession can be automatically renewed by EMCO for an additional 30 years, making it a 60 year concession, not the 30 mentioned in the press releases.  Facussé also pointed out that the contract obligates the Honduran government to close not just Toncontin International Airport in Tegucigalpa, but also Ramon Villeda Morales airport in San Pedro Sula, or face paying even higher monthly charges to EMCO.  A financial analysis of the income from the airport indicates that EMCO will not have to pay anything to the government of Honduras for the concession until years 27 or 28.  Facussé continued:

"I'd like to be in this type of business.  I don't know what kind of advisors the President of the Republic has who have told him that this is profitable for the country....The concessionary has all the advantages; that is to say that the owner of the contract for Palmerola, and the Government has a series of [financial] obligations."

Inversiones EMCO is a subsidiary of Grupo EMCO, a company founded in 2003 in Honduras.  It consists of a number of subsidiaries (Alutech, EMCO Mining, Inversiones EMCO, Constructora EMCO).Company owner  Lenir Perez is the son-in-law of Miguel Facussé, who before his recent death was the richest man in Honduras.  Perez is married to Ana Isabel Facussé.  Its subsidiary, EMCO mining began operations in San Pedro, Tocoa, Olancho in April of this year without the permission of the communities in which the mine resides, a clear violation of Honduran law.
 Another mining subsidiary, Minerales Victoria, with an iron mine in Nueva Esperanza, Atlantida has a history of human rights violations.  Perez's firm admits it kidnapped two international observers in 2014 and threatened their lives.

If Eduardo Facussé's statements about the clauses of the contract are correct, one wonders what President Hernandez's advisors were thinking in advising him to sign such a disadvantageous contract, but then, it was negotiated by COALIANZA, so we should have expected that.

Tuesday, February 11, 2014

Amapala, La Alianza, and Nacaome Studied for ZEDE Development

Honduras yesterday completed the announcement that Ebal Diaz started on February 5.  At that time he pre-announced that a ZEDE would be established in Choluteca or Valle. His latest announcement adds some details, but it turns out there is a lot more information that could be shared, and has not been.

On Monday February 10 Diaz, along with Juan Orlando Hernández, annnounced that in cooperation with the Korean International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) they would do a study of where in southern Honduras to establish a ZEDE.  Their announcement said that once an area is selected, the Koreans will develop a master plan for the administration of the ZEDE.  Diaz said:
It's an ambitious project which we start this day with a study and design of the country's first economic zone.

But there's a lot Diaz didn't say that's revealed in a document freely down loadable on the Honduran Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation (SEPLAN) website.  This document, signed by members of the previous administration on August 23, 2012, lays out the project more fully.

Titled in English "The Feasibility Study and Master Plan for the Establishment of a Special Development Region in Honduras", the document is signed by representatives of KOICA, Coalianza, SEPLAN, and the then-Vice President of Honduras, Maria Guillen de Bogran.

This agreement was made before the current ZEDE law was passed (in June 2013) and thus refers to Regiones Especiales de Desarrollo (RED), the predecessor to ZEDES in the model cities legislation that was found unconstitutional.

KOICA agreed to contribute $4 million, and the Honduran government an unspecified amount, in support of the project. The first step called for was a feasibility study of three particular locations in southern Honduras.

The studied locations are Amapala in Choluteca, and La Alianza and Nacaome in Valle.  Amapala is on Tigre Island in the Gulf of Fonseca.  La Alianza is located on the Guascoran river which forms the boundary between El Salvador and Honduras and currently has poor access to transportation.  Nacaome is on the Pan American highway which runs in one direction to El Salvador and in the other direction to Choluteca and on to Nicaragua.

The record of discussions between KOICA and the Honduran government indicates that the feasibility study should take three months from its inception.  The three feasibility studies will be given to the Honduran government, which will then have one month to select one of the three locations to build out.  Then, KOICA will do a more complete feasibility study, a concept design, a master plan for the design and operation of the ZEDE, and an implementation plan, all to be delivered about 19 months after the site is selected, or about halfway through the Hernández administration's term.

While the agreement between KOICA and the Honduran government was signed back in 2012,  apparently Porfirio Lobo Sosa decided to sit on it.  Juan Orlando Hernández, who traveled to Korea to see their economic development zones while head of Congress, and who supports the idea of model cities and economic development zones in Honduras, decided to proceed.

Like the model cities law, the ZEDE law has been contested, and on February 8 the Honduran Supreme Court admitted a challenge to the law.  The challenge alleges that the ZEDE law violates articles 294, 303 y 329 of the Honduran constitution.  These clauses have to do with the ordering of the Honduran territory, the justice system, and the economic development of Honduras.

