"Honduras has a clear, holistic perspective [on impunity], the institutionality of civil society and its intermediate bodies and the support of MACCIH, this is the mssion, the project is a complete system...It is worth noting this distinction because this project existed before MACCIH arrived and I assure you it will continue after MACCIH terminates its functions."
While technically correct, on paper it looks like Honduras was doing things to clean up corruption, in practice, this was a smokescreen for more of the same. In the months prior to the formation and installation of MACCIH in Honduras, the Honduran government, guided by Corrales, Juan Orlando Hernandez, and Ebal Diaz formed the Sistema Integral Control la Impunidad (SICI) as a palliative to quiet the weekly marches of the indignados. This was a largely hollow proposal that in effect consisted of the Executive branch of the Honduran government holding "hearings" with civil society groups that by and large already supported the existing government. In the weeks leading up to that announcement, Ebal Diaz, a government advisor spokesperson, made public statements that were counter factual, to the effect that "corruption was already contained" (it wasn't) and deliberately manufacturing false numbers to argue that the Comisión Internacional Contra la Impunidad en Guatemala (CICIG), which is what the indignados wanted for Honduras, was ineffective (it has, to date, been quite effective in identifying and prosecuting corruption and impunity).
The other smokescreen they erected was to allege that corruption during the Zelaya administration was more important, and the Public Prosecutor's office pursued this rather than the mess the National Party governments of the last two administrations created. With the help of the DEA, they proceeded to dismantle the drug cartels in Honduras that had supported the Liberal Party in the 2013 elections.
This is institutionality that Corrales was proudly referring to, palliatives and smokescreens that accomplished next to nothing.
Even today there is no institutionality against corruption and impunity in Honduras, or MACCIH would not be necessary. The Honduran government has neither the structure, nor the constitutional separation of powers, nor the laws, nor the legal system to combat corruption and impunity. Corruption is present in virtually all levels of government, from the military to the Executive branch itself. It has lacked this institutionality since the 1981 constitution brought an end to military rule. It was designed that way.
In fact, we know Honduras was ineffective in fighting corruption because the US State Department scored it low in the fight against corruption and impunity in ranking it for possible inclusion in the Millennium Challenge Grants every year since 2010.
If MACCIH succeeds in its mission, Honduras might have an effective system to fight both corruption and impunity going forward. But all of its suggestions will need to be in place, including changes to the Honduran constitution, for it to work.
So Corrales was at best exaggerating in saying that Honduras's institutionality already exists to fight corruption. It didn't, and still doesn't.
2 comments:
RNS says, "ith the help of the DEA, they proceeded to dismantle the drug cartels in Honduras that had supported the Liberal Party in the 2013 elections. "
I thought the cartels were all happily operating. Is the point that they left intact the National Party cartels?
From InsightCrime:
"In recent years, transnational criminal groups, particularly Mexican cartels, have expanded their presence in Honduras. The 2009 coup that ousted President Manuel Zelaya and caused international outrage also exacerbated instability in the country. Colombian drug trafficking gangs changed their routes to Honduras just days after the coup and turned it into the principal handover point for cocaine to Mexican cartels."
As the post states: the current government has been vigorously pursuing certain families participating in drug trafficking. In an analysis of the patterns of voting the RNS presented at LASA in May, support for the Nationalist party was strong (sometimes unbelievably strong) in municipios that are controlled by drug cartels. These Nationalist-party supporting cartels are not the targets of the campaigns by the Nationalist government.
The InsightCrime post quoted doesn't disentangle the political stances of drug cartel participants in Honduras, or their specializations within the traffic. We do agree that cartels took advantage of the coup and the subsequent violence within the country. They also seem to have preferences in internal party politics.
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