Thursday, September 9, 2010

Oscar Estrada: "La vida no vale nada" (Life is worth nothing)

Honduran film-maker Oscar Estrada weighs in on Vos el Soberano about the rush to attribute the multiple homicide in a factory in San Pedro Sula to "gang rivalry" that has received such unquestioning coverage in the English-language media. It would be wonderful if some of the reporters who find the story-line they are reporting so compelling would present even a bit of the context he provides:
At whom does the horror point?

When in 2007 I began work on the documentary "El Porvenir", seeking to understand and portray the most complex massacre that up until that moment had occurred in the country, in which 69 people lost their life in the penal center of La Ceiba at the hands of the prison guards in alliance with the common prisoners, one thing motivated me: I knew very well and wanted to present it that way in the film, that if as a population we allowed this frightening crime (and another four massacres that occurred in the same period) to be lost in oblivion, the horror would end by catching up with us.

In those dark years of the mano dura, public opinion that the media of communication manipulated at will succeeded in demonizing gang-member youth in such a way that, without subterfuge, many people publicly said that the massacre was good, since according to them it annihilated delinquents that otherwise would cause more damage to society.

The war against the gains was won physically eliminating almost all the gang members of the time, hence the fame of personages like Oscar Alvarez, to the point that today the gangs barely appear in the media spectrum that seeks constantly to create internal enemies to justify state repression.

But the robberies, extortion, rapes, assassinations, dismemberment of corpses, massacres and the rest of the crimes committed-- supposedly-- by the gangs continue happening. Every day in Honduras there are reported between 10 and 14 violent deaths, many of them by firearms and the numbers continue rising placing Honduras in the list of the most violent countries of the continent, only behind Mexico and Colombia.

Then came the Coup d'Etat and those persons who devised (or allowed to pass) the massacres, returned to appear stronger and unpunished. The government of the mano dura returned, now with the face of Christian humanism, to impose by force the reconciliation and unity of the gravedigger.

Who at that time was Minister of Security today continues being it and his practice, now less in the media because anti-insurgency can be carried off only in a secret fashion, continues as well to be repressive.

Who at that time was the president of Congress, today is that of the republic and, like Ricardo Maduro on the 4th of April 2003 left the country on the day of the massacre, so as not to be witness to the pain and indignation that left the dead wholesale.

In this country life is worth nothing. Literally speaking. With fifty dollars you can pay an assassin so that he will eliminate a person, with fifty dollars more you can eliminate the assassin and the traces of the crime. At 100 dollars per death, 1900 lempiras at the present exchange rate, the impunity of barbarism has been embedded in the depths of this Honduras that today falls on us.

Yesterday, while some of us marched following the call of the Frente Nacional de Resistencia Popular for a national civic strike, demanding among other things a raise in the minimum wage, respect for the labor laws, a halt to repression and violations of human rights, in San Pedro Sula, in a barrio that carries as its name Cabañas (ex-president of the 19th century, bulwark of Morazanism and of the ethics of power), in a small shoe factory, Marxist symbol of the worker, 19 young workers were assassinated, some of them apparently members of the resistance.

Beyond the symbolism of the massacre, it has to be clear that an act of terrorism of this nature is not done improvisationally. Calculated were the place where the crime was to be carried out, their routes of arrival and escape; calculated also the hour and the day. The assassins know very well how to create terror, for this they have been shaped in in this they are professionals.

While the bodies of the youths were carried away by the forensic doctor, Wong Arévalo, unconditional spokesman of the Coup and apologist for the violations of human rights squawked about the inactivity of the police and the intelligence corps. Not so much for the massacre (which he also did to a lesser extent), so much as for the windows of his building that the demonstration broke in its wake. "This group is only comparable with organized crime", shouted Wong Arévalo and his claim echoes the declarations of the prosecution that announced it would prosecute the members of the Frente de Resistencia for "illicit association".

There is a clear effort in the media of communication to link both events: the attack with stones on the golpista channels and the massacre in Cabañas. In this effort they mix maliciously to make believe that the resistance, while it is not directly responsible for this massacre, are equally detestable and dangerous and, the same as the gangs 10 years ago, any action of the system against us is justified.

It is interesting, in contrast to the other massacres, that in this terrorist act golpismo claims the inaction and "inefficiency" of its super Minister of Security Oscar Alvarez and demand immediate actions in respect to it.

