Why did the US reject three Honduran consuls?

The Spanish news agency EFE reports that the Honduran consuls of Los Angeles, Atlanta and San Francisco, Vivian Panting, Cecilia Callejas and Francisco Venegas, were refused accreditation by the US, for staying in their posts under the de facto regime after the coup d'Etat.

EFE cites vice minister Alden Rivera as saying the three "received a request that they change their migration status or leave the country within 30 days" during the de facto regime, to which they did not respond. EFE notes that as the US did not recognize the Micheletti regime, it considered the consulates closed, and thus, these individuals could no longer stay in the US as diplomats.

Honduran newspapers are covering the story somewhat differently.

El Heraldo leads with the dedication of Foreign Minister Mario Canahuati to personally denounce any "irregularity" detected in any of the US consulates. According to their story, the reason for the removal of the three officials was that they were doing personal business on the side.

Quoting vice-minister Alden Rivera, the story says that the US State Department has "begun to execute a new mechanism of evaluation to avoid diplomats of Honduras accredited in the US carrying out activities different from those of their functions". Proceso Digital emphasizes the same point, again quoting Alden Rivera: the US "is not going to permit in any case that a functionary would be accredited in a consulate and that he would not give services in that Consulate or that they dedicate themselves to another activity such as study, work, or conduct business".

This may well be true. But it is not clear that it has anything to do with these specific dismissals.

Buried deep in the Heraldo story, Foreign Minister Canahuati is quoted as saying

"I have said that I am going to share information about the way the diplomats are conducting themselves but at this moment I don't have any complaint, what has happened is that there are some functionaries that were renewed but the government of the United States does not want to accredit them because they simply adduce that they were working in the time of the Micheletti administration..."

"They will logically be removed from their positions but they simply were not accredited by the US, not for undue actions or incompletion of their duties."

Confused? you should be. Were the consuls in question conducting business on the side, not completing their duties, or acting as consuls for an unrecognized regime? You pick.

But wait, there's more!

Honduran congress member Marcia Facussé contradicts Mario Canahuati's explanation, arguing that these people cannot be tainted by associations with Micheletti because the US never recognized any Micheletti-appointed diplomats.

She has a point; however, it is a slippery one. And as an avid supporter of the coup, she is motivated to defend the regime it installed and not face up to the fact that this is another piece of collateral damage.

During the de facto regime, some Honduran diplomats went over to the side of Micheletti, so it is perfectly possible for there to be a diplomat from before the coup who nonetheless is unacceptable to the US now because of association with the Micheletti regime.

In a sense, the coup was a test for all the officials of the Zelaya government, and despite the fact that it created a horrific double-bind, when the consuls received notices from the US that their immigration status had changed, they had two choices. Not acting was not one of them.

A Year of Suspension

On July 5, 2009, the Organization of American States adopted a resolution suspending Honduras's right to participate in that body.

That resolution stated that "a coup d'etat against the constitutional government" had "produced an unconstitutional alteration of the democratic order." The OAS reaffirmed the principal of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states, but also noted that a suspended member of the OAS continues to be bound by the organization's charter and treaty obligations.

The resolution made reference to Articles 20 and 21 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter which urges the OAS member states to take diplomatic actions to restore the democratic order, and authorizes the suspension of the member state when those diplomatic actions fail.

Article 21 notes that although suspended, the suspended member "shall continue to fulfill all its obligations to the Organization, in particular, its human rights obligations." The same clauses require the active member states to maintain diplomatic initiatives to restore democracy in the suspended state.

Article 22 of the Charter covers reincorporation after suspension, "once the situation that led to the suspension has been resolved". This requires that two-thirds of the member countries agree it is resolved.

There was vigorous debate in June in the OAS meeting in Lima, Peru, between OAS members who believe the Honduran situation is resolved, and those who believe more needs to be done. The one thing that was clear at that meeting is that there is not currently the required two-thirds support for readmission.

Instead, the OAS voted to appoint a commission to deliver a report on the state of democracy and human rights in Honduras, with a report due July 30th. At the time, the OAS press release said

All Member States present in Lima agreed that "the situation in Honduras is a matter of concern for all," and that they "need more information on the current status of the political process in Honduras."

This commission should have been appointed several weeks ago according to statements Jose Miguel Insulza made at the time. It still has not been appointed or begun its work. It is not clear what such a commission can do that has not already been accomplished by the several reports of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and it seems very clear that there is little scope for the OAS to change the conditions that make many member states dubious about simply reintegrating Honduras, unrepentant about the coup d'Etat.

We've debated what the international community could do to make a real difference in Honduras, and rejected many ideas. Here's the little that survived that debate:

(1) Recognize the Frente Nacional de Resistencia Popular as a legitimate civil (not political) voice and respond to their initiatives as representatives of a civil organization, and as the opposition to the coup and its continued consequences. Stop treating the coup as a having been a confrontation between the traditional political parties in Honduras. Without involving the Frente, there can be no reconciliation.

