The Vice Minister of Security, Armando Calidonio, announced the formal addition of the Japanese model of community policing, called Koban, as part of the National Police training and continuing education. As part of the announcement, the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) turned over a manual on Koban, elaborated from the experiences of the military police of Sao Paulo implementation, La Tribuna reported. The JICA funded program is scheduled to run through the end of 2011.
So what is Koban? Literally it means "police box". The Honduran press is taking it slightly out of context as standing for the whole model of Japanese community policing, when its only one part of it. Japanese community policing consists of police boxes (koban) and residential police boxes (chuzaisho). The Japanese National Police published a good description of the system in English here, and its from this description that the rest of this article is sourced.
With koban, the idea is in urban areas to have a small number of police officers in every neighborhood, 24/7, working shifts that include standing watch at a small, neighborhood station, walking street patrols, and going door to door talking to people. The Japanese National Police hold that this is advantageous in preventing crime, a big concern in Honduras today.
Koban are urban police boxes, deployed at the neighborhood level, with from 1 to 10 police officers who work 8 hour shifts at the police box. Residential police boxes are deployed in rural areas where a single police officer lives with his family. These officers work a single shift, but are on-call to residents at all other times.
In Japan, the basic duties of a police officer posted to a koban include standing watch, which consists of either sitting in the police box or standing outside it, and field duties of going on patrol, which includes questioning people, and performing door to door visits with houses and businesses to inform the community. Typically an officer will do both kinds of duties on a single watch. These duties are interrupted by having to deal with accidents and crimes.
It's difficult to see how this community policing model can be applied in Honduras, since several factors the Japanese police identify as essential for its success aren't true in the Honduran case.
One such essential is that there already be good security conditions. Koban, according to the Japanese National Police, only work in areas that are already safe. They are particularly vulnerable to terror attacks and vandalism. This would seem to leave out large parts of Honduras, where narco-terrorism is already an admitted problem.
Another essential is that there need to be quality officers with a good relationship with community residents. Since the model involves police coming into direct contact with residents on a daily basis, it is the behavior of the local police that comes to tinge the perception of all police by the community. Officers posted to community policing come under direct supervision of their superiors less often and thus need quality training to work independently. Without the emphasis on the quality and honesty of the recruits, this would be a foucauldian recipe for social disaster, a panopticon placing everyone under surveillance.
This is where I think the system might have promise in application to Honduras. By improving the quality of police recruits, training them well, eliminating those who are corrupt, or cannot maintain good community relations, Honduras will have a police force that is more well respected both at home and abroad, one that can contribute to a greater community sense of security.
That's the real goal of Koban.
Saturday, November 13, 2010
Thursday, November 11, 2010
Strange Coincidences
On Saturday, the Special Anti-Kidnapping Unit (GEAS in Spanish, Grupo Especial AntiSecuestro) of the National Police announced they had rescued a kidnapped cousin of Porfirio Lobo Sosa.
Mario Filberto Moya Lobo was kidnapped October 16, 2010 near Catacamas, Olancho. According to El Heraldo, Moya Lobo was being held on a hacienda in the mountains of La Zarzaloza, Ocotillal, in the Municipio of Patuca, Olancho. After being freed, he was returned by the police to Catacamas.
Also involved in the operation were elements of the Colombian Special Anti-Kidnapping unit of the Army, the Gaula, who are in Honduras to train its National Police. The Gaula groups specialize in breaking up criminal groups. El Heraldo reported that they have helped free 11 Hondurans kidnapped so far. The National Police spokesperson went to great lengths to explain that their role was only advisory, that this was a domestic operation.
According to La Tribuna, no one was captured during the rescue, but the Anti-Kidnapping Police were left there to "comb the countryside" to find those responsible.
Thursday morning, six bodies (seven in some reports) turned up in one small aldea in Olancho.
All six bodies were found in Ocotillal, Municipio of Patuca, Olancho, where the operation that freed Moya Lobo was carried out.