It is very improbable that justice will be done. The most likely is that they will arrest some scapegoat to calm the demands of public opinion and will try to justify the massacre with the already trite "settling of accounts".

I was right. We as a society allowed impunity to embed itself like a malign cancer and today the horror points at us.

8 of September, 2010

Mano dura is literally "strong hand", the signature policy of Oscar Alvarez in his first incarnation as Security Minister of Honduras during the term of President Ricardo Maduro. Similar policies were widely implemented throughout Central America. In Honduras, they involved criminalizing gang membership, encouraging collaboration in policing by the armed forces, and formation of extrajudicial death squads targeting youths without apparent concern about whether those killed were guilty of any crime, or even actually were gang members. The majority of these killings went unsolved, and indeed, uninvestigated. Involvement of the security forces was widely suspected.

Anti-gang legislation was based on establishing "illicit association" as a crime. So the citation of "illicit association" as a supposed crime by the members of the resistance who marched in conjunction with the general strike is laden with disturbing overtones.

Convenient Explanations

Gangs, drug trafficking, and corruption are real problems in Honduras. Unfortunately, they are also a too-convenient explanation for crimes, an explanation rolled out before anything resembling police investigations are carried out.

Oscar Alvarez, Security Minister, appallingly trotted out his blanket excuse yet again; this time to explain Tuesday's massacre of 18 people in a shoe faction in San Pedro Sula: it was gangs, or rather, gang rivalry:
"A group belonging to one gang arrived at this place with the intention of eliminating supposed sympathizers of another gang"

Case closed.

He admitted that this was not to say that the employees of the factory were actually members of any gang:
"I want to be respectful of the families of the victims, and to say they were sympathizers. I'm not saying they were members of gangs, but they were friends of those who are gang members."

Blame the victims.

The factory owner disputes Alvarez's explanation:
"They haven't found any drugs or arms here, and the employees weren't tattooed... Its not certain that this crime was a dispute for territory between drug gangs. The police need to investigate more,"

He also noted that the police took no material evidence from the crime scene, which presumably means they have no material evidence to tie the criminals to the crime. The factory floor was littered with AK-47 and 9mm shell casings according to the reporters. Were these left behind by the police?

So what is Alvarez's evidence of any gang linkage to this crime?
"The three came in and shouted 'everyone on the ground'....that 'everyone on the ground' and then executing them is the modus operandi of a gang that operates in our country."

Yet witnesses said that most of the people were shot where they worked, only some on the floor.
"When we saw they were gone, we ran to the shoe factory and found everyone shot on their tables, in their work chairs, and on the bloody floor, some breathing their last breath, others asking for help"

said one witness to an El Tiempo reporter.

Alvarez claims to know who the guilty parties are, but that they've gone into hiding, so he's opened phone lines for people to call in and give them up, and released sketches of two of the assailants.

This raises the question, if he actually knows who they are, why not release names and/or photos from the Registro Nacional, rather than the very generic unidentified sketches that were released to the press?

Alvarez's convenient excuse for not investigating this massacre is just that, a convenient excuse. The story he tells bears little relationship to the events as reported by witnesses. He blames the victims for their undemonstrated gang "association". Applying a one-size-fits-all explanation substitutes for doing the much more difficult job of finding out what was behind this terrible event.

Wednesday, September 8, 2010

Technical Foul: Corruption in the allocation of Channel 8

A huge amount of ink is being spilt over Honduran TV Channel 8, once used by the Zelaya administration as a government information channel, then allocated to a private businessman by court action, rented back by the de facto regime, then claimed again by the current government.

Stay tuned for further developments. But meanwhile, a word from your sponsors about TV channels in Honduras and how they end up in private hands.

CONATEL is the Honduran agency that is in charge of administration of telecommunications, radio, and television, the equivalent of the US FCC. Its current operating rules were established in 2002 by accord 141-2002 and include procedures for allocating bandwidth and supervising all broadcasters in Honduras. This accord also establishes dispute resolution procedures, not that they were followed in the current case.

That case is the on-again, off-again pursuit of analog Channel 8 by Elias Asfura.

CONATEL had a policy of only allocating the odd analog channels (3,5,7,9,11) to avoid interference between the channels. The FCC used that allocation approach for years in the US before finally allocating some adjacent channels in crowded urban markets.