(2) Stop treating President Zelaya's return as the sole or most important necessary step in reconciliation. His continued exile is a symptom of larger problems, including continued political persecution of coup opponents by the courts and public prosecutor. Recognize that many Hondurans have left the country for their own safety and security, and that Zelaya, while certainly a powerful symbol, is not the only one, nor is he the sole leader of the opposition.

(3) Fund the Honduran Human Rights Platform and its alternative truth commission. Its budget would be a tiny amount compared to what the international community gives to Honduras every year, and it has more of a chance of actually bringing some light onto the human rights issues in Honduras than the official truth and reconciliation commission, which can't even say the word "coup".

We would like to have said, demand that Porfirio Lobo Sosa formally acknowledge that there was a coup, demand that the Honduran Congress retract its vote illegally installing Roberto Micheletti as "president", but these are things that only Honduran leaders could do, if they had the will to do so.

What seems self-evident is that the international community entirely failed, throughout the months of the de facto regime, to communicate to Honduran political leaders the real seriousness of what they had done, and the fact that it could not be overlooked or easily put behind. The mixed messages sent by the US were especially destructive to any firm international rebuke to Honduras. The control of most news media in Honduras by coup supporters guarantees even today that Honduran press will spin every international statement until black is white, and a refusal to readmit the country to the OAS is a step toward readmission.

Maybe there is no hope of countering this propaganda. But if those behind the 2009 coup don't get the message that it really was unacceptable in the contemporary world, there will be no reason for them to ignore this weapon in future political conflicts.

Contextualizing the Roland Valenzuela interview: Congress and Ambassador Llorens, June 22-28, 2009

What are the facts that Roland Valenzuela claimed, in an interview now circulating in Honduras, were established by a dossier of papers left by mistake in a Tegucigalpa hotel?

• that a group of businessmen in Dubai for a trade fair used the opportunity to conspire together;

• that they enlisted a former military attaché as their go between, and set out to enlist key players in their plot;

• that the plotters hired a lobbying firm to help them defame Zelaya (note that the lobbying firm is not said to have been party to the coup plot per se-- they were a tool, not an author);

• that Marcia Villeda faked Zelaya's signature on the "resignation" letter;

• finally, we get to the explosive allegation about Llorens being sent a draft of a decree removing Zelaya from office, signed by a group of individuals who at the time were congress members.

Reading this, I and others have wondered, why would the conspirators have sent a decree to the US ambassador?

I think we can unravel at least this last point.

The reporting on the interview quotes Valenzuela as saying

that the decree sent to the ambassador carried the signature of the congress members Ricardo Rodriguez, Liberal party member and present Sub Procurador of the Republic, Toribio Aguilera Coello, PINU member presently congress member, Rolando Dubon Buezo, Nacional party member and still congressman, Rigoberto Chan Castillo, Nacional party member now secretary of Congress and Gabo Alfredo Jalil Mejia who served as Minister of Defense in the Micheletti regime.

The list of names jogged my memory. On June 26, 2009, Honduran newspapers published stories about the events of the previous evening, which I watched unfold live on television on the north coast. Several of these people were prominent in the television and newspaper coverage.

Rabidly anti-Zelaya La Prensa titled its story that day "They investigate the actions of president Zelaya".

The lead sentence read

While rumors of a disqualification of president Manuel Zelaya Rosales grow like froth, the National Congress maintained steadfast the motion the actions of the leader should be investigated and his administration should be approved or disapproved with urgency.

[Mientras los rumores de una inhabilitación del presidente Manuel Zelaya Rosales crecían como la espuma, el Congreso Nacional mantenía firme la moción para que fueran investigadas las actuaciones del mandatario y de urgencia aprobar o improbar su administración. ]

The reporter for the newspaper repeated that the confrontation over the June 28 cuarta urna survey had motivated "the benches of Congress to lobby for an initiative that would disqualify Zelaya" [Esto motivó a que las bancadas del Congreso cabildearan una iniciativa para inhabilitar a Zelaya].

"Improbar" and "inhabilitar" refer to legal actions congress considered.

The first (equivalent to censure) it did have authority to do. The second, which was apparently the actual step desired by the congressional leadership, ceased to be a power of Congress when the constitution was reformed to remove impunity from prosecution that high officials had enjoyed. Under the present constitution, any high government official accused of crimes is tried by the Supreme Court, and removal from office is one of the possible punishments after a guilty verdict.

Toribio Aguilera is quoted as saying he had not participated in negotiations or dialogues, presumably from the context, about a removal of Zelaya:

"First there should be decreed a state of emergency and if the dialogue is exhausted, proceed to suspension"

[“Primero debería decretarse un estado de emergencia y si se agota el dialogo proceder a la suspensión”.]