After admitting the legal challenge, the Constitutional branch of the court passed the case on to the Public Prosecutor, Oscar Chinchilla, for comments.  Chinchilla was previously the lone Supreme Court justice in the Constitutional branch who did not find the model cities law unconstitutional.  Further, he traveled with Hernandez on the trip to visit Korean economic development zones. This suggests it is unlikely he will find anything wrong with the ZEDE law.

In theory, Honduras says it has local buy-in from the mayors of these towns.  But the ZEDE law exempts lands adjacent to the Gulf of Fonseca and on the Caribbean coast from having to hold a referendum for the population to approve being incorporated into a ZEDE.

So it will not surprise us if Amapala ends up being selected for development: the possibilities there include everything from a new port to luxury ocean residential properties, all in an area that has continued to be subject to tension with Honduras' neighbors on the Gulf of Fonseca. All this, and no need to hold a popular referendum if this site is selected.

Monday, July 29, 2013

Selling the Wind, or How Honduras Will Finance Its Debt

The government of Honduras wants to sell you the wind. Literally.

The proposal is for a new kind of investment instrument.

On July 20, the Honduran Congress passed a law called the Ley de promocón del desarrollo y reconversion de deuda publica, which can be read here in its entirety. 

The newly passed law, proposed by the Executive Branch, creates a special commission of trustees sited in the Central Bank of Honduras.  That commission, which includes the Minister of Natural Resources, will identify "idle" assets.  It will also create a technical committee to analyze the financial potential and return on such assets, and oversee the concession of assets to private parties.

So what are these "idle resources" that Honduras proposes selling?  The wind, for wind power; the rivers and the land for hydroelectric power; and mineral rights - gold, silver, and iron in particular, though it also just sold petroleum exploration rights. They can be pretty much anything not already under the control of the Comisión para la Promoción de la Alianza Público-Privada (COALIANZA).

Once the resource is identified as idle, the government will seek to lease it in concession to a third party. The lease process will involve estimating the income-producing potential of the asset, both for the party leasing it, and for the government.

The lease will produce, among other things, a future income stream for the government for the length of the lease. The leasing part of the law merely makes references to the processes used by COALIANZA for its concessions.  The same rules will apply.

Normally income from a lease would trickle in to the government coffers over the length of a lease, producing income for both the present and future governments of Honduras. 

But the new law empowers the Central Bank, or someone delegated by it, to securitize this future income stream and sell it to others, based on the discounted present value of that future income stream. 

This discounted present value of the future income stream will come to the government in a lump sum, rather than as several smaller payments over the lease duration.

The law specifies that it must be used to pay down the Honduran government's debt.

The Financial Minister, Wilfredo Cerrato, argued that the state would be getting the future income that this resource would generate over longer periods, like 20 years, but getting it all now instead of year by year over the 20 years, and that the money would then be used to pay down the national debt, because at least for now, the law prohibits it to be used to pay current expenses. 

Cerrato added:
What we want is to pay the internal debt, which is short term at high interest rates, to achieve what the law's title says, "reconversion of the debt".

Cerrato characterized the "idle resources" that are covered by the new law as not generating wealth but rather producing poverty.  He suggested that Honduran pension plans would be likely purchasers of the assets.

The law, which originated with Lobo Sosa's executive branch, was introduced and passed during a Congressional session held in Lempira rather than the capital of Tegucigalpa. 

The bill had not previously been disclosed or put through committee.  Its content was unknown to most at the start of this Congressional session.

Because the session was held outside the capital, fewer members attended, and those who did attend were primarily National Party members.

During the Congressional session, Congress voted to suspend the requirement for three debates and to hold only one debate on this law.  It then passed the law in a single debate. This has brought about much grousing from almost all sectors.

The law, by not going through the committee review, passed pretty much as it was submitted by the Executive Branch.  It was not publicly disclosed, so there was no discussion about what Congress was enacting. That seems to have been by design.

As Ralph Flores, an executive of the Foro Social de la Deuda Externa y Desarrollo de Honduras (FOSDEH) stated, the people should have been consulted.  FOSDEH is one place where the Honduran public gets to comment on proposed government policy.

Flores said that he thought the law probably was a good financial move, but that the government of Honduras shouldn't be managed like a private company.  As these are resources belonging to all the citizens, he said, probably they should have been consulted before the law was approved:
Unfortunately here they only talk about this type of activity as beneficial.  There needs to be an objective balance.  There are methodologies to analyze if an investment is positive or negative for the economy or for a society.  Here we only look at the financial stream as a positive element.

Mauricio Oliva, the new head of Congress, says that such lease arrangements are nothing new, that the approach has been used successfully by many other countries, and points to Costa Rica and Colombia. 

Cerrato vehemently defends the law, claiming that without it Honduras won't make payroll for government employees in November.  That in turn suggests they already have assets identified and potential buyers of concessions lined up and presume they can bring securities on these assets to market before November.