Technically, in analog television, adjacent channels don't actually overlap, except channels 7 and 8. The frequencies of these two channels do overlap, so that allocating both in the same market assures there will be some interference. The FCC has not allocated both channel 7 and channel 8 in the same market, even in the crowded New York City market.

Channel 7 had already been allocated in much of the country to TeleSistema Hondureña, S.A.

So in 2005, Teleunsa, S.A., owned by Asfura, was denied permission to operate a television station on channel 8 by CONATEL.

Rather than use the dispute resolution solutions specified in the CONATEL rules, Asfura chose to appeal the decision in the courts.

In May, 2007, a lower court found in favor of Asfura and ordered the government to give him channel 8.

Rasel Tomé, then legal counsel of CONATEL, filed an appeal on November 4, 2007, which the appeals court ruled was technically invalid because it was filed one day too late.

CONATEL had valid technical reasons for not allocating channel 8 to Teleunsa, S.A.. Nonetheless, in 2007, when the government requested a channel, CONATEL went ahead and allocated channel 8 to the government, for a period of 15 years, publishing its decree in La Gaceta. On August 10, 2008, the government began broadcasting on channel 8 as the Red Informativa del Poder Ciudadano.

But El Heraldo reported that on August 5, 2008, Rasel Tomé, as legal counsel of CONATEL, had signed CONATEL resolution AS327/08 allocating channel 8 to Asfura.

Under Honduran transparency law, CONATEL posts a document on its website that notes that every authorization/allocation of spectrum, be it a radio station, TV station, or other use, brings with it financial obligations to pay for the rights to the channel, the registration of that right, and for CONATEL's supervision of the operation of that broadcast unit. Resolution AS327/08 cannot be found on CONATEL's listing of 2008 resolutions, but the transparency law in Honduras is not enforced, so that, in and of itself means nothing.

Tomé's lax handling of the case was apparently scandalous. Enrique Flores Lanza, as Zelaya's principal advisor, stripped Tomé of his legal responsibilities at CONATEL. So, between August 5 and November 24, 2008, CONATEL apparently recognized Asfura as the owner of channel 8. But on November 25, 2008, CONATEL appealed the case to the Supreme Court using a new legal team.

Fast forward to June 2009, when in the week before the coup, Channel 8 broadcast Manuel Zelaya's appeals directly to the people from the presidential palace and the speeches of those who came to join him in an attempt to ward off his removal from office.

After the coup, on August 4, 2009, a lower court again awarded channel 8 to Asfura.

By then, the de facto regime had replaced several members of CONATEL and installed Miguel Rodas as its head. Another of Asfura's companies, Eldi, was assigned channel 12, which he won in another legal suit, this one against SOTEL.

Roberto Micheletti recongized the utility of having a government channel and on assuming power after the coup, signed a contract in which the government rented back from Asfura the rights to channel 8 for the duration of his government, 7 months, renting the channel from Asfura for 1 lempira a month. Micheletti rebranded channel 8 Televisión Nacional de Honduras.

Therein lies (part) of the current problem.

As part of the transparency law, CONATEL must post its fees, which in 2008-2010 included a 57,924 lempira annual fee for the right to transmit on a particular channel, fees for spectrum use, annual fees for supervision, etc? Did Teleunsa pay these fees?

When Micheletti rented back from Asfura the broadcast rights on channel 8, he violated CONATELs operating rules, which prohibit any transfer of broadcast rights without review by CONATEL and a corresponding published resolution.

In short, Micheletti acted irregularly in signing an agreement with Asfura. But equally, the courts which repeatedly have ignored the dispute resolution process applicants are supposed to file in order to affirm Asfura as owner of Channel 8 seem, at the very least, to be acting outside their authority.

As CONATEL argues, the airwaves belong to the government. But it would be hard to tell that by the actions either of Micheletti or the courts.

Tuesday, September 7, 2010

Culture, Peace and Contested National Identity

“Normally, the traditional politician has in his house a beautiful bar, but he does not have a library, they are enemies of the written word, they do not know Honduran music, they are fans of the narco-corrido, of ranchera and música procaz, and the proof of this is that this is the music they use in their political campaigns because it is the best representation of them and best identifies them...."