Every press account agrees they were some of those involved in the kidnapping of Moya Lobo. CODEH, the non-governmental human rights organization headed by Andres Pavon, has indicated the National Police are responsible for the deaths of these individuals. The National Police deny responsibility, explicitly stating they detained no one, and report they've opened a special investigation.
Its not the first time the Special Anti-Kidnapping Unit of the National Police has been embroiled in controversy. On November 1 a member of the unit, stationed in La Ceiba, was captured while kidnapping a San Pedro Sula businessman in San Pedro Sula.
The same officer's police-issued gun had been found in a car belonging to kidnappers "a few years ago", but "nothing came of it."
To hear the National Police tell it, it was just a coincidence that the Anti-Kidnapping Unit was combing the area where the six or seven bodies turned up, all on a single hacienda in the aldea of Ocotillal, Patuca, Olancho.
A coincidence that strains credulity, don't you think?
Mario Filberto Moya Lobo was kidnapped October 16, 2010 near Catacamas, Olancho. According to El Heraldo, Moya Lobo was being held on a hacienda in the mountains of La Zarzaloza, Ocotillal, in the Municipio of Patuca, Olancho. After being freed, he was returned by the police to Catacamas.
Also involved in the operation were elements of the Colombian Special Anti-Kidnapping unit of the Army, the Gaula, who are in Honduras to train its National Police. The Gaula groups specialize in breaking up criminal groups. El Heraldo reported that they have helped free 11 Hondurans kidnapped so far. The National Police spokesperson went to great lengths to explain that their role was only advisory, that this was a domestic operation.
According to La Tribuna, no one was captured during the rescue, but the Anti-Kidnapping Police were left there to "comb the countryside" to find those responsible.
Thursday morning, six bodies (seven in some reports) turned up in one small aldea in Olancho.
All six bodies were found in Ocotillal, Municipio of Patuca, Olancho, where the operation that freed Moya Lobo was carried out.
Every press account agrees they were some of those involved in the kidnapping of Moya Lobo. CODEH, the non-governmental human rights organization headed by Andres Pavon, has indicated the National Police are responsible for the deaths of these individuals. The National Police deny responsibility, explicitly stating they detained no one, and report they've opened a special investigation.
Its not the first time the Special Anti-Kidnapping Unit of the National Police has been embroiled in controversy. On November 1 a member of the unit, stationed in La Ceiba, was captured while kidnapping a San Pedro Sula businessman in San Pedro Sula.
The same officer's police-issued gun had been found in a car belonging to kidnappers "a few years ago", but "nothing came of it."
To hear the National Police tell it, it was just a coincidence that the Anti-Kidnapping Unit was combing the area where the six or seven bodies turned up, all on a single hacienda in the aldea of Ocotillal, Patuca, Olancho.
A coincidence that strains credulity, don't you think?
Cold Hard Facts
What were economic conditions like in Honduras before and during the Zelaya administration? what are they like now?
Don't look to US media for the answers to these questions. The only attention US media paid to Honduras during the Zelaya administration was framed in terms of US political interests: would Honduras remain the faithful dependent ally it had been, or would engagement with ALBA allow the country to establish an independent course guided by its own social interests? US media were pre-destined to cover the coup and its aftermath as a story of global power struggle between US interests and those of ALBA.
But as we have emphasized since the beginning, drawing on Honduran scholarship and reporting in Honduran news media and governmental and international sources of information, the Zelaya administration, and the coup that removed it, had a lot more to do with combating the conditions of economic inequality in the country, and experiencing push-back from those whose interests were not served.
So it is especially gratifying to see a mainstream English-language newspaper cover the economic context. Of course, it has to be a British paper. Jonathan Glennie, writing in the Guardian's "Poverty Matters Blog", has a terrific article that lays out the economic facts.
Let's summarize:
before the start of Zelaya's term:
2001: 60% of the population lived below the poverty line
2005: this number reached 66% of the population living below the poverty line
2005: urban unemployment stood at 6.5%
2005 data show that 47% of income was earned by the 10% of the population; 2.1% of the income was earned by the bottom 10%.
during the Zelaya administration:
2006 data show that 42.4% of income was earned by the 10% of the population; 2.5% of the income was earned by the bottom 10%.