"Suspension", presumably of Zelaya as president, was again actually not a power of Congress. Declaring a state of emergency would, of course, become the primary tool of control of the de facto regime.

Aguilera was one member of a committee appointed by congress that also included Emilio Cabrera and Antonio Rivera (in other places, the membership is given as Ricardo Rodríguez, Rigoberto Chang Castillo, Toribio Aguilera, Enrique Rodríguez y Will Bustillo). Rodriguez, Aguilera, and Chang Castillo are three of those who were named by Valenzuela as authors of the document he saw that was intended for Hugo Llorens.

This committee was charged with producing a report on Zelaya's actions and drafting a resolution for Congress to consider. The committee had been interviewed on live television when Congress went into continuous session the previous day, when they stated that they expected to finish their work within hours. On Friday morning, press reports said

they solicited more time to study other documents on which they would solidly base their decision

[solicitaron más tiempo para estudiar otra documentación en la cual fundamentar sólidamente su decisión]

The overlap between the membership of this Congressional committee and the individuals Valenzuela says signed the decree sent to Llorens for comments makes it almost certain that it is the product of this committee that Valenzuela was describing; a decree that would have had congress censuring Zelaya (which it legally could do) but going beyond its constitutional authority to suspend or disqualify him from office.

The article in La Prensa gives a hint of what the congressional strategy to get around this awkward fact was:

Failing to recognize that the Constitution of the Republic gives power to the Legislature to be able to remove a President if he presents an inability to govern, Zelaya said "the Congreso Nacional cannot disqualify me."

[Desconociendo que la Constitución de la República le da poder al Legislativo para que pueda quitar a un Presidente si presenta incapacidad para gobernar, Zelaya dijo: “el Congreso Nacional no puede inhabilitarme.”]

The apparent reference to a president unable to govern is to the part of the constitution aimed at allowing succession in office when a president was incapacitated (for instance, medically).

Marvin Ponce, congress member of the Unificación Democrática (UD) party said after congress approved censure that this was

"an evident demonstration of the interest of Congress in committing a technical coup d'Etat and overthrowing president Zelaya."

"If the National Congress wants to commit a coup d'Etat, say so clearly. I imagine that the commission named by the Junta Directiva [of Congress], that will investigate the President will present a report declaring him disqualified, to then name Micheletti as President of the Republic."

[“una evidente muestra del interés del Congreso de dar un golpe técnico de Estado y derrocar al presidente Zelaya”.

“Si el Congreso Nacional quiere dar un golpe de Estado, que lo diga claramente. Me imagino que la comisión nombrada por la Junta Directiva, que investigará al Presidente dará un informe que lo declarará inhabilitado, para luego nombrar a Micheletti como Presidente de la República”.]

Rigoberto Chang Castillo was quoted as saying

"we do not have intention to commit a coup d'Etat, we do not have the weapons nor the warlike capacity and the Armed Forces are not for that."

[“no tenemos intención de golpe de Estado, no tenemos armas ni capacidad bélica y las FFAA no están para eso.”]

How did Chang Castillo know the position of the Armed Forces on committing a coup on June 26?

Marvin Ponce, speaking on June 26, 2009, ends up sounding eerily prescient:

"Micheletti does not have the popularity in his party nor among the people and in place of calming the situation, we will be entering a series of convulsions that could cause blood to be spilled."

[“Micheletti no tiene la popularidad de su partido ni la del pueblo y en lugar de calmar la situación, estaríamos entrando a una serie de convulsiones que podrían causar derramamiento de sangre”.]

Unfortunately, the Honduran Congress, having started on its route to remove Zelaya, did not stop when it discovered it could not do so legally. The military coup Chang Castillo said could not happen happened. And the outcomes foreseen by Ponce also happened.

What Roland Valenzuela seems to have told us is that the committee of the National Congress charged with preparing a decree to remove Zelaya from office sent a copy of their draft decree to the US Ambassador for his comments. This does not tell us whether Llorens received this document, if he read it, or if he offered comments on it.

Certainly, the interview Llorens gave El Heraldo on June 27, 2009, shows no hint of possible knowledge of the coup that would take place mere hours later. On June 24, Zelaya cabinet minister Patricia Rodas was quoted as saying that she had spoken with Ambassador Llorens and asked him to abstain from interference in the internal affairs of Honduras.

Ambassador Llorens was definitely speaking with Honduran politicians during this week, and those contacts were clearly not just with the Zelaya administration. On the same day that Rodas was interviewed saying she had asked him to abstain from interfering, La Tribuna published an interview with Llorens in which he is quoted as saying

"as a friend of Honduras, I have urged the leaders of the nation to engage in dialogue and that they find a way to resolve their differences on the basis of discussion and the law.'

[“como amigo de Honduras, he instado a los líderes de la nación para que dialoguen y que busquen una forma de arreglar sus diferencias a base del diálogo y las leyes”.]

