Showing posts with label William Chong Wong. Show all posts
Showing posts with label William Chong Wong. Show all posts

Sunday, November 7, 2010

IHMA to Hondurans: What Emergency

Beans are sky high. Today's price is $1.26 a pound, or 120 lempiras for 5 pounds. You will recall that in July, beans sold for $0.47 a pound.

When we last checked in on the bean crisis in Honduras, it was to report that the Finance Minister, William Chong Wong, had not, more than 30 days after the declaration of a crisis by President Lobo's Council of Ministers, released the money to the Instituto Hondureño de Mercadeo Agricola (IHMA) to purchase beans on the international market to improve supplies and drive the price back down. That was the goal of the emergency decree.

Yesterday, the head of IHMA, Carlos Girón Ayala, announced that Chong Wong had released 20 million lempiras to IHMA, more than authorized in the decree, to buy 60,000 quintals of beans and 100,000 quintals of corn to guarantee the national supply of both foodstuffs.

Girón Ayala announced that the corn purchases had already started last Friday, and that the bean purchases would begin in 15 to 20 days, when producers begin the new harvest in Honduras. Girón Ayala announced he already has 30,000 quintals of beans which he is distributing to BANASUPRO. That should be more than enough to keep BANASUPRO supplied until the new harvest comes in.

So, the money will go to national bean producers, not international grain merchants, which makes sense as part of a national economic plan. However, it is also misleading. IMHA would be buying those beans anyhow as part of its mission. IMHA buys beans every year during the postrera harvest, so there's nothing extraordinary about it. It's business as usual, not an emergency purchase.

This purchase will have no impact on the elevated prices people are paying for beans, which was one of the announced goals of the emergency decree.

It won't increase supplies; the postrera harvest will do that by itself. From an economic standpoint, this is actually the worst time for IHMA to make a purchase in the domestic market, at the high side of a predictable downward curve. Bean prices will be starting to come down as the harvest begins to appear on the market, but they'll still be much higher than they will be in a few weeks, once the harvest is finished. The purchase will serve, IHMA hopes, to guarantee supplies to BANASUPRO over the coming year.

So the message of Girón Ayala's announcement today is, if you're Honduran and you eat beans, you'll continue to suffer high prices until the harvest of the postrera crop improves the supply and brings the market price down. The government isn't going to do anything to solve the problem; instead it is waiting for the harvest to do that. There is no emergency to be solved that time alone won't deal with well enough.

Thursday, November 4, 2010

Beans 2: Moving at the speed of bureaucracy

You will recall that on October 5, the Executive branch of the Honduran government declared an emergency because of the high domestic price of beans, a staple of the Honduran diet. The high prices were supposedly due to the scarcity of beans, allegedly caused by environmental conditions in Honduras. That emergency decree authorized the government, through the Instituto Hondureño de Mercadeo Agrícola (IHMA), to purchase up to 10 million lempiras worth of beans, store them, and use them to supply the local markets.

On October 21, Vice Minister of Agriculture, Juan Angel Artica, announced the 10 million lempiras had been spent, implying the supply of beans had been secured.

It never happened.

First came the investigations that found some distributors were deliberately withholding beans from the market to drive up prices. It also came to light that there were fair quantities of beans still to be bought and brought to market in places like Olancho, though insufficient to supply the entire nation for more than 20 days. IHMA itself found it still had some beans. Still, beans kept appearing, both in the BANASUPRO stores run by the government, and in the markets. Indeed, prices dropped for a bit. though they are still quite high, around 100 lempiras for 5 pounds, or 20 lempiras a pound. BANASUPRO maintains its price at 65 lempiras for 5 pounds, but limits purchases to 5 lbs. a day.

Now, with the new harvest of beans only 7 or so days away, it has come to light that the Finance Minister, William Chong Wong, didn't tranfer the 10 million lempiras to IHMA for it to purchase any beans.

Why not, you ask?

The Council of Ministers authorized the transfer on October 5 from the funds on loan from the Banco Social de Venezuela. These funds are sitting in an account in BANADESA, the national agricultural development bank.

In the Council of Ministers' meeting yesterday, William Chong Wong said that he had not authorized the transfer of government funds because IHMA has a 14 million lempira debt with BANADESA.

Huh? How is IHMA's debt to BANADESA an excuse for not carrying out an emergency order to address a government declared crisis? It is a government declared emergency, after all, and the transfer was properly authorized. BANADESA, at the time, even offered to take IHMA further into debt, 70 million lempiras further, to fund the purchase back when the emergency decree was issued.

Emergencies don't move at the speed of William Chong Wong's bureaucracy, they need real responses in real time.

Thirty days after it recognized the problem, the Honduran government still lacks a creditable response to the bean crisis. There is no accountability.

Its the Honduran people who continue to be hurt.

Wednesday, September 22, 2010

Broke Again

Like many families today, the government of Honduras is having problems making ends meet. This despite the flurry of financial support announcements this month unleashed by the agreement with the International Monetary Fund.

The problem is that what the government collects in taxes and payments from businesses and citizens is falling behind the financial projections. Spending, in turn, has accelerated, not in small part due to the problems produced by the inclement weather, poor or nonexistent construction standards, and previous infrastructure neglect. More cash is going out than is coming in right now.

William Chong Wong, the Minister of Finance to Lobo Sosa complained yesterday in the Council of Ministers meeting, that the payments weren't coming in as projected, and the government cash on hand was down to 200 million lempiras. This is not entirely a surprise. Chong Wong has been predicting the cash flow would reach a crisis without an increase in government income, and has been promoting belt tightening measures in the government. His original prediction that the crisis would occur in August was incorrect, but only slightly off.