In 2007, urban unemployment had declined to 4%
By 2007, the proportion of those living below the poverty line dropped to 60.2%
The minimum wage was increased over 60%.
School lunches were extended to 200,000 more children (a 25% increase).
Over the first three years of the Zelaya administration, economic growth averaged 5.6%
since the coup that illegally removed Honduras' president:
The economy contracted -3% in the year following the coup.
This kind of analysis-- no matter how it is substantiated, including with citation of Millennium Challenge Corporation data-- normally brings out the worst in commentators on this blog, who use weird anecdotal arguments to counter national and international, objective, data, and try to muddy the overall picture by selecting one or another of their favorite scandals and claiming it counters all the data confirming that Zelaya was good for the Honduran economy and was effecting modest decreases in economic inequality.
(We particularly like the commentators who cite the cost to maintain ex-President Zelaya's horse. Definitely on a par with the current right wing media claims that President Obama's trip to India is costing $2 billion.)
But the numbers don't lie.
So bravo to the Guardian for providing one of the first serious economic analyses in mainstream English-language media of the economics of the Zelaya administration.
Don't look to US media for the answers to these questions. The only attention US media paid to Honduras during the Zelaya administration was framed in terms of US political interests: would Honduras remain the faithful dependent ally it had been, or would engagement with ALBA allow the country to establish an independent course guided by its own social interests? US media were pre-destined to cover the coup and its aftermath as a story of global power struggle between US interests and those of ALBA.
But as we have emphasized since the beginning, drawing on Honduran scholarship and reporting in Honduran news media and governmental and international sources of information, the Zelaya administration, and the coup that removed it, had a lot more to do with combating the conditions of economic inequality in the country, and experiencing push-back from those whose interests were not served.
So it is especially gratifying to see a mainstream English-language newspaper cover the economic context. Of course, it has to be a British paper. Jonathan Glennie, writing in the Guardian's "Poverty Matters Blog", has a terrific article that lays out the economic facts.
Let's summarize:
before the start of Zelaya's term:
2001: 60% of the population lived below the poverty line
2005: this number reached 66% of the population living below the poverty line
2005: urban unemployment stood at 6.5%
2005 data show that 47% of income was earned by the 10% of the population; 2.1% of the income was earned by the bottom 10%.
during the Zelaya administration:
2006 data show that 42.4% of income was earned by the 10% of the population; 2.5% of the income was earned by the bottom 10%.
In 2007, urban unemployment had declined to 4%
By 2007, the proportion of those living below the poverty line dropped to 60.2%
The minimum wage was increased over 60%.
School lunches were extended to 200,000 more children (a 25% increase).
Over the first three years of the Zelaya administration, economic growth averaged 5.6%
since the coup that illegally removed Honduras' president:
The economy contracted -3% in the year following the coup.
This kind of analysis-- no matter how it is substantiated, including with citation of Millennium Challenge Corporation data-- normally brings out the worst in commentators on this blog, who use weird anecdotal arguments to counter national and international, objective, data, and try to muddy the overall picture by selecting one or another of their favorite scandals and claiming it counters all the data confirming that Zelaya was good for the Honduran economy and was effecting modest decreases in economic inequality.
(We particularly like the commentators who cite the cost to maintain ex-President Zelaya's horse. Definitely on a par with the current right wing media claims that President Obama's trip to India is costing $2 billion.)
But the numbers don't lie.
So bravo to the Guardian for providing one of the first serious economic analyses in mainstream English-language media of the economics of the Zelaya administration.
Sunday, November 7, 2010
IHMA to Hondurans: What Emergency
Beans are sky high. Today's price is $1.26 a pound, or 120 lempiras for 5 pounds. You will recall that in July, beans sold for $0.47 a pound.
When we last checked in on the bean crisis in Honduras, it was to report that the Finance Minister, William Chong Wong, had not, more than 30 days after the declaration of a crisis by President Lobo's Council of Ministers, released the money to the Instituto Hondureño de Mercadeo Agricola (IHMA) to purchase beans on the international market to improve supplies and drive the price back down. That was the goal of the emergency decree.