So, who might we imagine made this provocative statement? One of the Artists in Resistance who have kept the spotlight on the erosion of public culture that began with the appointment of Myrna Castro by the de facto regime, to replace Minister of Culture Rodolfo Pastor Fasquelle?

Would you believe maybe a cartoonist who was elected to the Honduran Congress in 2009 as a Liberal representative in Congress?

Ángel Darío Banegas has been a political cartoonist since 1985. His work appears in La Prensa, and has been recognized internationally.

When he began his run for the Congreso Nacional in 2008, he was quoted as saying that he wanted to clear out the "monsters and dinosaurs that have discredited politics for years". He also made an apparently serious proposal at that time that Congress members receive only minimum wage.

Starting in 2000, Banegas began to teach courses on drawing and painting, especially for children. His latest move, described as "a permanent cultural activity to stimulate youth so that they stay away from idleness and violence", seems to be closely related.

It also highlights the contested nature of "culture" in the aftermath of a coup and a de facto regime that made cultural institutions central targets for attack.

As announced in La Tribuna this weekend, using his new position in Congress as head of its "Commission on Culture" Banegas has promoted the first Honduran "Festival de las Artes, Congreso, Cultura y Paz" (Festival of the Arts, Congress, Culture and Peace). Taking place in Danlí, it is supposed to be the first of a series in all departments of the country, "to convert public areas into spaces of expression that will contribute to the formation and consolidation of peace, as a culture".

Invoking "peace" as a culture echoes a public discourse in Honduras that predates the coup, but is strongly linked to it. Public concerts and marches as early as May, 2008, explicitly framed as attempts to persuade young people not to take drugs or become involved in street gangs, were organized with the support of the Catholic hierarchy and the business community.

In July 2008, we watched one of these marches in the former colonial capital city of Comayagua, ending at stages set up in front of the cathedral where inspirational speeches were given and Garifuna musicians and dancers performed, explicitly urging teenagers to adhere to "peace". The crowd included large numbers of people dressed in white.

Both before and after the coup, marches using similar rhetoric and clothing were mobilized against President Zelaya and later in support of the de facto regime by the right-wing Unión Civica Democratica and its allies. The rhetoric used in these marches equated "peace" with more intensive policing. As press coverage on June 5, 2009 of a demonstration in Choluteca organized by the Chamber of Commerce described it, marchers were "in favor of peace, security, and democracy and therefore asked for an end to high indices of violence and insecurity that afflict the country".

Banegas' campaign advances a second emphasis, on national identity. The first event in Danlí, and the other festivals of arts to follow, are described as intended to help identify students with artistic talent "who will contribute to local and national culture in the forge of identity".

Banegas personally emphasizes the link between art, national identity, and the outsider political stance on which he ran:
“Because of my critical attitude towards traditional politics, I committed myself strongly to not be the same and to be different; ...I was charged with presiding over the Commission of Culture and Arts, for which we are pledged with a group of partners to make a meaningful effort to manage to fortify national identity."

The first program to this end is the festivals of art. The second is equally ambitious:
"we have created an National Identity Prize that will be given every year, on the 20th of July, in the City of Gracias, Lempira, with the honor in 2010 going to the singer/songwriter Guillermo Anderson."

What is left unstated here is what stands as national identity.

Both programs represent incursions by Congress onto terrain of the executive branch's Ministry of Culture. Banegas seems to be directly taking aim at the Ministry through the Casas de Cultura it coordinates, saying that he will promote congressional initiatives
related to strengthening the Casas de la Cultura in all the country that... in many cases are empty shells, entities abandoned to their own luck.

Banegas repeatedly defines cultural activity as aimed at reinforcing a uniform national agenda and a singular national identity:
“culture is fundamental for the development of a country since it contributes to national identity and we ourselves regain faith in what we do, what he have and our own way of being".

The original mission of the Casas de Cultura was something quite different: "to provide conditions for the flourishing of local culture" through a "policy of decentralization of cultural material".

The Casas de Cultura were central to efforts under the Zelaya administration to promote pluralistic cultural identity; as Rodolfo Pastor Fasquelle notes:
we almost tripled the number of Casas de la Cultura in capitals and important towns with their own identity and in remote ethnic communities, Garifuna, Cusuna, or Tawaka, each with bilingual libraries.