Hugo Noé Pino, who represents the  Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Fiscales (ICEFI) in Honduras, told La Prensa that the law was suspicious because not only of the rapidity with which it was proposed and passed, but for the lateness in Lobo Sosa's term.  This made him suspect that there were some ulterior motives.  He said the law sells Honduras in pieces:
"The most worrying part of this affair, given that the government has not shown itself to be trustworthy, is that  through this hurried law, just as with the model cities, [it has] committed all the resources of the state of Honduras without leaving to the next government any possibility of structuring its own recovery and investment plan for the country.  The next government will have its hands tied by these decisions."

Lobo Sosa says the law helps, not hinders, future governments.  Lobo Sosa goes on to claim this will not benefit his government one bit, a statement seemly contradicted by his Finance Minister's statement that without this law the government will not be able to meet the November payroll, implying income to this government, surely a benefit.

By using the processes specific to COALIANZA, the government avoids its own contracting law which would impose a greater transparency on the process.  It was this process that resulted in COALIANZA signing an MOU with Michael Strong for a model city somewhere other than where Congress had stated it wanted model cities (eg, San Pedro Sula instead of Puerto Cortes). 

COALIANZA's processes are not transparent nor do they always work towards the same goals as the government, as the model cities bungle demonstrated.  Civil society has no input into what the new commission decides to license. 

All resource-based projects involve expropriation (with long delays in payment in cases like the Patuca III dam project now underway). They may involve the dislocation of populations living on the concession, without any compensation.

There are no controls on either the number of employees, or the budget of the oversight commission set up in the new law.  It is unconstrained, and at this time, unfunded. Future governments will have to allocate it a budget for salaries and operations.
 
Civil society should pause at the statements of the Finance Minister that employee pension funds should invest in these financial instruments, which are effectively unsecured bets where a payment to the government up front gives the lease holder the "right" to profits from exploitation of a resources that may or may not be successful.

It has been an expressed goal of Honduran governments since at least 2009 to use the large government employee pension funds to improve the liquidity of the central government. It sounds like Cerrato sees this as one such mechanism.

This is just the latest of a series of laws passed by this administration that takes control of national assets and turns them over to private parties. 

These include the original model cities law, and the COALIANZA law that has sold concessions to airports, roadways, and railways. It includes the ZEDE law (aka model cities 2) which creates private economic development zones that can have their own laws, as well as the new mining law, which pretty much gives mining companies permission to do what they want on their concession.

There apparently is nothing that the Lobo Sosa government won't privatize.

Even the wind.

Wednesday, September 5, 2012

Agreement for a Model City

Juan Orlando Hernandez, the head of the Honduran National Congress announced Tuesday afternoon that COALIANZA, the Comisión para la Promoción de Alianzas Público-Privadas, had signed an agreement for the first of three model cities in Honduras.

The agreement will cover one of the regions being discussed as possible locations for a model city.  The three regions mentioned as possibilities for model cities are:  near Puerto Cortés, the Agalteca Valley or the Sicaya-Paulaya valley near Puerto Castilla, and Choluteca. According to COALIANZA, it must be located near to both an airport and a port.

Hernandez told the press:
"It should be noted that these model cities will be established in depopulated areas of Honduras.  It does not imply the displacement of people or social groups."

None of these regions is completely vacant. Reading between the lines, what Hernandez is saying is that there are no large cooperatives or powerful landowners in these regions, groups that might vocally protest the expropriation of the land on which they live and work. 

La Tribuna reports that a funding partner for this model city will be the US company MKG Group, which has agreed to invest some 15 million lempiras ( or $7.8 million dollars ).  Michael Strong, identified an executive with the company, is reported to have said:
"The future will remember this day as that day that Honduras began developing.  We believe this will be one of the most important transformations in the world, through which Honduras will end poverty by creating thousands of jobs."

We were unable to locate any information on MKG Group, though the Michael Strong in question is, we believe, the Michael Strong associated with FLOW and the Free Cities Institute. Strong formed the Grupo Ciudades Libres LLC, a Nevada Company, with Kevin Lyons in 2011. 

Another group that claims to be involved is the Future Cities Development Corporation, one of whose founders is Patri Friedman, grandson of Milton Friedman, nobel laureate in economics. This group has previously been linked by The Economist to the Model Cities project in Honduras.

Hernandez said that the main funding partner of the project, whose identity will be revealed later, is a Canadian company that has been investing in development regions worldwide for the last 15 years, but he would not identify the company.

According to COALIANZA, the project will provide 5000 direct and indirect jobs this year, 15,000 next year, 30,000 in 2014, and 45,000 in 2015.

The agreement must still be approved by the rubber-stamp Honduran Congress, and the Executive Branch must appoint a governor.