The implication of his remarks, in which he singled out the congress and Armed Forces as institutions for positive comment, seemed at the time to be giving them backing against the executive branch. Re-reading these remarks now, one can only find his assurance about the Armed Forces bitterly ironic, and his statement that he would not entertain any stories curious:

"I think that the Armed Forces will do what is correct and this will be resolved by the Honduran vocation of doing things with tolerance and within the law, democracy is not exempt from problems, but the reality is that no one is going to come to me with any story, I entered as an agent of diplomacy in the time of the military dictators and totalitarianism."

[“Creo que las Fuerzas Armadas van hacer lo que es correcto y esto se va a resolver por la vocación hondureña de hacer las cosas con la tolerancia y dentro de la ley, la democracia no está exenta de los problemas, pero la realidad es que a mí nadie me va a venir con ningún cuento, yo entré como agente de la diplomacia en la época de las dictaduras militares y el totalitarismo”.]

On June 26, Patricia Rodas worried openly about the power elite contacting Llorens, commenting that while Ambassador Llorens

"abstained from expressing opinions on the internal affairs of our country, we should not forget that powerful groups continue pressuring him so that together they can articulate plans against our country and our people."

["se abstuvo de opinar de los asuntos internos de nuestro país, no olvidemos que lo grupos de poder siguen presionándolo para que juntos puedan articular planes en contra de nuestro país y de nuestro pueblo".]

The implication that powerful groups in Honduras could succeed in enlisting the US Ambassador in their schemes may seem far-fetched from a position outside Honduras. Yet the existence of a draft copy of the decree through which the Honduran Congress intended to remove President Zelaya from office, intended for Ambassador Llorens, indicates a degree of communication between the authors of the coup and the US representative that is giving those suspicious of the role of the US support for their worst doubts.

Honduran suspicions of US complicity in the coup (part two)

The second story posted today stemming from the interview with Roland Valenzuela, now circulating by email and on the internet, cites the mechanism by which Valenzuela said he gained access to papers from the planning of the coup:

The coup d'Etat was planned by Honduran businessmen in an Arab emirate

The assassinated ex minister, Roland Valenzuela, for the ousted president Manuel Zelaya, denounced, on "San Pedro Sula by Night", that the coup d'Etat in Honduras was planned by a group of six Honduran businessmen, who coincided in attending a fair in Dubai, one of the seven Arab emirates.

They met in a bar in a hotel and decided that they had to remove Zelaya: "we cannot bear him any more". Just when the Cuarta Urna started to be pushed, a menace to them, since Zelaya sought a constitutional assembly to convert into law the economic and social measures of his government, in order to protect them.

The "articulator", the coordinator of the coup d'Etat, Jackeline Sandoval, graduated with honors from West Point, and trained afterwards in the US Rangers, forgot a dossier of papers in the Hotel Plaza San Martin, that contained various drafts with precise details of how the Coup would occur.

The dossier was delivered, by "a common citizen who to me is a hero", said Valenzuela, in a recorded copy of the radio program, of almost two hours duration that is circulating on the Internet.

They paid four million dollars to a "powerful lobbyist", someone who promotes political proposals, last name Smith, to misinform about Zelaya through accusations to the Pentagon, the CIA, and the FBI, and to predispose the government of the US. Smith and partners contacted the coordinator of the coup.

Valenzuela commented that those groups, that had sworn an oath to kill Zelaya, would be listening and would say "how does this hayseed [hijuelmaíz] know so much, I don't know if they will kill me right now when I leave [the Radio]", he said, laughing.

The ambassador Hugo Llorens and the US

Among other papers, is the draft of the decree to remove Zelaya, with the number of the Act, dated the 28th of June 2009, signed by Ricardo Rodriguez, José Toribio Aguilera, Rolando Dubón Bueso, Rigoberto Chang Castillo and Gabo Alfredo Jalil Mejía; who address Hugo Llorens, telling him that some corrections are lacking but that "your opinion requires immediate attention".

"what does ambassador Llorens have to do meddling in those matters... giving opinions on a draft that is, nothing less, than the draft of the removal of President Zelaya. This love so great that Llorens had for Zelaya, after not liking him, always called my attention", Valenzuela opined.

He accused the US: "the coup was not reversed because, they betrayed us". Zelaya never was restored because the US assured Micheletti "hold on, hold on, stay there, because we are not going to remove you", he asserted.

"Hillary Clinton swore to Zelaya that they were going to restore him", but at the same time turned over control of the situation to Oscar Arias, who Valenzuela called "the clerk of the gringos".

There is also a communique of the international community, in which "they report that the rule of law was persistently broken" by Zelaya, that "he was attributed, de facto, the supremacy of all the powers of State".

He said that in the sheet, there was a "little list" of the people that were in the meeting, and a set of "untrue accusations" against Zelaya, with observations and corrections that were considered necessary for the proposed plan. Jackeline Sandoval delivered to each person involved which were their tasks and what they should do, or say.