Politicization of culture is nothing particularly new, in Honduras or elsewhere. Pastor Fasquelle begins a review of governmental intervention in Honduran culture with the proposition that "the organizations of Honduran cultural institutionality, the Instituto de Antropología e Historia (I.H.A.H) and la Secretaria de Cultura (S.C.A.D.), were creatures of dictatorship":
The Institute was founded with the idea of glorifying ancient Copan as the historic navel of the nation, paradoxically by foreign inspiration, while the Secretariat was established with the primordial aim of co-opting intellectuals and creators. And it ended up deposited in the hands of the military, whose vision amalgamated a folk concept of the culture of the people and an elitist vision of bourgeois High Culture. These were its sins of origin.

Pastor Fasquelle writes that in his first term as Minister of Culture starting in 1994, he began "the professionalization [of these organizations] and the articulation of policy lines: decentralization, democratization, ethnic rescue and support for creators".

When he returned to that role in 2006 he again pushed forward an agenda of "diffusion [of information], rescue of the national patrimony, diversity, direct assistance to creators and decentralization of functions and resources".

Rather than aim to produce a single national identity by promoting a uniform culture, the Ministry of Culture in the Zelaya administration promoted projects designed to exemplify Honduras' cultural diversity.

Pastor Fasquelle argues (as does the former director of the Institute of Antropology and History, Dario Euraque) that the very direction of these policies-- pluralistic, democratizing, decentralizing-- is what brought on the de facto regime's suspicion, embodied memorably in the appointment of Myrna Castro, who denounced book distribution, labeled the Casas de Cultura "Casas de ALBA", and redirected funding to Fashion Week in Tegucigalpa.

But, Pastor Fasquelle argues, all of this "underlines as the moral that our principal function-- institutionally-- is to secure that the people appropriate their own patrimony". He notes that only when culture is locally produced and controlled can it actually survive, a principle that guided policies of the Ministry that encouraged mobilizing local historians and local stakeholders in presenting their own culture.

In stark contrast to the implicit argument that culture is weaker in Honduras today, Pastor Fasquelle suggests that resistance to the coup has awakened creators of the arts in Honduras to their role in public life:
the brave involvement of the great majority of the best thinkers and artists in the country in civic life is one of the unexpected fruits [of the coup], surprising and hopeful. ... our artists and intellectuals have subscribed-- for decades-- to skepticism, not just towards the public cultural institutions, but also towards the State and politics. This skepticism has been a problem for the culture and a headache for the public cultural institutions. But worse, it has been part of the civic problem. Because, to the degree that the critical and creative spirits absented themselves from the forum, politics remained orphaned of intelligence and imagination. The flourishing of culture in the Resistance has engendered a new consciousness, a new type of commitment, critical for the opposition and for the future reconstruction of a deeper and more authentic democracy.

So we have laid out for us a series of contrasts: decentralization versus centralization; State projects versus local appropriation of patrimony; an idealized culture of "peace" versus culture as the expression of critical consciousness.

A telling detail: the time and place cited for the new "National Identity Prize", on the Día de Lempira in the heartland of the Lenca people, implicitly invokes a national imaginary of mestizaje, but now stripped even of the nominal and token brandishing of the Lenca as the primordial people of Honduras.

In the aftermath of a coup that polarized the Honduran people, two models of cultural production are now in open competition. One argues for promoting a common Honduran national identity; the other to recognize the multiplicity of Honduran identities. In the absence of any coherent cultural policy emerging from the new Minister of Culture, the nationalist project enjoys the advantage of energetic promotion by a Congressional novice with a public profile and the means now to promote his own agenda on a national stage. Yet we cannot help wonder if it will prove so easy to put the genie of Honduran diversity back in the bottle of a uniform national culture.

Monday, September 6, 2010

Minimum Wage or Living Wage?

In all the discussion about setting a new minimum wage, with its focus on the proposals and counter-proposals of business and labor organizations, it can be easy to lose sight of what it costs urban workers to subsist in Honduras. The Honduran government has defined this as the cost of the canasta basica alimenticia, a monthly supply of 32 basic products that feeds a family of six.

In 2008, Honduras' labor minister said the cost of the canasta basica was 6,800 lempiras ($360 US). The minimum wage then was just half that amount.

Rampant speculation in 2008 was driving up the cost of beans. When the minimum wage was last set, Honduras had the most expensive canasta basica in all of Central America.