Yesterday, the head of IHMA, Carlos Girón Ayala, announced that Chong Wong had released 20 million lempiras to IHMA, more than authorized in the decree, to buy 60,000 quintals of beans and 100,000 quintals of corn to guarantee the national supply of both foodstuffs.
Girón Ayala announced that the corn purchases had already started last Friday, and that the bean purchases would begin in 15 to 20 days, when producers begin the new harvest in Honduras. Girón Ayala announced he already has 30,000 quintals of beans which he is distributing to BANASUPRO. That should be more than enough to keep BANASUPRO supplied until the new harvest comes in.
So, the money will go to national bean producers, not international grain merchants, which makes sense as part of a national economic plan. However, it is also misleading. IMHA would be buying those beans anyhow as part of its mission. IMHA buys beans every year during the postrera harvest, so there's nothing extraordinary about it. It's business as usual, not an emergency purchase.
This purchase will have no impact on the elevated prices people are paying for beans, which was one of the announced goals of the emergency decree.
It won't increase supplies; the postrera harvest will do that by itself. From an economic standpoint, this is actually the worst time for IHMA to make a purchase in the domestic market, at the high side of a predictable downward curve. Bean prices will be starting to come down as the harvest begins to appear on the market, but they'll still be much higher than they will be in a few weeks, once the harvest is finished. The purchase will serve, IHMA hopes, to guarantee supplies to BANASUPRO over the coming year.
So the message of Girón Ayala's announcement today is, if you're Honduran and you eat beans, you'll continue to suffer high prices until the harvest of the postrera crop improves the supply and brings the market price down. The government isn't going to do anything to solve the problem; instead it is waiting for the harvest to do that. There is no emergency to be solved that time alone won't deal with well enough.
When we last checked in on the bean crisis in Honduras, it was to report that the Finance Minister, William Chong Wong, had not, more than 30 days after the declaration of a crisis by President Lobo's Council of Ministers, released the money to the Instituto Hondureño de Mercadeo Agricola (IHMA) to purchase beans on the international market to improve supplies and drive the price back down. That was the goal of the emergency decree.
Yesterday, the head of IHMA, Carlos Girón Ayala, announced that Chong Wong had released 20 million lempiras to IHMA, more than authorized in the decree, to buy 60,000 quintals of beans and 100,000 quintals of corn to guarantee the national supply of both foodstuffs.
Girón Ayala announced that the corn purchases had already started last Friday, and that the bean purchases would begin in 15 to 20 days, when producers begin the new harvest in Honduras. Girón Ayala announced he already has 30,000 quintals of beans which he is distributing to BANASUPRO. That should be more than enough to keep BANASUPRO supplied until the new harvest comes in.
So, the money will go to national bean producers, not international grain merchants, which makes sense as part of a national economic plan. However, it is also misleading. IMHA would be buying those beans anyhow as part of its mission. IMHA buys beans every year during the postrera harvest, so there's nothing extraordinary about it. It's business as usual, not an emergency purchase.
This purchase will have no impact on the elevated prices people are paying for beans, which was one of the announced goals of the emergency decree.
It won't increase supplies; the postrera harvest will do that by itself. From an economic standpoint, this is actually the worst time for IHMA to make a purchase in the domestic market, at the high side of a predictable downward curve. Bean prices will be starting to come down as the harvest begins to appear on the market, but they'll still be much higher than they will be in a few weeks, once the harvest is finished. The purchase will serve, IHMA hopes, to guarantee supplies to BANASUPRO over the coming year.
So the message of Girón Ayala's announcement today is, if you're Honduran and you eat beans, you'll continue to suffer high prices until the harvest of the postrera crop improves the supply and brings the market price down. The government isn't going to do anything to solve the problem; instead it is waiting for the harvest to do that. There is no emergency to be solved that time alone won't deal with well enough.
Saturday, November 6, 2010
Honduras Is Open For Business
Porfirio Lobo Sosa is going to Denver on Sunday, returning Tuesday night. He reportedly told a reporter for La Tribuna that he's going to hold discussions there with the Millennium Challenge Corpration and to talk about energy.