"Call Marcia Villeda so that she obtains those documents" said one of the annotations read by Valenzuela. She "faked the signature" on a supposed resignation of Zelaya and afterwords "they declared her innocent" in a court, he explained.

When Zelaya decided to carry out the Cuarta Urna, the businessmen had a meeting in Dubai and discussed that he wanted the constitutional assembly to convert into law the discounts on fuels. For Valenzuela this had been the motive.

They convince the Armed Forces of Honduras

The conspirators went in search of the Armed Forces, which was the final shield of defense of President Zelaya, that had "remained loyal" to the president, he said.

Romeo Vásquez Velásquez, who was at the time in the Hotel Christopher Columbus in Trujillo, "seemed like a child running from one side to the other showing the plans for the Cuarta Urna to the President", Valenzuela observed. "Suddently, he radically changed his position".

The golpistas acted divided

The only "lying excuse" that they had to kidnap the President was the Cuarta Urna. One golpista group said that there was no way "to touch the president, there are not processes yet, they haven't done what needs to be done, they haven't fulfilled the plan that we made, they are going to reverse the coup", they complained to the other group.

Micheletti persisted and "convinced the Armed Forces, with a perverse connection". Those involved "are the men that command in this country", Rafael Ferrari, media baron, "became ill and went to the US, but left instructions for Renato Alvarez and Edgardo Melgar [journalists] so that they would dedicate themselves to blowing up flowerpots at Mel, and follow the instructions of Billy Joya".

He said that "the golpistas did not follow the scheme that the hawks gave them, the procedure that the American ambassador accepted". Carlos Flores, also golpista, followed the proposal of the US, he was the first to show solidarity with president Zelaya and his wife Xiomara, and to say to him that he "had nothing to do with the coup".

According to Valenzuela those pressing for the coup were "a chuña faction, those that came from below and were desperate to divvy up power".

"The are going to have me killed for this", Roland Valenzuela then said.

He asserted that there is a group of hitman to assassinate Zelaya. That the order in the coup "was to kill him, pretend that the presidential guard resisted, that there was a shoot-out and a shot hit him. But, a man that was opposed" when the elite guard arrived to take away the president, sent 500 soldiers so that "600 eyes would see what happened".

Valenzuela mentioned, in the interview, that he did not go out to march with the Resistance, because he feared that they would kill him in the street, because it fell to him to do "private things, alone" to push for the return and the restitution of Zalaya.

With the Constituyente, Zelaya sought to convert into law the social conquests pushed ahead

Valenzuela mentioned seven measures of the government of Zelaya that produced the discontent and caused the various powerful groups to unite against him.

Among others, the order to lower the prices of the basic shopping cart, the regulation and pressures by the DEI [income tax agency] for the dispensations to fast food franchises, that introduced products like a consumer shop, and sold them in other places.

The measures to adjust the price of fuels, Petro Caribe that provoked the revolt of the transnationals. He told that one of the importers said to the president: "if I stop importation of fuels, president, you will not last even 24 hours more in your position". Valenzuela said that he pushed that businessman, and insulted them.

Zelaya had concluded that the measures achieved in his government could only be protected by "turning them into law", and for that the constitutional assembly was needed, that led him to push for a popular poll, known as the Cuarta Urna. Because, as he said, "in the Congress we have no power. The Court, the Tribunal Superior de Cuentas, 'are owned"".

The role of the Commission of Truth and reconciliation

The "commission of the lie" intends to say that "they committed the coup against president Zelaya because he provoked it", Valenzuela concluded.

Roland Valenzuela, close collaborator and friend of Zelaya, was assassinated by a bullet in the back, by another businessman, Carlos Yacamán Meza, in the bar of a hotel, the 16th of [June] or 2010. The Police initially hid the name of the person that killed him in order not to "hinder the investigations".

Honduran suspicions of US complicity in the coup (part one)

Adrienne Pine on quotha.com provides links to new articles on the website of the Frente de Resistencia, along with audio links and emails circulating that relate to suspicions of US foreknowledge about the coup d'etat of June 28, 2009.

This is the kind of discussion that US commentators routinely reject out of hand as too fantastic to be given any attention.

But in my experience, the Hondurans who are taking these questions seriously are not impressionable: they include a wide range of highly educated people who find it hard to credit that the US was taken entirely by surprise and had no knowledge of the planned coup in time to intervene. This leads to the conclusion that the US did know, and chose to look the other way or even actively endorse the coup.

Concretely, people point to the various meetings Ambassador Hugo Llorens had with parties to the coup in the weeks leading up to June 28. The fact that the plane that illegally carried Manuel Zelaya to Costa Rica landed at Palmerola (Soto Cano) air base, where US forces are stationed, without encountering any reaction, is seen as particularly suspicious.