When he set a new minimum wage in December 2008, Manuel Zelaya explicitly placed it at 500 lempiras less than what it would cost a worker to buy the components of the canasta basica at that time.

Yet the claim being made today is that the canasta basica costs a fraction of its 2008 price, a claim that if true, would justify (in some measure) a lower minimum wage. How is this estimate being produced?

COHEP says the canasta basica cost is about 4,400 lempiras per month, basing their estimate on pricing the goods at the Tegucigalpa government-subsidized supermarket called Banasupro and the wholesale market in Tegucigalpa. This is well under the current minimum wage of 5,500 lempiras.

The workers unions, in contrast, suggest the canasta basica costs about 6,300 lempiras a month in the stores where their employees actually typically shop. The difference between the two sides comes to about $100 (US) a month.

The Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (INE) calculates the prices of the constituents of the canasta basica in a quite different manner from that used by COHEP. INE collects prices from six retail markets in a specific city, for a given week, as well as in seven supermarkets, 46 pulperias and two farmer's markets in the same city, and for each category calculates an average price. These four averages are then averaged to get a price for a given item in the canasta basica. You can find the weekly price reports for 2006 to 2008 for several cities on the INE's website here.

The Banco Central de Honduras then use these prices and applies them to a standard amount of each item sufficient to feed a family of six for a month, and calculates the cost of the canasta basica.

What COHEP did, in contrast, is go to a wholesale food market and to a government subsidized supermarket, a disingenuous selection of prices that systematically profoundly underestimates the real cost of the canasta basica.

Current INE estimates, and in fact, any of those for 2009-2010, are not available online. But one thing is clear: proposing a minimum wage based on low prices very few Hondurans will actually be able to obtain would make the minimum wage something far different from a living wage.

La Prensa noted in August that, in general, prices have continued to increase throughout all of 2009 and 2010. Bean prices increased $0.80 a pound just in the month of August, largely due to speculation. Vegetable prices have increased rapidly as the persistent heavy rains damage field crops. To the extent that these prices are not reflected in neighboring Central American countries for the same commodities, and they are not, this indicates significant market price manipulation in Honduras.

When Porfirio Lobo Sosa was sworn in in January, 72 percent of Hondurans lived in households that didn't have access to even the canasta basica according to a European Union study, creating a serious food security problem for Honduras. That's 5.7 million people. A further 1.5 million Hondurans lived in households that earned enough to pay for the canasta basica every month, but not enough to afford housing, health care, transportation, education, etc. That leaves just 800,000 people in Honduras, according to the study, in households with incomes that adequately support them.

And that is what is at stake in the current negotiation, if we step back and think about how wages affect people's ability to survive.

Friday, September 3, 2010

How Rumors Get Started-- and Why they Spread

Little did we know a week ago when we posted about Leonardo Villeda Bermudez crying wolf about Honduran teachers, that we would be writing again so soon about child organ trafficking in Honduras, the topic that first made him notorious.

To refresh your memory: in January 1987, Villeda Bermudez told a reporter in Honduras that there was a child organ trafficking problem in Honduras; specifically he said:
"Many families came forward to adopt children with physical defects. At first we thought they were decent people who loved children, but in time it was discovered that they wanted to sell them for body parts..."

(quoted in Tim Tate, "Trafficking in Children", in C. Moorhead, Ed. Betrayal: Child Exploitation in Today's World. Barrie and Jenkins, 1989, pp. 115)

It wasn't true; Villeda later retracted the statement, albeit too late to avoid getting fired by President Jose Azcona.

Imagine my surprise, then, to read the headline in Friday's La Tribuna: "Supposed christians linked to organ trafficking in Honduras", over a story reviving the fear that children are being abducted to harvest their organs.

Attributed to documents leaked from the Supreme Court of Honduras, as broadcast on radio station HRN, La Tribuna reported that Mexico is investigating the trafficking of organs of Mexican children transported to Honduras.

Similar stories appeared in Friday's El Heraldo and La Prensa but with one critical difference: there are two separate investigations alleged, one of organ trafficking, and the second of the trade in the children of migrants. La Tribuna apparently merged the two and revived the old rumor about trafficking of organs of children.

The story in from Mexico is very different.