On Monday, November 8, Lobo Sosa will also give a talk in Denver entitled
The Chamber of the Americas is a private non-profit that facilitates US companies doing business in Latin America. In July, 2010, they sponsored a visit by US businesses to Honduras and were received by Lobo Sosa at the presidential palace in Tegucigalpa.
The slogan "Honduras is open for business" is the message developed by the Foundation for Investment and Development of Exports (FIDE) in Honduras after the 2009 coup. It complements their program, "Honduras Si Exporta" to promote Honduran goods abroad. FIDE was created by US AID in 1984. It is run by Hondurans but funding comes from US AID.
Lobo Sosa has given several talks to business associations in the United States. His April, 2010 talk in New Orleans was also strangely reported in the Honduran press. In September, 2010, a "Honduras is Open for Business" event was held in New Orleans a week after Lobo Sosa visited.
Lobo Sosa seems to like being away from Honduras. In June, he had already made 13 trips. He was preparing to embark on a multi-week stay in South Africa for the World Cup Soccer Match, a trip which ultimately would cost the country more than 2 million lempiras. Each trip seems to involve travel with multiple Ministers. The trip to Denver includes 17 people. Each of these foreign trips involves significant cost to the Honduran people. Because of the budget crisis, he has just asked all his Ministers to provide detailed reports of any trips abroad, including their purpose and what was achieved.
Perhaps Lobo Sosa should provide the same travel justifications to the Honduran people.
On Monday, November 8, Lobo Sosa will also give a talk in Denver entitled
Honduras Is Open For Businessat the Americas Presidential Forum Breakfast, hosted by the Chamber of the Americas at the Crowne Plaza Hotel. At this talk the President of Metropolitan State College of Denver will present Lobo Sosa with a "Token of Appreciation". According to the college's press release, also attending will be 17 "Honduran" dignitaries, including Foreign Minister Mario Canahuati and U.S. Ambassador Hugo Llorens.
The Chamber of the Americas is a private non-profit that facilitates US companies doing business in Latin America. In July, 2010, they sponsored a visit by US businesses to Honduras and were received by Lobo Sosa at the presidential palace in Tegucigalpa.
The slogan "Honduras is open for business" is the message developed by the Foundation for Investment and Development of Exports (FIDE) in Honduras after the 2009 coup. It complements their program, "Honduras Si Exporta" to promote Honduran goods abroad. FIDE was created by US AID in 1984. It is run by Hondurans but funding comes from US AID.
Lobo Sosa has given several talks to business associations in the United States. His April, 2010 talk in New Orleans was also strangely reported in the Honduran press. In September, 2010, a "Honduras is Open for Business" event was held in New Orleans a week after Lobo Sosa visited.
Lobo Sosa seems to like being away from Honduras. In June, he had already made 13 trips. He was preparing to embark on a multi-week stay in South Africa for the World Cup Soccer Match, a trip which ultimately would cost the country more than 2 million lempiras. Each trip seems to involve travel with multiple Ministers. The trip to Denver includes 17 people. Each of these foreign trips involves significant cost to the Honduran people. Because of the budget crisis, he has just asked all his Ministers to provide detailed reports of any trips abroad, including their purpose and what was achieved.
Perhaps Lobo Sosa should provide the same travel justifications to the Honduran people.
Friday, November 5, 2010
Transparency and Corruption in the Ministry of Culture
Minister of Culture Bernard Martínez was the first of more than 40 government officials called before the Instituto de Acceso a la Información Pública (IAIP), to explain the low ranking on transparency attained by his ministry.
The IAIP is charged with monitoring compliance with Article 13 of the Law of Transparency. Government offices are required by this law to publish 19 categories of information, including salaries and disbursals of budgeted funds. According to press reports on this year's review, 75% of the score awarded to each unit is for compliance with the law; 20 additional points are awarded for management, and the final 5 for reporting.
The Ministry of Culture initially managed to receive a perfect score-- zero.