The current stories come from a new source: ex-Zelaya minister Rolando Valenzuela, who was fatally shot on June 17. The death has been reported as resulting from an argument of a personal nature with Carlos Yacaman, now being sought for the crime.

Shortly before his death, Valenzuela gave an interview to a San Pedro Sula radio station. And that is what has inspired the current return to the nagging question of what Hugo Llorens knew, and when he knew it.

Here are our translations of the first of two articles posted by the FNRP; the second will follow in its own blog post.

Regardless of how likely readers think it is that US officials were part of the planning of the coup, or knew in advance, we would underline that what matters here is that Hondurans in resistance have so much distrust of the US. There is a reason why the US-supplied map to put the coup behind is viewed skeptically: it is called history.

North American ambassador did know about the coup and was part of the conspiracy

The North American ambassador accredited to Tegucigalpa, Hugo Llorens, did know about the coup d'Etat against Manuel Zelaya Rosales, the ex-minister of the Zelaya administration, Roland Valenzuela, revealed days before his death, in an interview broadcast by the journalist Ernesto Alonso Rojas, in a local radio station of the city of San Pedro Sula.

Fifteen days after the assassination of the ex-minister of the National Program of Sustainable Development (PRONADERA), at the hands of the businessman Carlos Yacaman Meza, the interview has circulated on different networks on the Internet, in which he signals in a clear way that the North American ambassador participated directly in the planning of the coup d'Etat and expressed his fear that he could be assassinated for the interview.

The interview, taped the first of May and broadcast by Radio Internacional of San Pedro Sula, regained importance after President Zelaya accused the US of forming part of the coup d'Etat, and Ambassador Llorens appeared denying his participation.

But Valenzuela related in detail how the Ambassador did participate in the coup and how the 10th of June of 2009, the then-president of the National Congress Roberto Micheletti, converted into dictator the 28th of the same month, sent the draft of the decree that would remove Zelaya from office to the North American ambassador to ask his opinion.

According to the story of the ill-fated ex-minister, despite the fact that it was still the 10th of June, the decree carried the date the 28th of June, with the following message for the ambassador, "Ambassador Llorens, this is the decree that Micheletti delivered to me, some opinions are lacking but it requires your immediate opinion."

Valenzuela pointed out as well that the decree sent to the ambassador carried the signature of the congress members Ricardo Rodriguez, Liberal party member and present Sub Procurador of the Republic, Toribio Aguilera Coello, PINU member presently congress member, Rolando Dubon Buezo, Nacional party member and still congressman, Rigoberto Chan Castillo, Nacional party member now secretary of Congress and Gabo Alfredo Jalil Mejia who served as Minister of Defense in the Micheletti regime.

In accord with the interview the person who supposedly sent the decree to the North American ambassador was Jacqueline Foglia Sandoval, a Honduran ex-military, graduate of West Point, who served as attaché of defense in the Honduran embassy in Washington, and as a member of COHEP (Honduran Council of Private Enterprise), among other organizations.

"What did ambassador Llorens have to do walking around, getting involved in the internal affairs of Honduras, giving opinions on a draft document that is the removal of president Zelaya" the ex minister asked in the conversation with the journalist Rojas.

Hillary Clinton promised to restore Zelaya

Valenzuela went further by affirming that the North American Secretary of State promised Zelaya to restore him in power on the first visit that he made to Washington after being overthrown.

"Hillary Clinton on the first visit of president Zelaya swore to president Zelaya that they were going to restore him and afterward they went looking for a position so that the dictatorship could perpetuate itself in power".

Valenzuela affirmed that the restitution of President Zelaya did not happen, "because the gringos betrayed us, because the gringos always betray us... they play a role, saying to us that they are going to aid us and on the other hand they say to Micheletti, hang on, Micheletti, hang on, we aren't going to remove you".

They never restored Zelaya.

Who is Jacqueline Foglia Sandoval

Foglia is singled out by Valenzuela, as the person charged with coordinating and operating the coup d'Etat, "she is the one that coordinated what would be delivered to each one of those that served as executors of the coup, what they should do and say, and what they wanted them to declare", and proposed as an example what she said to the then-Procurador General of the Republic, Rosa América Miranda de Galo.

"Attorney this is the cuarta urna decree, it is published now, you have to declare it illegal".

The 11th of May of 2009, the Court of Administrative Disputes in Tegucigalpa, declared the petition to nullify the survey of the 28th of June presented by the Special Attorney Against Corruption, Henry Salgado, admissable. Three days later the Procuradora General, Rosa América Miranda, cleared it at trial, leaving defenseless the government of President Manuel Zelaya Rosales.

Foglia Sandoval also is singled out in the report "The Facts Speak for Themselves" of the Commissioner of Human Rights, Leo Valladares Lanza, of being part of the battalion 3-16, which in the 1980s was in charge of assassinations and disappearances of Hondurans.