Chong Wong warned that he was being creative, using funds from other sources, such as the excess investible capital in government employee retirement funds managed by the private sector. Isn't this the same kind of creative financing that the Public Prosecutor is calling corruption when members of the Zelaya government did it? Still Chong Wong warns that as things stand, the government will not be able to pay the salaries of all the public employees this month.

This is the direct result of the spending practices of the de facto government. Last time Chong Wong issued a warning about cash flow, Lobo Sosa called him a cry baby. It should be interesting to see his reaction this time.

Friday, March 26, 2010

Devil in the Details: Honduras' Budget Proposal

Among the multitude of things that a new executive administration does, the one that best shows its priorities is its budget proposal. This week, we got to see the proposal by the administration of Porfirio Lobo Sosa.

The bottom line: the budget proposes an increase of about 6.5% over 2009.

But this is not to say that every part of the budget is treated equally. In fact, a number of government agencies will face declining budgets under the proposal.

Big losers in the proposed budget:
  • the Fondo Hondureño de Inversión Social (FHIS), which would lose about 25% of its budget, affecting its mission of providing funding for social development projects;
  • the Consejo Hondureño de Ciencia y Tecnología appears to face a budget more than 95% reduced from 2009, perhaps indicating that in Honduras as in the US, right wing governments think science and technology are best left to the private sector; meanwhile, the Direccion de Ciencia y Tecnología Agropecuaria would lose more than 50% of its 2009 funding, presumably indicating that the application of science and technology to farming and animal husbandry is something recognized as usefully done by government;
  • the Instituto Nacional de Conservación y Desarrollo Forestal will experience about a 13% decline, presumably not good for its mission of encouraging forest ecosystem preservation and development;
  • the Comisión Nacional de Telecomunicaciones will see its budget decline by 30%, presumably because telecommunications has ceased to be a corrupt part of Honduran commerce;
  • the Registro Nacional de las Personas, responsible for the voter rolls that were so contested in November 2009, would be reduced by 17%; the Tribunal Supremo Electoral would have its budget cut in half, perhaps in tribute to its role in the "success" of the November 2009 election;
  • smaller but still significant decreases were proposed for the Judicial branch; Instituto de la Propiedad; Empresa Nacional de Artes Gráficas (responsible for printing La Gaceta-- twice in the case of the Nacaome dam scandal); the Fondo Víal; and the Comisión Nacional de Energía.

Within the executive branch, the proposed budget makes several dramatic adjustments, which cumulatively give a sense of what cabinet offices are likely to have the resources they need to carry out existing programs or implement new ones. Juxtaposing these changes reveals troubling policy directions.

Remaining close to the same level: the Secretaría de Gobernación y Justicia.

Meanwhile, the Secretaría de Despacho Presidencial, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Secretaría de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, Secretaría de Recursos Naturales y Ambiente, all are slated for budget decreases. The Secretaría de Agricultura y Ganadería will see a 15% decline in its budget.

While the Secretaría Técnica y de Cooperación Internacional would see its budget decline by more than 95%, a newly established Secretaría Técnica y de Planificación y Cooperación Externa, with a budget of 371,150,742 lempiras, would increase funding in this area five-fold. A Secretaría de Desarrollo Social y Red Solidaria which had no budget in 2008 would see an increase from 54,658,900 lempiras in 2009 to 532,289,371 lempiras in 2010.

Going up modestly are the budgets for the Secretaría de Educación; Secretaría de Salud; Secretaría de Seguridad; and Secretaría de Finanzas.

Most striking are a few ministries with greatly increased proposed resources. First among these is the Secretaría de Defensa Nacional, which oversees the Armed Forces, and will do so with 23% more budgetary resources if Lobo Sosa's budget is approved. The Secretaría de Industria y Comercio will see a 15% increase in budget to allow it to promote the interests of the business community.

One dramatic juxtaposition will give an example of the implications of such increases and decreases.

On the one hand, the Secretaría de Cultura, Artes y Deportes (Ministry of Culture) would see its budget decline 9% (to 244,354,800 lempiras), while the Secretaría de Turismo would see an increase of almost 50% in its budget (to 333,987,604 lempiras). Readers of our coverage of the Ministry in Culture's mismanagement under the de facto regime of Roberto Micheletti will recall that the woefully inadequate appointee to that ministry, Myrna Castro, was confused about the respective roles of these ministries, criticizing the head of the Institute of Anthropology and History for declining tourism as if tourist development were the role of the Ministry of Culture. At least the Lobo Sosa administration appears to understand where to put its money if it wants to increase tourism, without ensuring professional research and education about national culture.

As part of its process of deliberation, Congress also received a delegation of cabinet-level officials charged with economic affairs who were charged to explain the need for a "paquetazo" of special economic measures. As reported in El Heraldo, the president of the Banco Central de Honduras, María Elena Mondragón, Minister of the Presidency María Antonieta de Bográn, and Secretary of Finance William Chong Wong, explained that
Honduras is bankrupt and that the coffers of the State have a 17,000 million lempira deficit, as well as a floating debt around 33 million lempiras.

Such a deficit is precisely what we projected based on the rate at which the de facto regime of Roberto Micheletti burned through Honduran funds to avoid coming to terms with international disapproval of the coup d'etat. Now there's a price tag on the coup, if anyone cares to notice.