Martínez, in his testimony, said that since the initial report, he has taken steps to improve the level of public access to information, so that now his ministry would register 15%. He blamed the low degree of transparency on "technical problems out of his hands" . Saying these are now resolved, he expressed hope that his ministry would now provide all the public information it is required to by law.
Martínez has had a rocky history at the Ministry of Culture. In September, he claimed that his vice minister for sports, Godofredo Fajardo, tried to bribe him (with 100,000 lempiras, not quite $6000) to step down and leave Fajardo clear to take over. The carrot of the bribe was followed by a stick: a vaguely worded threat that if he did not resign, there would be consequences, specifically, a campaign to discredit him.
Fajardo responded, calling Martínez a "crazy person". On the other hand, his basis for denying Martínez' claim seems to be that the reported level of the bribe was too low for someone "sitting on millions of lempiras", which hardly gives the impression he is above thinking about the job as an opportunity for his own profit.
But the story is even more complicated. News reports in September said that Martínez made his accusation of Fajardo
The union also complained that Martínez hired as legal counsel people without the proper educational qualifications. The union has tried to publicize irregular hiring of personnel lacking legally mandated credentials before. At issue more generally is the use of contract consultants who are apparently quite generously compensated, information that would have had to be disclosed if the Ministry had managed any transparency in operations.
Fajardo said that 90% of the budget of the division of Culture and Arts has been spent on salaries and per diem to contracted employees, so that Martínez had to divert funds from Sports (his own vice ministry) to supplement the budget of Culture and Arts.
Echoing the complaints of the union, Fajardo traced his conflict with Martínez to his dismissal of someone unqualified to a position that required recognition by the Honduran College of Lawyers. According to Fajardo, his order was countermanded verbally by Martínez, so as not to leave a record in print of this action.
Claims of corruption in the Ministry of Culture were first made by Martínez himself in February. As reported then, the ministry could not account for over $8 million dollars worth of funding. Martínez blamed administrative disorganization under the Micheletti regime (although he kept on key personnel from that regime). That drew a sharp and defensive response from Micheletti's minion at Culture, Myrna Castro.
The latest reports about possible corruption, published earlier this week, have Martínez saying that
Fajardo isn't the only one in trouble at Culture. Claims of corruption published some time ago on the resistance website, Vos el Soberano named others accused of profiting from the lack of transparency at the Ministry. Prominent in this alternative medium was the name of Tony Sierra, Vice Minister for Culture and the Arts.
Friday, Sierra made it into the mainstream Honduran media: El Tiempo reports from the city of La Ceiba on the Caribbean coast:
Now, it isn't alleged that Sierra wanted the funds for himself. According to Tiempo, he wanted to
But critics note that the fundraiser was specifically for the survivors of those who died in this event. People who donated did so for them, not to fund some sort of bureaucratic process.
That's part of what transparency means: what you say you will do is what you do; you don't say one thing and do another.
Trust that the Ministry of Culture will do the right thing is obviously low-- the artists' guild called for the results of the telethon to be verified by an outside auditor.
Meanwhile, despite raising its score on transparency by 15%, other reports suggest that the Ministry of Culture is not out of trouble yet.
Proceso Digital included it on a list of ministries asked by Lobo Sosa to submit a written report of foreign travel, explaining what the business purpose of each trip was.
That's one of the other problems with a lack of transparency: it gives the impression that there is something to hide.
The IAIP is charged with monitoring compliance with Article 13 of the Law of Transparency. Government offices are required by this law to publish 19 categories of information, including salaries and disbursals of budgeted funds. According to press reports on this year's review, 75% of the score awarded to each unit is for compliance with the law; 20 additional points are awarded for management, and the final 5 for reporting.
The Ministry of Culture initially managed to receive a perfect score-- zero.
Martínez, in his testimony, said that since the initial report, he has taken steps to improve the level of public access to information, so that now his ministry would register 15%. He blamed the low degree of transparency on "technical problems out of his hands" . Saying these are now resolved, he expressed hope that his ministry would now provide all the public information it is required to by law.