Enjoying the luxury of Dubai the overthrow of Zelaya started

The ill-fated minister revealed how six major businessmen came together at a fair in the city of Dubai, in the bar of a hotel, saying that "Zelaya has to be removed, we cannot support him anymore".

According to the declarations of Valenzuela the conspiracy to remove President Zelaya began in the capital of the United Arab Emirates, in the distant Middle East, immediately after the project of the cuarta urna was announced.

A group of businessmen that were participating in an international fair, who Valenzuela did not identify, decided in that meeting that they were going to remove Zelaya from power and then they articulated and paid a lobbyist in Washington, identified only with the last name of Smith, to begin to discredit the government of Zelaya, a job that cost them four million dollars.

Perhaps Valenzuela was referring to the firm of lobbyists Smith, Dawson and Andrews with its headquarters in Washington.

According to the story, it was in the same reunion that the decided to name Jacqueline Foglia as the coordinator and person in charge of logistics to prepare the overthrow of Zelaya.

Marcia Villeda faked the signature of president Zelaya

In one part of the interview, Valenzuela mentions how the coup d'Etat was planned in congress and in one of the many meetings of the conspiracy, the then and present congress member Marcia Facusse de Villeda was ordered to obtain documents for the accusations against Zelaya.

And about the falsification of president Zelaya, Valenzuela said without subterfuge that it was Marcia Facusse de Villeda who was charged with faking the signature of the president.

In the extensive interview that Valenzuela gave days before his death, he confessed that when Zelaya named him as minister of Pronadera, he knew nothing about agriculture; he criticized the role of the fuel transnationals, the system of administration of justice, as well as the role of personages such as Carlos Flores, who he singled out as involved directly in the coup d'Etat.

Valenzuela will not be able to testify before the Truth Commission because of his assassination in cold blood, in the city of San Pedro Sula, but without knowing his declarations it will be a good contribution to the knowledge of the truth, although now, Valenzuela is dead.

Rodolfo Pastor Fasquelle on justice and the return (or not) of Mel Zelaya

From Vos el Soberano:

Coup, cut, and action: A telenovela called "The Humbug"

Rodolfo Pastor Fasquelle

Today the most recent episode of the local soap opera "The Humbug" was transmitted. The Attorney General Rubí, protege and sidekick of Carlos Flores Facussé and politically chosen in Congress weeks before the coup, under intense international pressure-- always "the interference!", as Leitzelar and the bards lament--announced with bass drum and cymbal, that he would file away the political proceedings brought against ex President Zelaya after the coup and would graciously permit him to defend himself in liberty against allegations of administrative offenses, that were also the means and pretexts of the coup, before the Court that justified and endorsed the coup, equally chosen among the friends of Flores Facussé by the golpista Congress. Do we have to applaud? Laugh? or cry, as is customary with the soap opera genre?

In theory there is not much to fear. Indeed this is the same Court that only a few days ago (after the coup, pardon me if I insist on the chronology, that is the methodological recourse of my trade) just concluded giving a final dismissal to ex-President Callejas, accused by the conservative US senator Jesse Helms of being in his time "the most corrupt in Latin America" and against who the Attorney, even in the hands of the National Party, kept the charges pending for twelve years! But who had to be rewarded.

We are dealing with a transformation, to a very different Rubí from the one that has declared again and again that he would have to detain and jail ex President Zelaya the moment he arrived in Honduras. And in effect I have an ambivalent feeling because all my adult life I have dreamed about how to construct a country where the powerful would be responsible before the law and
what's justice? My stomach turns at the statement of ex Ambassador Arcos, noting that in Honduras justice is a serpent that only bites the barefoot.

The announcement by Rubí is a new step on the turn that is observed, for months, in the strategy of Lobo and the USA, that are "flexing" their positions with respect to the return of the ex president to the country. And it provides a new trap, of those of which the political field is full. A friend revealed to me a couple of months ago in Honduras, explaining to me that it deals with generating the impression that the conditions for his return have already been established in the country and that "if Mel does not return, it is because he doesn't want to", even if Lobo is not in any condition to absolutely guarantee anything with respect to his security. Under the supposition that this would be enough for the -- meantime, inadmissable-- readmission of the country to the OAS and SICA. And without committing himself in the least to confront the actual situation of insecurity and political persecution that obtains against the opposition.