The Mexican government is investigating child trafficking by members of the Christian Restoration Church in Mexico. A judge in Mexico City has issued arrest warrants for Alonso Emmanuel Cuevas Castañeda, a pastor, Elvira Casco Majalca, ex-director of a children's shelter run by the church, and Leticia Arrieta Estrada, an English teacher for the children's shelter. All are accused of trafficking in children and organized crime.

What the members of this church are not accused of in Mexico is any kind of organ trafficking, let alone traffic in the organs of children. And the Mexican news coverage doesn't make any connection to Honduras.

But that hasn't stopped the story from gaining official traction in Honduras.

La Tribuna lavishly illustrates its story with pictures of human torsos with surgical scars, letting us assume they are scars on involuntary organ donors. It quotes the Director of the Honduran Institute of Children and the Family (IHNFA), Suyapa Nuñez, as being very preoccupied by the story:
"We will investigate the sources which generated [this story], to then take the necessary actions to stop the traffic in children's organs."

Nuñez promised to take strong measures to stop the organ traffickers who the media claims are operating in the country, even though there is no basis to the story.

Organ trafficking is a real, world-wide problem, especially in poorer countries, where adults are induced by relatively small amounts of money to "donate" organs used in sophisticated international transplant facilities.

Nonetheless, the claim that children's organs are being harvested is a persistent yet unsupported rumor, one that is far from harmless, leading to attacks on innocent people.

And it is a rumor that is especially associated, according to research by anthropologist Nancy Scheper-Hughes, with particular political circumstances:
“You could map the rumour and see that it was tied especially to states going through civil war or genocide.” So, looking at this wider pattern, she developed a new theory: “maybe it can be seen as a sort of inchoate testifying by illiterate people on the margins, who don’t have other discourses to fall back upon, but who recognise that their bodies are not safe under these regimes, where there’s torture, disappearances and so forth”.

As, for example, a country in the aftermath of a coup, still facing unrestrained police repression in response to legal protests. Like Honduras today.

Thursday, September 2, 2010

Setting the Minimum Wage: Third Rail of Honduran Politics?

When then-president Manuel Zelaya, acting as required by Honduran law, last set a new minimum wage, the 5,500 lempiras a month baseline bottom wage shocked Honduran businessmen, enraged many of them, and reportedly was a contributing factor in the coup in 2009. Many companies refused to pay it with impunity.

Now it's Porfirio Lobo Sosa's turn, and his attempt to avoid this electrified issue has been prolonged.

His government has "hosted" negotiations between business leaders and worker's union leaders, as required by Honduran law, since the spring. These talks are supposed to allow these two sectors to agree on the new minimum wage, avoiding the need for the president to take a unilateral position.

But talks have been at a stalemate since at least May. By law, once they reach such an impasse, it is up to the President to set the new minimum wage. Lobo has been sitting on a decision since before he went to the World Cup in May.

The Lobo Sosa government has promised to declare a new minimum wage several times this summer, most recently, on August 30.

Instead, it convened yet another fruitless meeting between business representatives and union leaders. Lobo Sosa's Labor Minister, Felicito Avila, first declared Lobo would freeze the minimum wage where it is now, and as recently as yesterday argued that the government would insist that, rather than changing the minimum wage, businesses pay a one-time bonus of 3000 lempiras to workers this year.

Lobo himself is in a catch 22 situation. He says his government doesn't have the funds to pay a wage increase to government workers that would be triggered by raising the minimum wage.

As the government, it could, in theory, issue bonds to cover the increase. But in reality the Lobo Sosa administration cannot take such a step, because it would interfere with his negotiations with international financial agencies.

In order to convince the International Monetary Fund that Honduras qualifies for a standby line of credit, Lobo Sosa must prove to them that he has contained government costs in the 2011 government budget, especially salaries. The IMF returns to Honduras next week to review Lobo's 2011 budget proposals. Obviously, adding a large increase to the budget, specifically for salaries, would undercut meeting that target.

So, for now, not having set the minimum wage is probably better for the Lobo Sosa administration, although it has reinforced the atmosphere of labor unrest that exists.

Because Lobo has not set the minimum wage, labor unions have called a "civic strike" day for next Tuesday, September 7. Some unions, such as STENEE, the state electrical workers union, have said this is a preview to a national strike, should there be no progress on a minimum wage.

Wonder if a general strike will help or hurt the task of impressing the IMF?