Martínez has had a rocky history at the Ministry of Culture. In September, he claimed that his vice minister for sports, Godofredo Fajardo, tried to bribe him (with 100,000 lempiras, not quite $6000) to step down and leave Fajardo clear to take over. The carrot of the bribe was followed by a stick: a vaguely worded threat that if he did not resign, there would be consequences, specifically, a campaign to discredit him.
Fajardo responded, calling Martínez a "crazy person". On the other hand, his basis for denying Martínez' claim seems to be that the reported level of the bribe was too low for someone "sitting on millions of lempiras", which hardly gives the impression he is above thinking about the job as an opportunity for his own profit.
But the story is even more complicated. News reports in September said that Martínez made his accusation of Fajardo
one day after the union of employees of Culture denounced the minister for having squandered funds of the institution to pay salaries, per diem, and bonuses to outside advisors.The claim by the union was specifically that Martínez used funds received from international aid organizations, intended for specific projects, to enrich personnel hired at the ministry. The union claims the funds misused totaled 40 million lempiras (more than $2 million).
The union also complained that Martínez hired as legal counsel people without the proper educational qualifications. The union has tried to publicize irregular hiring of personnel lacking legally mandated credentials before. At issue more generally is the use of contract consultants who are apparently quite generously compensated, information that would have had to be disclosed if the Ministry had managed any transparency in operations.
Fajardo said that 90% of the budget of the division of Culture and Arts has been spent on salaries and per diem to contracted employees, so that Martínez had to divert funds from Sports (his own vice ministry) to supplement the budget of Culture and Arts.
Echoing the complaints of the union, Fajardo traced his conflict with Martínez to his dismissal of someone unqualified to a position that required recognition by the Honduran College of Lawyers. According to Fajardo, his order was countermanded verbally by Martínez, so as not to leave a record in print of this action.
Claims of corruption in the Ministry of Culture were first made by Martínez himself in February. As reported then, the ministry could not account for over $8 million dollars worth of funding. Martínez blamed administrative disorganization under the Micheletti regime (although he kept on key personnel from that regime). That drew a sharp and defensive response from Micheletti's minion at Culture, Myrna Castro.
The latest reports about possible corruption, published earlier this week, have Martínez saying that
while not continuing to confront his vice-minister Godofredo Fajardo, he hopes that the suspected cases of corruption in which [Fajardo] might be involved will be clarified.
Fajardo isn't the only one in trouble at Culture. Claims of corruption published some time ago on the resistance website, Vos el Soberano named others accused of profiting from the lack of transparency at the Ministry. Prominent in this alternative medium was the name of Tony Sierra, Vice Minister for Culture and the Arts.
Friday, Sierra made it into the mainstream Honduran media: El Tiempo reports from the city of La Ceiba on the Caribbean coast:
The artist's guild of La Ceiba denounced the vice minister of Culture, Tony Sierra, for intending to deduct 40% from the total of the funds collected in the TV/radio marathon in favor of the families of the musicians that died in the bus accident of Las Chicas Samba.(The accident that led to the telethon killed 13 people, members of three bands: Las Chicas Samba, La Raza, and Kasabe.)
Now, it isn't alleged that Sierra wanted the funds for himself. According to Tiempo, he wanted to
begin a process of strengthening, organization, and life insurance, or dedicate them for musicians who, in the future, would be in similar situations as occurred for the artists who died last October 4th.
But critics note that the fundraiser was specifically for the survivors of those who died in this event. People who donated did so for them, not to fund some sort of bureaucratic process.
That's part of what transparency means: what you say you will do is what you do; you don't say one thing and do another.
Trust that the Ministry of Culture will do the right thing is obviously low-- the artists' guild called for the results of the telethon to be verified by an outside auditor.
Meanwhile, despite raising its score on transparency by 15%, other reports suggest that the Ministry of Culture is not out of trouble yet.
Proceso Digital included it on a list of ministries asked by Lobo Sosa to submit a written report of foreign travel, explaining what the business purpose of each trip was.
That's one of the other problems with a lack of transparency: it gives the impression that there is something to hide.