Although I do not wish to label as "military", thus excusing the prominence of the political and business partners of the conspiracy, the President of the USA, his Foreign Minister, his ambassador and the spokespeople of the State Department have labeled what occurred in Honduras as a "coup d'Etat". That is to say as a rupture of the legal order, a crime against institutionality and the Honduran citizenry. Thus it has been labeled as well by the UN, the OAS, SICA, and it has been recognized repeatedly as well by President Lobo himself and other national actors, accomplices who want to feign candor and objectivity. (Let alone the Resistance in which we locate ourselves for distinct reasons, with cell phones and multicolored flags with an undetermined number-- because we don't want to tell-- of citizens.) And it has been recognized by all those organizations, that have certified and documented many (although not all) of the abuses of human rights and crimes against humanity: illegal detentions, tortures, and assassinations of members of the opposition and their relatives, with the goal of intimidating and silencing it. They were also recognized as abuses, the day before yesterday by the Washington Office for Latin America (WOLA), abuses that there is no way to stop while the apparatus of justice is devoted to covering them up or justifying them.

This actual situation of Honduras will not be remedied in the least with the return (yearned for by many) of ex President Zelaya. Of course Mel should submit himself to justice, and to all the accusations that can be sustained; it comforts me-- serving him-- that he has never refused that and that, only under pressure and for the sake of social peace, accepted the false amnesty that was offered in the San Jose-Tegucigalpa Accord. But the recognition that there was a coup d'Etat and of the present situation derived from it, obliges that all the facts be investigated, so that their perpetrators-- as well-- give an account of their respective responsibilities before Justice. Not by a commission named by the lone wolf that will reveal the facts in ten years nor before the golpista Court. Power, like love, comes to an end; put it in the script.

That is to say that everyone should submit themselves to justice before a trustworthy, objective judicial institution, that cannot be the same Honduran Court since it pronounced in favor of, and even legitimated the coup with an illegal order, when it came about that the Congress would not accept the supposed "resignation of the President with all his ministers" and whose magistrates-- of the Court-- therefore would have to be themselves investigated and indicted for those crimes, which are "treason against the nation", indefeasible. And so that the magistrates and the golpista Fiscal and their other partners and accomplices submit themselves to justice, it is critical to remove them from their offices and immunities, as have to be removed as well, to ensure respect for citizenship and to respond, the police and military commanders directly implicated in the action of the coup and of the repression. The situation is not insurmountable, but the Resistance is more than its head and will not stop until it attains its goal and should be patient.

Ex President Zelaya of course will not fall into this trap. Because the operation of the makeup is transparent and because it is his obligation to continue demanding a correction of the irreversible wrong. The dominant class of Honduras has to learn to be responsible. The situation of the country is no wonder and does not just affect the man in the street. The USA has to reconsider its role in the soap opera to rectify it, in the historical record. Already enough to mourn and to repent.

One Year Later: Edmundo Orellana

One year after the Coup d'Etat many things have happened. Many evils, for certain.

The national problems have been accumulating dangerously as in a pressure cooker. If they have no escape, the country will be exposed to a convulsion without parallel in national history.

The government is alone. It is alone because no one serves it. Many of its functionaries have already begun to push their candidacies and with energy.

They work for themselves and not for the country. They fight even about the quantity of potholes they fill, with a publicity display whose cost is much higher than the repair of the pothole.

They work without coordination. Each one does what he wants and how he fancies. Meanwhile, they go around expounding a plan that no one puts in practice because if they were to execute it surely it would have already had positive results for the population.

Tired of such an administrative disaster. They decide to go on vacation. They all went to South Africa. The mayor of the capital went, despite the fact that the city remains in the middle of a chaos of grand proportions after the most recent tropical storm. The president of the national congress also went.

In the face of the indifference of his comrades and without caring about the threats of a Coup d'Etat, the head of government decided to accompany them in their vacations. The country remained adrift. And no one cared.

Meanwhile, civic insecurity is increasingly alarming and no one discusses the advance of organized crime. Legal insecurity has investors running. The lack of work is an increasingly and more dangerous destabilizing factor. The rise in costs of the family budget distresses households. The rise in taxes steals money from the pockets of the taxpayers, who do not see in exchange any compensation on the part of the central or local government. The middle class declines, poverty grows and extreme poverty becomes huge.

An army formed in the battle to obtain its daily bread is more dangerous than a regular army ready to shoot.

The range of health services has touched bottom. Hemorrhagic dengue is winning the battle against us because of the negligence of the health authorities. And there is another menace in the saturation of latrines in the hills, that the insalubrity that it generates only is compensated by the capacity of our organisms to generate antibodies, exposed every day to a dirty city full of trash.

Education seems no longer to be an option of progress in the country, because the children take classes on the bare ground, in schools with just one teacher, and that's when there are classes.

Recognition by the international community doesn't matter. What will come will be because God wants it so. This is what those who insist that this government should be a simple prolongation of the de facto regime are betting. Those responsible for foreign policy, when they express something in this respect, do so in response to the questions of reporters in a casual interview, where each phrase is a passionate reaction, and in each one can be divined as a challenge to the international community; as if it would not matter that Honduras, despite its fragility, remains on the margin of the international community.

One year after the Coup d'Etat and the problems are bad and worse. With a government, that is, yes, casual.

Translated from the original published June 28 in La Tribuna.