Thursday, November 4, 2010
Beans 2: Moving at the speed of bureaucracy
You will recall that on October 5, the Executive branch of the Honduran government declared an emergency because of the high domestic price of beans, a staple of the Honduran diet. The high prices were supposedly due to the scarcity of beans, allegedly caused by environmental conditions in Honduras. That emergency decree authorized the government, through the Instituto Hondureño de Mercadeo Agrícola (IHMA), to purchase up to 10 million lempiras worth of beans, store them, and use them to supply the local markets.
On October 21, Vice Minister of Agriculture, Juan Angel Artica, announced the 10 million lempiras had been spent, implying the supply of beans had been secured.
It never happened.
First came the investigations that found some distributors were deliberately withholding beans from the market to drive up prices. It also came to light that there were fair quantities of beans still to be bought and brought to market in places like Olancho, though insufficient to supply the entire nation for more than 20 days. IHMA itself found it still had some beans. Still, beans kept appearing, both in the BANASUPRO stores run by the government, and in the markets. Indeed, prices dropped for a bit. though they are still quite high, around 100 lempiras for 5 pounds, or 20 lempiras a pound. BANASUPRO maintains its price at 65 lempiras for 5 pounds, but limits purchases to 5 lbs. a day.
Now, with the new harvest of beans only 7 or so days away, it has come to light that the Finance Minister, William Chong Wong, didn't tranfer the 10 million lempiras to IHMA for it to purchase any beans.
Why not, you ask?
The Council of Ministers authorized the transfer on October 5 from the funds on loan from the Banco Social de Venezuela. These funds are sitting in an account in BANADESA, the national agricultural development bank.
In the Council of Ministers' meeting yesterday, William Chong Wong said that he had not authorized the transfer of government funds because IHMA has a 14 million lempira debt with BANADESA.
Huh? How is IHMA's debt to BANADESA an excuse for not carrying out an emergency order to address a government declared crisis? It is a government declared emergency, after all, and the transfer was properly authorized. BANADESA, at the time, even offered to take IHMA further into debt, 70 million lempiras further, to fund the purchase back when the emergency decree was issued.
Emergencies don't move at the speed of William Chong Wong's bureaucracy, they need real responses in real time.
Thirty days after it recognized the problem, the Honduran government still lacks a creditable response to the bean crisis. There is no accountability.
Its the Honduran people who continue to be hurt.
On October 21, Vice Minister of Agriculture, Juan Angel Artica, announced the 10 million lempiras had been spent, implying the supply of beans had been secured.
It never happened.
First came the investigations that found some distributors were deliberately withholding beans from the market to drive up prices. It also came to light that there were fair quantities of beans still to be bought and brought to market in places like Olancho, though insufficient to supply the entire nation for more than 20 days. IHMA itself found it still had some beans. Still, beans kept appearing, both in the BANASUPRO stores run by the government, and in the markets. Indeed, prices dropped for a bit. though they are still quite high, around 100 lempiras for 5 pounds, or 20 lempiras a pound. BANASUPRO maintains its price at 65 lempiras for 5 pounds, but limits purchases to 5 lbs. a day.
Now, with the new harvest of beans only 7 or so days away, it has come to light that the Finance Minister, William Chong Wong, didn't tranfer the 10 million lempiras to IHMA for it to purchase any beans.
Why not, you ask?
The Council of Ministers authorized the transfer on October 5 from the funds on loan from the Banco Social de Venezuela. These funds are sitting in an account in BANADESA, the national agricultural development bank.
In the Council of Ministers' meeting yesterday, William Chong Wong said that he had not authorized the transfer of government funds because IHMA has a 14 million lempira debt with BANADESA.
Huh? How is IHMA's debt to BANADESA an excuse for not carrying out an emergency order to address a government declared crisis? It is a government declared emergency, after all, and the transfer was properly authorized. BANADESA, at the time, even offered to take IHMA further into debt, 70 million lempiras further, to fund the purchase back when the emergency decree was issued.
Emergencies don't move at the speed of William Chong Wong's bureaucracy, they need real responses in real time.
Thirty days after it recognized the problem, the Honduran government still lacks a creditable response to the bean crisis. There is no accountability.
Its the Honduran people who continue to be hurt.
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